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Introduction 
The protracted nature of the current global economic downturn, beginning in late 
2007 with the crash of the US credit markets and continuing on into today, suggests that 
a wider range of policy responses are now required by the international community to 
get the global economy back on an upwards trajectory of growth. Orthodox economics, 
with its disproportionate bias towards the supply-side of the economic equation, has 
proved extremely ineffectual in addressing the multitude of problems associated with 
the current global recession. In particular, the apathetic approach encapsulated by the 
neo-classical position, which asserts that the „free market‟ should be left alone to 
generate a solution to any economic downturn, has proved a highly costly ideological 
position for the global economy to follow. Fortunately however, in policy-making 
circles, a slight move away from the debilitating neo-classical supply-side position is 
now under way, giving rise to proactive policies that do not wait for the market to 
„inevitably‟ fix itself.  
It is now recognised by the policy-making community that a degree of 
governmental oversight is required over the financial markets in order to prevent 
irrational exuberance from taking over and becoming a systemic problem. This new 
policy approach is centred on the need to institute minimal safeguards in order to 
prevent a massive build-up in credit and credit-expanding financial instruments, which 
have been attributed to causing the crash of the US credit markets in late 2007.  
Conventional policy is concerned with the initiation of light regulation over 
financial market activity, in order to regulate liquidity and prevent excessive leverage 
within the financial system. It is recognised that the expansion in credit over the last 
decade was systemic and not the work of a few reckless individual institutions. 
Conventional policy-makers argue that it was the considerable expansion of credit and 
its related instruments during the decade of the 2000‟s that produced the unsustainable 
credit bubble that crashed in late 2007, leading to today‟s global recession.  
However, where the contemporary policy response comes up short is in 
providing an answer to the reasons why expanded access to credit was relied upon to 
such a disproportionate degree to stimulate economic growth in both the United States 
and the global economy at large throughout the decade of the 2000‟s. The answer to this 
question requires a wider political-economy approach, with an historical analysis that 
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extends much further than the immediate years preceding the crash. It is this wider 
historical analysis that encompasses the body of this paper. 
The contemporary policy response also suffers from the fact that it is a mere re-
tinkering of the orthodox supply-side position. It is argued by contemporary policy-
makers that top-driven financialised growth is an efficient and effective economic 
platform, which only led to a severe contraction in late 2007 due to the absence of 
minimum regulation to guide the financial markets in the right direction. The 
conventional policy position therefore does not view the system of financialisation per 
se at fault; rather it argues that the absence of sufficient regulation prevented the system 
from achieving the positive outcomes espoused by the neo-liberal position. It is argued 
that the few flaws in the financialised system, once offset by the required regulation, 
should enable economic growth to occur and the ideals of the neo-liberal economic 
position to bear fruit in material growth. 
In contrast, this paper argues that if a sustainable and effective recovery is to be 
generated out of the current recession, then far more than just a light tinkering of the 
orthodox neo-classical position is required. While the conventional approach is able to 
mitigate some of the immediate symptoms of the recent crash, a radical move away 
from the financialised system of growth inside the United States is urgently required in 
order to effectively address the root cause of the current global economic crisis. For this 
to be realised, it is vital that the scope of the current debate is widened considerably, to 
include alternative positions that do not conform to the neo-liberal consensus.  
The postwar political economy of the United States shall be re-examined in this 
paper in an effort to provide an alternative account of American economic history from 
that which has been provided by the predominant paradigm of neoliberalism. This 
alternative reading will be heavily based on the Keynesian tradition and will place its 
central focus upon conditions of demand in order to counterbalance the orthodox 
position with its disproportionate emphasis upon factors of supply. The nature of this 
undertaking means that the paper is substantially broad in its analysis. It therefore must 
be stated in advance that this paper is by no means attempting to undertake an 
exhaustive account of the entire period of US postwar economic history. Rather its aim 
is to widen the scope of contemporary economic debate by revealing that the chain of 
causation for the current recession stretches back far further than the conventional 
account has been willing to recognise in its policy analysis. 
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It is imperative that the scope of the contemporary debate is widened to include 
the historical period of the 1950s and 1960s, leading up to the decade of the 1970s. This 
is essential as the economic situation of the 1970s has often been employed as an 
empirical justification for the practical implementation of neoliberal economic policies 
from the 1980s on. This so-called „empirical‟ justification has spawned such debate-
defying statements as the T.I.N.A. slogan (There Is No Alternative) and other such 
positions, whose politicisation has dramatically confined the scope of economic debate 
within policy-making circles to the paradigm of neoliberalism. It is therefore necessary 
to go back and re-examine American postwar economic history from an alternative 
perspective, in order to determine whether in fact there was an alternative to the 
adoption of neoliberalism in the 1980s. This historical re-examination is essential for 
the contemporary policy debate, for if it is uncovered that there was an alternative to 
neoliberalism in the 1980s, that also suggests that there is an alternative to neoliberal 
policies today. This therefore means that the contemporary debate should include other 
paradigms of political economy, in order to ensure that we do not repeat the mistakes of 
the past.  
This paper posits as its central thesis the position that the substantial expansion 
in credit within the United States was employed as a necessary substitute to cover the 
dearth in global aggregate demand that has existed over the last thirty years. For the 
global economy taken as a whole, supply far outstrips demand. There are considerably 
more producers selling goods into the global economy than there are consumers who are 
able to purchase these products. Mass consumption, which the mass production of 
industrial capitalism is ultimately dependent upon, has not been extended onto the 
international stage alongside the globalisation of industrial production. This has meant 
that the consumer markets of the developed economies, especially that of the United 
States, have been overwhelmingly relied upon to purchase the goods produced by the 
growing number of exporting nations within the global economy. This disproportionate 
dependence upon American consumers has in turn inspired an expansion in credit inside 
the United States domestic economy, effectively enabling its consumers to continue to 
purchase the goods produced by the global economy at large.  
Expanding access to credit to these consumers has received an additional 
impetus from the current microeconomic formula of reducing commercial operating 
costs – including labour – to as much as possible. Often this microeconomic strategy 
involves outsourcing production away from workers who were once paid a middle class 
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income in a developed economy to the sweatshops of developing nations, where 
workers are only paid at a subsistence level and are thus unable to purchase the goods 
that are manufactured by their labour. This has resulted in a further contraction in global 
aggregate demand, leading to an increased dependence on expanded credit to stimulate 
economic growth within both the United States and the global economy taken as a 
whole.  
It is therefore clear that if regulation is to be implemented in order to curtail the 
expansion of credit, as suggested by the conventional policy response, then wider 
measures need to be devised that enable global aggregate demand to grow in order to 
replace the stimulus effect that expanded credit access has provided in recent years. 
Fortunately there is an historical model for such a capitalist economy, found in the 
structure of the American economy throughout the „Golden Age‟ period of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This historical model shall encompass the focus of the first chapter of the 
thesis.  
The application of neoliberal supply-side policies from the 1980s on has often 
been justified on the grounds that the Keynesian inspired economic structure of the 
1950s and 1960s generated a number of economic inefficiencies that later led to the 
problems experienced by the American economy during the 1970s. Chapter Two of the 
thesis challenges this neoliberal consensus by re-examining the economic situation of 
the 1970s. In particular, the chapter re-examines the relationship that existed between 
the domestically oriented economic structure of the United States with that of the 
increasingly integrated international economy from the 1970s on.  
Chapter Three will detail the ways in which the practical application of supply-
side policies further contracted the conditions of real aggregate demand inside the 
United States economy, thus exacerbating the underlying problem of the US economy 
in the contemporary period. The fourth and final chapter examines the ways in which 
credit was expanded inside the United States, along with the dependence of the US 
economy on this expanded credit in order to generate economic growth. The paper will 
conclude by exploring alternative avenues to economic recovery from that which has 
remained the convention over the last thirty years. 
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Chapter 1: Rediscovering the Golden 
Age 
 
Introduction 
The fallout from the 2008 crash of the US financial sector is threatening to have 
grave and long-lasting ramifications for both the United States and the global economy 
at large. With its financial sector mired in deep recession, the US economy needs to find 
a way to achieve economic growth that is not disproportionately centred on the 
performance of its companies on the financial markets. This is essential if the country 
wishes to avoid the trappings of the current crisis being exacerbated into a debilitating 
depression of global dimensions. Fortunately there is an historical precedent for such a 
system of economic growth. This is to be found in the productive system that 
encompassed commercial relations within the American economy during the 1950s and 
1960s.  
The twenty-five year period following the culmination of the Second World War 
till the beginning of the 1970s will be analysed in this chapter, as a means to provide an 
empirical example of an economy where growth is based on productive performance, 
not financial asset appreciation. The chapter will begin by analysing the conditions 
found within the US economy following the culmination of the Second World War. It 
will examine the industrial make-up of the US economy and analyse the influence this 
had on the system of economic growth that developed in the United States during this 
timeframe. The chapter will then analyse the role of the US government in encouraging 
the development of an economy where growth was primarily centred on the production 
of advanced technological items.  
The next section will examine the normative regime that developed amongst the 
dominant manufacturing corporations during this period. It will be argued that this 
normative regime was developed by the private sector as a means to maintain the 
essential economic conditions that were required for the production of advanced 
commercial technologies. The analysis of this normative regime will be based on 
academic literature from this period. Notably, the paper will adopt the term the 
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„planning system‟, penned by the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, as a means to 
analyse the productive system of economic growth during this period. 
 As shall be revealed in the final sections of the chapter, the kind of economic 
growth that was achieved by the American planning system was one that was primarily 
based on knowledge and innovation. It was a capitalist system of economic growth that 
utilised the productive power of the country‟s public sector, along with providing an 
essential role for organised labour within its commercial system. Moreover it was one 
that reduced industrial corporations‟ dependence to as much as possible on the 
potentially disruptive financial sector.  
 Thus the following analysis of the American economy in the 1950s and 1960s 
provides an empirical example of an economic model where growth was achieved 
through productive innovation rather than financial speculation. As such, this period 
serves as a useful contrast to the financialised economy of the United States today. It is 
therefore essential that this period is analysed and lessons learned from the United 
States‟ economic history, if there is to be established an effective form of capitalist 
growth-generation that is not dependent upon the „trickle-down‟ investment of a 
financial sector that is currently stifled by a serious recession. 
 
The Post-war US Economy 
The years 1950 through to 1969 are now affectionately referred to as the Golden Age 
years of the American economy. This is an endearment enacted to describe the 
consistently impressive levels of economic growth that were achieved during this 
period. According to the scholar Robert Reich, “from the end of World War II to the 
mid-1970s the pay and benefits of the American workforce grew, on average 2.5 – 3 
percent each year, in tandem with productivity growth. Between 1947 and 1973, real 
median family income doubled, as did the value of what the typical American worker 
produced”.1 A number of factors can be attributed to the prevalence of these highly 
impressive growth levels, not the least of which is the fortuitous set of economic 
circumstances the country found itself in following the culmination of the Second 
World War.  
                                                             
1
 Robert Reich, Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and Everyday Life, New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, P.36 
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 Emerging as the only advanced capitalist nation to have its economic 
infrastructure in strong working health following the war, the United States was from 
the beginning of the period, placed at a considerable competitive advantage over that of 
the other advanced industrial economies. Indeed, while the economic infrastructure of 
the Western European nations had been largely decimated by the destruction of war, 
that of the United States had remained not only intact, but also importantly, significantly 
modernised by the mobilisation effort initiated during the war years.  
The federal government, operating under the rubric of New Deal policies, 
occupied a pre-eminent position in generating the economic development that was 
instigated under this mobilisation initiative.  In the United States, mobilisation was 
achieved through the awarding of government contracts to the established 
manufacturing corporations operating throughout the economy. This was undertaken in 
an effort to utilise existing infrastructure in order to quickly and efficiently engineer the 
armaments required for successful engagement in the ensuing global conflict. In 
consequence, the US government adopted the vital role of maintaining aggregate 
demand during the war years, providing a stable customer for the country‟s large 
corporations and thus filling the market vacuum that had opened up due to the 
depressed levels of consumer spending throughout this period. 
Since a large number of these government contracts included a considerable 
R&D component, (initiated under the recognition that victory would be achieved by 
technological supremacy rather than sheer force) American industry underwent a 
considerable technological advancement during this period. In addition, the 
maintenance of relatively high employment levels during the war, an outcome of the 
government‟s efforts to maintain adequate aggregate demand, enabled American 
households to achieve a substantial level of individual savings. Thus once the war was 
over, sufficient liquid capital (earned cash through accumulated savings) existed within 
the economy to enable a consumption boom to quickly embrace the American economy. 
This created the conditions enabling the country‟s manufacturers to quickly re-orient 
themselves back to the civilian economy, a re-direction further facilitated through the 
utilisation of technological advancements developed during the preceding period. As 
such, recently developed technologies were utilised to innovate and redesign existing 
consumer goods (such as automobiles), while also enabling the manufacture of new 
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electronic goods, marketed towards the ordinary household needs of American 
consumers.
2
 
This development can clearly be seen in the example of the traditionally 
important economic sector of car manufacturers. Here, it was possible, following the 
“serious erosion of cars during the war and in the general forward surge of the aftermath 
boom… [for] automobilization, with all its multifarious ramifications, [to] once again 
become a major stimulus” within the American economy. In turn this generated demand 
for the inputs of other American industries, precipitating a massive stimulus spin-off 
effect.
3
 
 
The Post-War US Corporation 
With such prevailing post-war domestic economic conditions, pre-existing US 
corporations faced few barriers indeed to economic growth. In addition, the likelihood 
that new commercial competitors would develop to contest their dominance within their 
respective fields was significantly reduced. This was namely due to the massive size of 
the dominant corporations, who were accumulating a vast store of capital and resources 
through the consumption-driven boom underway during that time. This thus provided 
them with the means to withstand any attack by a newcomer to their industry.  
Furthermore, their market position had been symbolically strengthened by the 
establishment of recognised brands by the dominant companies. Through advertising, 
brand identification was a factor rapidly increasing in influence, especially with the 
introduction of the medium of television in the 1950‟s. On top of all this, the vast sums 
of capital required to acquire the type of technology utilised in the production 
undertaken by the dominant corporations, effectively precluded the possibility of a new 
firm entering an established industry on a competitive footing. 
The lack of serious competition for the dominant corporations was further 
compounded by the near-total absence of foreign competitors vying for market share 
within the US domestic economy. As previously mentioned, the main international 
rivals of American industry were temporarily incapacitated by the massive destruction 
of infrastructure during the Second World War.  Thus with virtually no foreign 
                                                             
2
 Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweeny, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social 
Order, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966, P.176 
3 Ibid, P.236 
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competition to contend with, and the prospects for the emergence of commercially 
viable domestic competitors markedly slim, what tended to develop within each 
established industry was the emergence of three or four large firms dominating each 
industry, typically with one giant corporation enjoying the largest market-share.  
 
The Role of Government in the Post-War Economy 
In the post-war Truman administration, there was significant debate on the role 
of government and how its policies would be employed to influence the subsequent 
character and development of the US economy. It was decided by the administration 
that rather than place limits on the growth of large corporations and thus engineer more 
competition within the economy (a position with its precedent in the break-up of 
Standard Oil in the nineteenth century and the ensuing anti-trust movement), 
government would utilise the enormous economic power of the giant corporations and 
direct this in a manner that was both productive and profitable for the nation‟s economy 
as a whole. As can be seen, this was largely in keeping within the direction that 
developed during the war years, where the government would ensure that economic 
gains would be distributed in a fairly equitable fashion, following the directive of the 
New Deal policies, while further ensuring a stable customer for a large number of 
corporations via the granting of governmental research contracts, a position that was 
progressively able to be facilitated under the imperative to maintain technological 
advancement. Indeed the prerogative to maintain technological supremacy derived 
increasing importance during this period, as the demands of the Cold War quickly 
occupied the political objectives of the succeeding administrations. 
Thus while military spending was high during the years of the Cold War, a large 
chunk of this government spending was distributed to the private sector in the form of 
contracts for the development of advanced technology. An example of this can clearly 
be seen with the sensitive technological sector of nuclear energy. Here, while the 
“Atomic Energy Commission still controlled much of atomic power, major research 
was carried on by such firms as Westinghouse, General Electric, and North American, 
while privately owned utilities accounted for most of the commercial uses of atomic 
energy”. Likewise, with the race to space involved with the Government department of 
NASA, “space exploration was initiated and carried on by the government”. But this 
was largely achieved “through large contracts given to private firms such as McDonnell 
Corporation, North American, Litton Industries, Grumman and many others”. 
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Moreover, the “use of satellites for communication, first explored by government 
agencies, was carried out by a government-created but private firm, Communications 
Satellite Corporation”.4  
All of these examples point to the vital role of the government in creating the 
conditions conducive for technology-centred corporations to engage in the otherwise 
risky endeavour of innovative research in the development of advanced technological 
equipment. This development experience further provided them with the means to adapt 
these technologies into commercially viable household products. For example military 
research into radio heat waves was largely responsible for the technology behind the 
microwave oven.  
A unique feature of the political-economy of post-war America was the welfare 
orientation of the system, whereby benefits were primarily distributed through the 
private sector, operating as conditions tied to employment in one of the large 
corporations dominating the country‟s industrial landscape. This indeed signified a 
unique development, especially as it occurred in the era of the welfare state, a 
development that encompassed the vast majority of other advanced capitalist nations 
during this timeframe.  This is not to say that there was no welfare state development at 
all within the American economy. Indeed the policies instituted under the New Deal of 
the 1940‟s heavily argue against any such assertion. Nevertheless, it is arguably clear 
that welfare state development in the succeeding post-war period was significantly 
stifled, when compared to that of the other advanced capitalist nations. This was an 
historical outcome that was enabled by the fortunate economic conditions the country‟s 
corporations encountered in the immediate post-war period. For as they enjoyed high 
aggregate demand levels, private firms could easily afford to pay for such benefits, 
utilising them as a means to attract the most productive workers. In addition, the high 
employment levels prevalent during this period ensured that private sector distribution 
would reach the great majority of American citizens.  
Thus the mixed system that developed in the United States was something of an 
anomaly, when compared to that of the other advanced capitalist countries. Instead of 
the development of a strong welfare state with the means to counter the destabilising 
tendencies of the open market, the United States developed a governmental system that 
can be more accurately depicted as a loose safety net. This key difference is clearly 
                                                             
4
 Robert Sobel, The Age of Giant Corporations: A Microeconomic History of American Business 1914-
1970, Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972, P.179  
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demonstrated by the fact that in the western European economies, those in wont of work 
received an unemployment benefit, while those in the US were entitled to an 
unemployment insurance package, largely existing as a short-term stop-gap measure, 
granted with the expectation that the recipient would quickly recover work, in line with 
the favourable employment conditions that prevailed during that period.  
Nevertheless, in the absence of adequate state protection from the inherent 
instabilities of the market system, the private sector itself came to coordinate a rough 
system of normative behaviour, intended both to enhance and protect the power of the 
productive economy, being at the time primarily composed of manufacturing industries. 
This was achieved through a number of initiatives designed to shield their business 
practices as much as possible from the disruptive forces of the free market. It is to this 
interesting set of circumstances, peculiar to the US economy in the historical era of the 
Golden Age that we now turn. 
 
“Co-respective Competition” 
Owing to the existence of three to four large corporate firms dominating each 
industrial sector, with each firm occupying relatively entrenched market positions, any 
attempt at unilateral price reduction by any of the major firms would prove counter-
productive for all concerned. For if one company lowered its price, all would be forced 
to follow suit, with the end result being that each company would still have the same 
market share, but now at reduced revenue, due to the successive downscaling of price 
for their product during the escalating price war. As a result, the major corporations 
adopted alternative means of competing for market share within their respective 
industries. This included “advertising, research and development of new product 
varieties, [and the inclusion of] extra services”.  During the Golden Age, these 
alternative methods came to constitute “the usual means of fighting for market shares”. 
In addition, they tended “to yield results in proportion to the amounts spent on them”.  
The major industrial firms of the time thus engaged in complicit (yet widely 
accepted) norms to refrain from aggressive price reduction as a competitive strategy. 
This acceptance was termed “corespective competition” by the scholar Joseph 
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Schumpter.
5
 Complicit acceptance was deemed a necessity, as any open practice of this 
policy would constitute illegal activity under the prevailing antitrust legislation that 
governed commercial relations during this period.  
In order to remain under the radar of the regulating authorities, this complicit 
consent at tacit price coordination appeared in a number of forms. The most prevalent 
measure was that which was identified by the scholars Paul A. Baran and Paul M. 
Sweeny in their research during this period. According to these scholars, the complicit 
consent to roughly coordinate prices reached “its most developed form in what is known 
as „price leadership‟”.  Under this system, each firm competing within the industry 
accepts the price maintained by the leading firm as the prevailing price for that specific 
industrial product. The „leader‟ is defined as “the largest and most powerful firm in the 
industry – such as U.S. Steel or General Motors”.  The others accept this price as the 
industry standard, an understanding reached in awareness that if it ever came to a 
competitive price war, the „leader‟ holds the sufficient size and internal revenue to out-
compete all concerned.
6
 
Importantly, the system also accommodates an inducement that serves to 
discourage the „leader‟ from engaging in any competitive price reduction strategy. This 
is important as the leader occupies a position that would otherwise embody a 
destabilising factor, which in turn would exist to deter the institutionalisation of this 
normative regime. This inducement involves the desire by the „leader‟ to avoid any 
activity that could be interpreted by the courts to denote an attempt to acquire a 
monopoly share over a specific market.  Aggressive short-term price competition, if 
undertaken by the „leader‟, with the greatest share of resources at its disposal (and thus 
likely to be the sole survivor if such a strategy was followed to the full) could well 
indeed constitute such activity.
7
 
An example of the restraint exercised by the industrial „leaders‟ of post-war 
America can clearly be seen in the behaviour of General Motors within the automobile 
industry. At the time, a number of “analysts believed that General Motors set its prices 
so as to enable Ford and Chrysler – not to mention the smaller firms – to compete 
successfully. Through this approach, “General Motors tried to gain a twenty-percent 
                                                             
5 James Crotly, ‘The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact of Destructive Product Market Competition and 
‘Modern’ Financial Markets on Non-Financial Corporations Performance’ in Gerald A. Epstein, 
Financialisation and the World Economy, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005 
6
  Baran and Sweeny, Monopoly Capital, PP 69-70 
7 Ibid 
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return on equity, a higher rate than was the practice at Ford or Chrysler. Should it lower 
prices, the argument went, the other firms would be forced into dissolution or mergers, 
in which case the Justice Department would try to dismember General Motors”. As a 
result, General Motors was able to erect a price umbrella over the market price of 
automobiles, “in much the same way that U.S. Steel used a similar device in Steel 
during the early twentieth century”.8 
It must be said that there were notable exceptions to this rule. According to 
Baran and Sweeny, these exceptions are “particularly likely to arise in a new industry 
where all firms are jockeying for position and no reasonably stable pattern of market 
sharing has yet taken place”.9  Typically, in newly-emerging industries, a lower-cost 
producer with a long-term vision will forego maximising immediate profits by 
instigating price reductions in order to attract new customers and thus capture a greater 
share of the newly emerging market. In turn, their competitors, if unable to match these 
reductions, are either forced out of the market, or made to submit to a lopsided merger, 
where they would subsequently remain the weaker party. Thus through this process, an 
emerging industry undergoes a formative phase, whereby the numerous firms jostling 
for market position all attempt to undercut each other until only a few firms are left with 
the sufficient resources and technological capacity - combined with a more concentrated 
share of market power - to withstand any war of attrition conducted through the means 
of aggressive price reduction.
10
  
In consequence, as Baran and Sweeny point out, “at any given time there are 
likely to be a number of industries in the shake-down period of development”.11 This is 
especially true in an era conducive to the production of innovative products and 
advanced technology, which the immediate post-war period of the Golden Age 
assuredly represents. As a result, it is always possible to identify industrial sectors that 
do not conform to the “corespective competition” thesis of Joseph Schumpter. However, 
this by no means renders the theory incompatible with the economic reality of the 
Golden Age years. Indeed, as Baran and Sweeny persuasively argue, such exceptions 
“simply serve to remind us that it takes time for a stable oligopoly to emerge and for the 
                                                             
8 Sobel, The Age of Giant Corporations, P.193 
9
Baran and Sweeny, Monopoly Capital , P.72 
10
 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
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corporations which compose it to develop an appropriate pattern of profit-maximising 
behaviour”.12 
 
The Planning System 
John Kenneth Galbraith, a pre-eminent economist of the period, argued that this 
type of tacit price coordination was but one feature of what he coined the „planning 
system‟.13 According to Galbraith, the „planning system‟ was the business response to 
the demands associated with the development of advanced modern technologies.
14
 He 
argued that the products produced by the immediate post-war American economy all 
required committed investment to develop and build, and even more still to remain 
advanced and hence competitive in the modern world.  In this manner, the “products 
that define modern life – automobiles, jet aircraft, electronic power, microchips and 
cable television – cannot be produced except over long lead times and by the integration 
of vast networks of engineering talent”. As a result, this type of production “requires 
planning”.15 In consequence, post-war modern corporations devised means to control 
market forces, whose volatility and hence unpredictability was not conducive to the 
stability required to plan out the long-term trajectory of investment in advanced 
technological equipment.   
In characteristic Galbraith fashion, the scholar penned a word to describe the 
technological make-up of the post-war economy, a make-up that he argued differed 
markedly from the “entrepreneurial capitalist” model that prevailed during the 
nineteenth century. He coined the term “technostructure” to define the modern 
economy. This is in reference to the importance of knowledge and technological 
development to the growth of the economy, in contrast to the financial model of 
economic growth that predominated during the preceding “entrepreneurial” period.16   
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The “classical entrepreneur” identified by Galbraith, refers to the individual 
owners of large firms in the nineteenth century, individuals such as Henry Rockefeller 
of Standard Oil, or Andrew Carnegie of U.S. Steel. Such industrial identities attained 
their fortune from financing mergers and acquiring smaller businesses, along the way 
accumulating a vast personal commercial empire. Sweeny and Baran employ the term 
“Tycoon” to describe this entrepreneurial individual.  According to the authors, a 
Tycoon‟s “primary interest  lay in capital gains, made through buying securities cheap 
and selling them dear, an objective which could be promoted at times by building up a 
company and at other times by wrecking it”.17 Thus the primary source of wealth for the 
nineteenth century class of capitalist was through finance, with the productive business 
operating as a secondary vehicle, providing the collateral both to borrow off, and also as 
a means to achieve financial gains through the enlargement of the capital stock via the 
process of mergers and acquisitions.  
According to Galbraith, in reference to the twentieth-century period in which he 
was writing, the capitalist entrepreneur “is a diminishing figure in the industrial 
system”.18 This was because in the post-war period, it was sophisticated technological 
production, not financial accumulation, which came to constitute the dominant source of 
wealth-generation within the American economy. Galbraith argued that the primary 
source of strength of modern corporations lay in their ability to organise production on a 
large scale. Hence by exploiting their size and enormous resources, corporations could 
largely control inputs and eliminate market variables. By doing so, they were effectively 
enabled to engage in long-term patterns of planning and investment. Thus in contrast to 
the financial source of corporate power in the age of entrepreneurial capitalism, in the 
post-war period “[p]ower has passed to a new factor of production. This is the 
association of men of diverse technical knowledge, experience or other talent which 
modern industrial technology and planning require”.19  
Clearly then, economic competition based on advanced technology requires far 
more personnel input than the financial funds of a wealthy industrialist. In the Golden 
Age Corporation, human organisation “extends from the leadership of the modern 
industrial enterprise down to just short of the labor force and embraces a large number 
of people and a large variety of talent”. It is therefore “on the effectiveness of this 
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organization, as most business doctrine agrees, that the success of the modern business 
enterprise now depends”.20 The power of organisation was able to achieve immense 
productivity gains in the corporate system of the Golden Age.  Galbraith argued that the 
“real accomplishment of modern science and technology consists in taking ordinary 
men, informing them narrowly and deeply and then, through appropriate organization, 
arranging to have their knowledge combined with that of other specialized but 
increasingly ordinary men. This dispenses with the need for [individual] genius”.21  It 
was thus through this effective organisation, that Golden Age Corporations were able to 
harness their productive power, generating gains for the economy as a whole. 
Baran and Sweeny similarly testify to the redundancy of the entrepreneurial 
capitalist during this period. They however take on a more conservative approach than 
Galbraith, arguing that financial entrepreneurs were still able to operate during this 
period , citing the “long inflation of the 1940‟s and 1950‟s” as generating “a whole crop 
of promoters and operators conforming exactly to the sociological type of the Tycoon”. 
Nevertheless, they admit that such types “operate around the periphery and in the 
interstices of the American economy, and they are looked down upon with a mixture of 
disdain and contempt by the real big businessmen of today, the managers of the giant 
corporations”.22 They thus conclude that in contrast  to the entrepreneurial capitalist of 
the nineteenth century, whom they describe as an “individualist”, merely preoccupied 
with “self-enrichment”; the “modern manager [of Golden Age Corporations] is 
dedicated to the advancement of the company: he is company man”.23 
 
Finance in the Post-war Period 
In order to isolate investment from the instabilities inherent to the financial 
marketplace, post-war corporations utilised their growing internal revenue earnings as 
the principal source of productive investment. According to Galbraith, the move to 
internally-generated investment embodied a significant transformation in the type of 
capitalism practised within the United States. The importance Galbraith attributed to 
this development is clearly demonstrated in his assertion that “[i]t is hard to 
overestimate the importance of the shift in power that is associated with availability of 
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such a source of capital”. Indeed, Galbraith went so far as to argue that “[f]ew other 
developments can have fundamentally altered the character of capitalism”.24  
In their work, Monopoly Capitalism, Baran and Sweeny identified the process 
whereby post-war corporations were able to limit their obligations to the financial 
sector: 
Most large companies have a target dividend payout rate which remains 
remarkably constant over long periods of time (fifty percent seems to be the 
most common figure). When profits rise, however, they do not immediately 
adjust dividends to maintain the target rate. For example, if a company has been 
earning $2 a share for some time and is paying out a dividend of $1, and if 
earnings then rise to $4, the dividend will be raised to $2 not in 1 year but over a 
period of several years. In the meantime the actual payout rate will lag behind 
the target rate. If this pattern is adhered to - and there is every indication that it is 
a deeply rooted aspect of corporate behaviour – it follows that a continuous rise 
in earnings would be accompanied by an increasingly continuous decline in the 
payout rate.
25
 
Due to the fortuitous economic conditions of the period, combined with the pay-offs 
associated with long-term planned investment, American firms increased their earnings 
considerably in the ensuing years and thus reduced their dependence on the financial 
markets significantly. For example, from “1954 through 1969, there was only one year 
in which as many as three of the hundred largest corporations lost money. In six of these 
sixteen years, all of the one-hundred largest showed profits. Similarly, in eight of the 
fifteen years from 1955 to 1969, all of the fifty largest merchandising corporations – 
Sears, Roebuck, A&P, Safeway et al – made money. In only one year of the fifteen did 
as many as two make losses”.26 
 In consequence, the character of the US share-market was fundamentally 
different to the version that dominates economic relations today. For the duration of the 
period now known as the Golden Age, the “stockmarket was never an important source 
of corporate finance in the United States”. It was primarily used as “a market where 
enterprises could cash out, trading control of illiquid equipment and structures for 
money, and households could store value over long periods”.  As a result, “almost all 
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stock was owned by individuals and held for long periods; stock turnover was quite 
low” and, most importantly for the arguments of this paper, corporations were not 
required to “disgorge earnings to financial markets each quarter, forcing them to 
compete with other firms and individuals to get them back”.27  
 A burning question comes to mind, however, when analysing the prevalence of 
the planning system in the Golden Age period: why did the financial markets - an 
economic sector formerly of prime importance to the American economy - accept its 
substantially reduced role in the structure of the post-war system? One major reason of 
course, is the widespread elimination of financial wealth involved in the bankruptcies of 
the depression years of the 1930‟s. Understandably, those financial institutions 
remaining at the beginning of the post-war period, took a considerably more 
conservative approach to the one that had prevailed during the interwar years. As a 
result, individual entrepreneurs now found it substantially more difficult to borrow the 
capital required to embark on a course of buying up business in order to acquire extreme 
levels of personal wealth.  
Galbraith provides an additional explanation for the trend towards productive-
generated growth (as opposed to financially-generated growth) in the immediate post-
war period. Galbraith argues that the level of technical expertise and specialised skills 
involved in the organisation and production of modern corporations significantly 
limited the ability of financial interests to interfere in the governance of these 
enterprises. For example, Galbraith reasoned that the “country banker, out of his 
experience and knowledge of the business, can readily interpose his judgement, as 
against that of a farmer, on the prospects of feeder cattle – and does. [However n]ot 
even the most self-confident financier would wish to question the judgement of General 
Electric engineers, or product planners on the technological sophistication of 
products”.28  
With insufficient knowledge of technical processes, bankers and shareholders 
played only a passive role in corporate governance. Their lack of any real control can be 
seen in Galbraith‟s somewhat sarcastic depiction of the typical annual Board of 
Director‟s meeting during this period.  
They [the Board members] are presented with handsomely printed reports, the 
preparation of which is now a specialized business. Products and event plants 
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are inspected. During the proceedings, as in the report, there are repetitive 
references to your company. Officers listen, with every evidence of attention, to 
highly irrelevant suggestions of wholly uninformed participants and ensure them 
that these will be considered with the greatest care.
29
 
Galbraith concludes his summarisation of these standard proceedings by ascribing the 
“annual meeting of the large American corporation [as] our most elaborate exercise in 
popular illusion”.30  
 Moreover, Baran and Sweeny contend that shareholders were happy to allow 
“the corporations in which they own stock to do the saving for them”.31 This stemmed 
from the wide-spread acknowledgement that the most effective means of generating a 
return on a long-term stock investment was by leaving that investment with the firm. 
This was largely in keeping with the reality of the economic system practised in 
America at that time, where productivity was clearly the most prevalent form of wealth-
generation, as opposed to speculative financial growth. It therefore made sense for a 
shareholder to invest long-term and thus leave the investment in the productive hands of 
the corporation, the entity most equipped with the resources to engineer the greatest real 
returns on that investment. This by far constituted the most sensible personal investment 
decision during this period.  
 This thinking was further reinforced by the tax laws then in place. Under the 
then prevailing tax system, a shareholder who wished to sell all or part of his shares, 
would have to pay a maximum rate of twenty-five percent capital gains tax on the 
difference between the price of the share when it was originally purchased, and the 
amount that it was finally sold for. If however, the shareholder was to earn more 
through annual dividends, then these earnings would have to be declared as part of his 
annual income, and thus the stock investment would be taxed under the higher income 
bracket levels. Thus it made sense for investors to accept low dividend payouts during 
the holding of the share, under the prerogative that the money stay within the 
corporation, which is most able to maximise the long-term gains of the investment by 
utilising it in a productive purpose. In this way, when a shareholder finally decides to 
sell his shares, he is rewarded for his long-term loyalty by receiving a significant pay-
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off from the original investment that has not been too heavily reduced by tax 
obligations.
32
   
 Knowledge, therefore, came to comprise the primary source of power for 
corporate America, releasing it from its traditional obligation to the financial sector. 
Galbraith argues that the existence of this knowledge-based source of power can be 
clearly identified by the development of inter-related infrastructure, providing the 
required inputs to fuel the engines of the modern economy. This infrastructure included 
the educational institutions, scientific research institutes, development centres and 
universities, whose existence experienced exponential growth during this period.
33
  
Galbraith argued at the time that these institutions stood “in relation to the 
planning system much as did the banking and financial community to the earlier stages 
of industrial development”. In the earlier entrepreneurial era, “capital was decisive, and 
a vast network of banks, saving banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses and 
investment bankers came into existence to mobilize savings and thus to meet the need”. 
In contrast, with “the mature corporation the decisive factor of production, is the supply 
of qualified talent. A similar complex of educational institutions has similarly come into 
being to supply this need”.34  
Interestingly, Galbraith‟s argument extends beyond that of institutional change 
to incorporate a normative change of values throughout American society, largely in 
response to the changed character of capitalism emerging during that period. The 
scholar claimed that the “values and attitudes of the society had been appropriately 
altered to reinforce the change. When savings and capital were decisive, thrift was the 
most applauded of social virtues… As qualified manpower has become important… 
Education, instead, has now the greatest solemnity of social purpose”.35  
Because education was becoming increasingly important to the technical 
production of post-war corporations, the public sector – the largest provider of educated 
labour – became an extremely important player in the American economy. Indeed, the 
giant corporations of the private sector were highly dependent on the public sector as a 
source of qualified labour, in order to maintain the ongoing profitability of their 
productive activities.
36
 This therefore provided another useful role for the state in the 
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economy besides the one previously mentioned, where the state maintained demand for 
innovative research through the allocation of government contracts for the development 
of advanced technological equipment.  
 
The Role of Organised Labour and the Public Sector in the Planning System 
In fact, what stands out in the Golden Age is the highly important impact the 
involvement of the public sector had in capitalising on the fortunate economic 
conditions the United States inherited following the Second World War. By 1969, 
twenty-three percent of all economic activity was conducted by the state (at the federal, 
state and local levels of government) and one-eighth of all American workers were 
working within the public sector.
37
 These statistics say nothing of the government‟s 
indirect involvement in, for example, supplying government contracts, or the long-term 
commercial spin-offs the private sector received from the government‟s infrastructure 
developments. It is thus clear that the strong economic conditions during this period 
were heavily dependent on the prominence of the public sector in the workings of the 
American economy.  
Another vitally important component of the Golden Age economy was labour. It 
was the harnessing of the skills of the American work-force that accounted for the 
dramatic advances in economic productivity during this period. Labour‟s importance to 
the profitability of American corporations was reflected in the relatively high wages that 
were paid throughout the Golden Age period. In turn, these high wages served as an 
important source of aggregate demand within the domestic economy, providing the 
disposable income among American consumers to ensure the existence of a sufficient 
consumer base to sell the influx of new items and the latest advanced electronic 
products to.  
Like all economic factors within the planning system, wage rises had to be 
accounted for in advance and thus taken into consideration when scheduling the 
investment decisions of the post-war corporations. The annual wage negotiations with 
the labour unions thus played an important function in ensuring that all wage increases 
would be coordinated in a predictable fashion, not in an ad hoc manner that modern 
managers could not plan or prepare for. Through this coordinating function, labour 
unions were an extremely important component of the post-war corporate planning 
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system. Furthermore, with the industry-wide consent to not resort to price reduction as a 
basis for competition, unions provided an important industrial institution in ensuring 
that wage increases were negotiated industry-wide. In turn, the industry-wide wage 
increase enabled firms to pass on the costs of the wage increase to their customers, via a 
mark-up in price for their product in the consumer markets. Thus through the existence 
of unions, no firm was put at an undue cost advantage by having lower labour costs than 
its primary competitors, enabling the price convention of the planning system to remain 
in place.
38
  
The dynamics of the US economy in the twenty-year Golden Age period placed 
productive growth in a position of prime importance for the generation of wealth in the 
US economy. In the process, the role of the financial sector was heavily reduced. As the 
arguments of many prominent economists demonstrated at the time, this indeed 
embodied a fundamental shift in the US economy, as the classical formulas of the 
entrepreneurial era were found to be no longer appropriate to the realities of the modern 
economy and its investment intensive advanced production. The argument put forth by 
classical economics was developed during a time when 
“business enterprise was assumed to be small in relation to the market supplied. 
The price it received was impersonally and competitively determined by the 
market. So were the prices paid to suppliers. Wages were also set by the market. 
So was the interest on borrowed funds. Profits reduced themselves to a 
competitive level. Technology was assumed to be stable. Under these 
circumstances the ideal volume of production for the firm was externally 
established by the relation of costs to the market price at various levels of 
output”.39  
Clearly this was a model that was fundamentally different to the one that prevailed 
during the period of the Golden Age. Thus through this major discrepancy between the 
practical requirements of long-term investment in the development of modern 
technologies and the contrasting assumptions of (neo-)classical economics, we begin to 
see part of the problem of American industrial policy and economic thinking as it stands 
today.  
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Conclusion 
 In the search for a capitalist model where growth is not dependent upon access 
to cheap credit and speculative activity on the financial markets, the economic period of 
the 1950s and 1960s provides an insightful example of a high-road economic model 
where growth is instead based on high wages and the production of advanced 
technological equipment. The main source of aggregate demand in the United States 
throughout the period known as the Golden Age was generated through wage growth 
and increased employment. Rather than this growth being defined as inflationary and 
hence disruptive to the country‟s economic prospects, as is maintained by orthodox 
economists today, ongoing wage rises and employment increases provided the 
foundation from which economic growth was then centred upon. Growth in 
employment and wages provided a growth in the spending power of American 
consumers, enabling domestic aggregate demand to continue to grow alongside 
domestic aggregate production, providing a sustainable self-generating system of stable 
economic growth in the process.  
 The stability of this historical system of economic growth stands in stark 
contrast to the financialised system of economic relations that has predominated inside 
the United States over the last thirty years. The planning system was a version of 
capitalism that was able to achieve productive growth in a manner that was 
uninterrupted by the country‟s financial markets, as evident by the nearly twenty years 
of continuous economic growth that were achieved during this period. In contrast to 
today, where financial players attempt to predict what will happen in the future; the 
commercial leaders of the Golden Age planned out ahead of time what they intended to 
achieve into the future. Rather than rely on the „market‟, they organised production in a 
manner that was consistent and thus were able to achieve consistent economic growth as 
a result. Their profitability was based on the sales of goods in the consumer markets, 
which through the coordinated system of industrial wage increases, was a market that 
continued to grow alongside the productive growth of American corporations.  
Thus by relying on internal revenue to fund their productive investment, and 
with this revenue being derived from sales in a consumer market that was 
simultaneously growing through an expansion in employment and wages during this 
period, Golden Age Corporations reduced their dependence on the country‟s financial 
sector and as such the whims of the financial markets ceased to function as a disruption 
to their productive growth. Prior to the development of the planning system - as indeed 
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is the case again today - the peaks and troughs of the financial markets had proved 
extremely difficult to predict, thus accounting for the series of booms and busts that 
then occurred and have resurfaced since. Through the power of planning and 
organisation however, together with the pre-eminence of productive growth as opposed 
to financial speculation, the planning system was able to reduce these financial 
uncertainties, in the process achieving a sustainable system of capitalist development. 
 The stability of this productive-based system was also greatly assisted by the 
role of the American government in the Golden Age economy. Through the provision of 
R&D contracts to the country‟s commercial enterprises, the American government 
ensured that there was a stable customer for this necessary research. It was these 
government contracts that ensured that the initial research and development stage in the 
production of high-tech equipment would be undertaken. In the absence of this 
government support, new research would prove highly risky and thus not commercially 
viable for the private sector to undertake. It was therefore the initial provision of 
government R&D contracts to the private sector that enabled a high-road economic 
model based on the commercialisation of advanced technological equipment to be 
established during the Golden Age of the American economy. 
This role of the government in stimulating the conditions for advanced 
technological production is a factor that is notably absent from the conventional policy 
response to the current recession. The prescribed role for the American government in 
the conventional policy response is to institute minimal regulation in order to prevent 
irrational exuberance from encompassing the country‟s financial markets. In contrast, 
this paper argues that the most effective method of eliminating irrational exuberance 
from the American economy is to eliminate the economy‟s excessive dependence upon 
financial market activity to generate economic growth. This would most effectively be 
achieved through a return to productive-based growth reminiscent of the American 
planning system of the Golden Age period. However this embodies a reorientation in 
economic thinking that the conventional policy approach has thus far proved unwilling 
to consider. As such, there is a vital need for an expansion in the current economic 
debate, along with a re-examination of the historical processes that have led up to the 
contemporary recession.  
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Chapter 2: A Re-examination of the 
1970s 
 
Introduction 
One of the reasons why the current policy debate has only involved a light re-
tinkering of the neo-liberal tradition rather than a radical overhaul is due to the 
perceived failure of Keynesian policies in the 1970s. As we saw in the last chapter, 
Keynesian-like policies of demand management proved extremely effective in placing 
the US economy on a high-road economic model based on the growth of employment 
and wages, along with the technological advancement of American society. 
Nevertheless, despite this empirical success, orthodox economists today claim that this 
system of economic growth created a number of inefficiencies that later led to the 
emergence of „stagflation‟ in the 1970s. This widespread assertion has effectively 
discredited the Keynesian tradition from the current policy debate, demonstrated by the 
fact that while the rhetoric for a return to Keynesianism has been gestured at by 
contemporary policymakers, this rhetoric has not been matched by a translation into 
actual policymaking. 
The avoidance of demand management in the policy-making arena is primarily 
due to the widespread perception that the application of Keynesian policies in the 
postwar period led to the economic problems of the 1970s. However this perception of 
postwar economic history is based on a version of events whose scope of analysis has 
largely been confined to the neoliberal paradigm. This chapter analyses the decade of 
the 1970s from an alternative perspective, in order to introduce the question of whether 
it was in fact the failure of Keynesian policies that produced the problems of the 1970s, 
or whether in fact there was more to the story that has been missed by the analytical 
focus of the neoliberal paradigm.  
The previous chapter illustrated how the high-road economic model of the 
planning system was ultimately centred on the complicit consent by the established 
corporations of the period to refrain from engaging in aggressive price competition. 
This chapter will show how, along with the increasing integration of the international 
economy during the 1970s, a number of external factors emerged that challenged this 
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domestically-centred normative regime. It is the influence of these international factors 
upon the American economy that will embody the focus of this chapter. 
 The first sections of the chapter will analyse the rise of the export-oriented 
model of economic development, as successfully practised by West Germany and Japan 
during this period. This growth model was centred on keeping domestic demand within 
these economies low, so as to keep their costs of production down in order to render 
their exports price-competitive inside the US consumer markets. The initiation of this 
strategy, it will be argued, undermined the stability of the domestically oriented 
American planning system. 
 The chapter will then go on to examine both the Keynesian and neo-classical 
arguments that were proposed to address the problem of industrial stagnation within the 
American economy during this period. It will be argued that in contrast to the neo-
classical assertion that the emergence of stagnation empirically invalidates the 
Keynesian position; the failure of Keynesian policies to stimulate the American 
economy in the 1970s was primarily due to the influence of the unfettered nature of the 
wider international environment, which undermined the application of domestically 
oriented demand management policies. 
 A significant component of this unfettered international economy was the rise of 
the unregulated Eurodollar market during this decade. The chapter will show how the 
emergence of this unregulated international market enabled American banks to evade 
the lending limits imposed by the Federal Reserve at this time, leading to an expansion 
in consumer credit and the emergence of price inflation decoupled from economic 
growth within the US economy. It was the combination of price-aggressive foreign 
competition along with unregulated borrowing from the Eurodollar market, the paper 
argues, which led to the emergence of „stagflation‟ within the American economy 
during the 1970s. 
 The root cause of the economic problems of the 1970s was the opening up of a 
significant imbalance within the international economy between the factors of supply 
and demand, as export-oriented nations exponentially increased the amount of supply 
within the global economy without correspondingly increasing the level of aggregate 
demand. The final section of the chapter will analyse the attempt undertaken by the 
Carter administration to address this international imbalance through an inter-
governmental global growth stimulus strategy. It was the political discrediting of this 
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strategy within the United States, the chapter argues, that led to the ascension of the 
neo-classical tradition and the subsequent financialisation of the American economy. 
 
West Germany and Japan „Catch-up‟ 
The economic gains of the Golden Age soon filtered through into the economies 
of the advanced capitalist world, generating a period of prosperity amongst the 
industrially developed bloc. Initially these gains were spread through direct government 
interaction, as the US government donated public works grants to the Western European 
nations under the initiative of the Marshall Plan. Japan too received significant US aid 
grants during this time, especially with the onset of the Korean War in 1950. Indeed the 
scholar Chalmers Johnson, who served in Korea during this time, maintained that the 
war was “the equivalent for Japan of the Marshall Plan”.40 As such US aid grants 
provided an important source of funds that enabled these economies to rebuild their 
economic infrastructure and rapidly re-engage in the growth pattern of advanced 
industrial production that had been the norm in these nations prior to the outbreak of 
war in 1939.  
 As a result of their rapid reorientation back into advanced industrial production, 
together with the consistently impressive growth levels achieved during this Golden 
Age period, production soon expanded amongst the majority of advanced capitalist 
nations. Indeed this growth became significant enough to warrant export sales by these 
countries and world trade steadily grew during this period.  
Central to this rapid economic growth was the existence of highly skilled labour 
forces within these advanced capitalist nations. Thus even though their economic 
infrastructure had been largely destroyed by the war, the knowledge and skills of each 
country‟s work-force enabled their infrastructure to be rapidly rebuilt (with the help of 
American capital), and technological progression to once again be initiated throughout 
their respective economies.  
For example, in the case of Germany, the scholar Robert Brenner attributes the 
rapid growth of manufacturing during this period to the country‟s highly skilled labour 
force, itself “the product of long-established industrial traditions”. In this manner, 
Germany‟s post-war economic “miracle” was dependent to a considerable extent on the 
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utilisation of its skilled labour force to recover its historical prominence in advanced 
industrial production. This prior prominence is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in 
the “1920s and 1930s, Germany held a share of world manufacturing exports equal to 
those of the UK and US, and was the world‟s leader in the overseas sale of chemicals 
and other manufactures”. As a result, the “German economy was able to base its 
resurgence directly on its earlier achievements”. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact 
that during “1952 and 1953, 80 per cent of exported branded articles [coming from 
Germany] were sold using international trade marks valid before the war”.41 
 The economies of Western Europe and Japan also benefited from the process of 
„catch-up‟, from which they were enabled to leapfrog the initial capital-intensive period 
of development that had already been undertaken by producers in the United States. 
Because US industry was largely responsible for a great number of the technological 
innovations that emerged in the early postwar period, they shouldered the great majority 
of the initial costs involved in the research and development of these innovations. Thus 
by leapfrogging the initial intensive investment period already undertaken by American 
industry, Japan and Germany were able to, over a relatively short space of time, 
advance to a level whereby they could effectively compete on price against American 
manufacturers. Heavily advantaged by the fact that they did not have to sink any capital 
into the initial development period of the product, Japanese and German firms were thus 
able to divert more resources towards generating productivity and efficiency gains on 
the finished product, thus enhancing their ability to compete on price.
42
 
In consequence, by 1965, the economies of West Germany and Japan had 
advanced to a level whereby their exports were able to achieve significant inroads into 
the United States‟ consumer market. As a result, the level of competition within the US 
domestic market heightened considerably. This proved extremely destabilising to the 
„planning system‟ that governed economic relations in the country during that time. 
Being based upon the dominance of three to four large firms within each industrial 
sector, and with each firm enjoying relatively entrenched market positions, the rapid 
introduction of foreign competition proved a serious blow to the complicit coordination 
strategies of the post-war corporate planning system.  
This problem was further compounded by the fact that the German and Japanese 
producers based their competitiveness on a cheaper price for their product than that 
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which prevailed in the US planning system. As we have seen, the complicit agreement 
to not engage in aggressive price competition was one of the principal (if not the pre-
eminent) building blocks of the post-war corporate planning system. As such, the steady 
increase of cheaper imports post-1965 proved to be a dramatically destabilising factor, 
preventing the effective continuation of this normative regime. The sudden need to 
concentrate on the immediate future in order to hold on to current market-shares, 
distracted American firms from their long-term investment strategies.  Moreover, an 
increasing allocation of resources was now required by American firms to maintain 
profitability in the face of reduced market-shares. This took an escalating amount of 
resources away from long-term investment in innovative production. The basis for the 
stagnating industries of the 1970‟s had begun.  
 
The Export-Oriented Model of Development 
Before we look at the deteriorating prospects of American industry, it is 
important to determine the means in which the German and Japanese companies were 
able to undercut American manufacturers on their own home soil. In this regard, the 
cost-competitiveness of their products was primarily achieved via an export-oriented 
strategy of economic development. Under this strategy, production is rapidly increased 
but domestic demand is not. As a result the costs of production are kept low, thus 
providing a means to profitably undercut American companies. The only corollary of 
this strategy is that domestic demand becomes increasingly unable to consume the 
increase in production, thus exacerbating the dependence on export markets for 
economic growth. Nevertheless, this export-oriented strategy initially proved extremely 
successful for the German and Japanese economies, accounting for a considerable 
degree of their economic growth during this period. 
 The strategy of keeping domestic demand low in order to increase cost-
competitiveness and thus generate growth through export markets is clearly 
demonstrated by the considerable divergence between productivity statistics and wage 
growth within these economies during this period. Take West Germany for example. 
Here between “1948 and 1951, labour productivity increased by a spectacular 50 per 
cent, but product wages grew by just a quarter”.43 This therefore enabled German 
manufacturers to utilise the nation‟s highly-skilled labour force to undertake advanced 
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technological production at a fraction of the cost encountered by their American 
competitors.  
 In Japan too, a similar set of circumstances developed. “Between 1950 and 
1960, Japanese manufacturing output grew at an average annual rate of 16.7 per cent, 
and GNP at about 10 per cent – the highest rates among the advanced capitalist 
economies”.44 However despite this growth, between “1952 and 1961, the real 
consumer wage increased at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent, [and] the real product 
wage at an average annual rate of 6.1 per cent”. As such, wages only grew “two-thirds 
as fast as labour productivity”. As a result the manufacturing profit share “rose at an 
average annual rate of 6.6 per cent during these years”.45 The great gap between profits 
and costs provided considerable capital for Japanese firms to invest in productivity-
improving innovations, along with initiating technological advancements of pre-existing 
products. Nevertheless, the considerable divergence between corporate profits and the 
domestic capacity for consumer demand (as evident in the above wage statistics) 
highlights the ultimate dependence the Japanese placed on the US consumer market to 
achieve economic growth. 
  
Foreign Competition and the Planning System 
The intensification of international competition within the American consumer 
market clearly had an impact on the profitability of the dominant manufacturing 
corporations that encompassed the largest wealth-generating entities within the US 
economy. The extent of this impact was considerable, demonstrated by the fact that 
between “1965 and 1973, the rates of profit in the manufacturing and private business 
sectors fell by 40.0 per cent and 29.3 per cent respectively”.46 A principal problem for 
the future productivity of the US economy was that at the time the „planning system‟ 
had not planned for such a rapid incursion into their immediate profits. In the absence of 
former price competition, American corporations had generally assumed that prices 
would gradually rise over time (along with wages). 
 The relatively rapid influx of foreign competition post-1965 therefore proved to 
be a major destabilising factor, preventing the realisation of the long-term technological 
investments that provided the backbone to the productive source of wealth-generation 
                                                             
44
 Ibid, P.82 
45
 Ibid 
46 Ibid, P.92 
35 
 
during that period. In consequence, between “1965 and 1973, US manufacturers 
sustained a decline in the rate of return on their capital stock of over 40 per cent”.47 This 
failure to realise their previously projected rate of return on their investments meant that 
a significant proportion of the internal revenue of American corporations had essentially 
gone to waste. Moreover, this problem was further compounded by the reduced rates of 
profit American firms now found themselves able to generate, as foreign competitors 
made major inroads into their respective market-shares and forced significant reductions 
on the prices (and thus revenue) for their products within the American consumer 
market.  
 The combination of reduced rates of profits, along with the inability of 
productive investments to generate greater returns for future profitability, seriously 
undermined the internal capacity of American corporations to finance their own 
productive investment. As a result, American manufacturing firms assumed greater 
dependence on the financial sector as a source of funds to finance their long-term 
investment projects. This was a dependence that American firms had long aimed to 
prevent, in an effort to reduce the power of financial interests over their productive 
operations. As we shall later see, the renewed power of the financial sector to influence 
and direct the investment decisions of American corporations was to become a key 
catalyst in the transformation of the US economy away from productive wealth-
generation towards financial speculation, as the driving engine behind America‟s 
economic prospects. 
 The renewed importance and influence of the financial sector is clearly evident 
from the transformation of banking operations during this period. Writing at this time, 
the scholar William G. Shepherd observed that before “1960, bank loans to companies 
were mainly short-term credit, to finance routine cash needs of firms (for example 
seasonal inventory shifts and payrolls)”.48 This nature of banking operations reflects the 
aforementioned corporate investment strategy of the planning system, where long-term 
productive investment was financed out of a firm‟s own internal revenue streams, thus 
limiting dependence on financial institutions. However from the mid 1960‟s onwards, 
Shepherd observed “a strong shift into long-term loans, for nonrecurring basic corporate 
projects”.49 This shift reflects the renewed dependence of American manufacturing 
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corporations on the financial sector for their long-term industrial investment projects. In 
light of the reduced revenue American corporations now received as a result of 
intensified international competition within their home market, this increased 
dependence was deemed a necessity if they wished to maintain their current growth path 
based on productive investment. 
 Increased interaction with financial institutions raised the costs associated with 
productive investment for American corporations. This is clearly evident in the increase 
of interest payments by US firms during this period. Between “1950 and 1965, interest 
payments had constituted a mere 1 per cent of profits” for American manufacturers. 
However this figure “jumped to 11 per cent between 1965 and 1973, as profitability fell 
sharply”.50 With increased costs associated with investment, along with dwindling 
returns from this investment, competition based on productivity improvements or the 
marketing of novel electronic products became harder to sustain. In consequence, price 
competition became the name of the game. The problem for American industry thus 
became one of a downward pressure on prices. This rendered it progressively more 
difficult for American firms to mark up prices over costs to a sufficient level from 
which they could generate enough internal revenue to re-embark on the long-term 
growth strategies that characterised the planning system of the Golden Age period. 
 
Supply vs. Demand 
Enter into this mix the 1973 OPEC oil price shocks. The rise in the price of oil 
as an intermediate product in the manufacture of many American products considerably 
compounded the difficulty of marking up prices to a sufficient level over costs. It is here 
where we begin to see the germ of the supply-side argument take hold. According to the 
supply-side argument, the problem with American industry was that it was essentially 
inefficient in its production. With their costs of production too high, American 
corporations represented bloated bureaucracies, whose inefficiencies rendered them 
ineffective against their „leaner‟ foreign competitors. The solution was simple: reduce 
the cost of production and achieve greater efficiency.
51
  
 One of the largest and most readily adaptable cost components of production 
was labour. This supply-side rationale came to constitute the economic basis behind the 
                                                             
50
 Brenner, Economics of Global Turbulence, P. 
51
 Michael Perelman, The Confiscation of American Prosperity: From Right-Wing Extremism and 
Economic Ideology to the Next Great Depression, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, P.103 
37 
 
attack on organised labour under the regime of the Reagan administration during the 
1980s. According to this argument, American wages had far outstripped the ability of 
firms to effectively pay. This was because wages had been largely insulated from the 
market and thus prevented from reaching their „equilibrium‟ level, owing to the 
protection offered by the political institution of trade unions. As such, the theory 
argued, if American firms were to effectively compete against foreign manufacturers, 
they would have to reduce their labour costs. If this reduction was to be effective, then 
the power and protection offered by the trade unions would have to be reduced as well. 
This was required in order to allow market forces to determine the „equilibrium‟ level of 
wages in the country. In consequence, it was America‟s workers who became the 
primary target of adjustment measures undertaken in response to the rapid infiltration of 
foreign competition into the US economy post-1965.
52
 
 However this supply-side argument totally ignores (in fact it undermines) the 
key to successful growth during the Golden Age period, namely: a domestic consumer 
market that was able to grow alongside American industry, ensuring effective aggregate 
demand to match the growth of supply by American business. The combination of 
rising unemployment, stagnating wages and withdrawals from productive long-term 
investment during the 1970s, dramatically decreased the degree of aggregate demand 
prevalent throughout the US economy at this time.   
The problem was therefore not one of supply, but rather the reverse, that of 
inadequate demand. Germany and Japan had entered the international economy through 
a rapid expansion of exports, but they had done this without simultaneously increasing 
the level of demand within their own economies. As a result the increase of 
international suppliers was not balanced by an increase in international buyers. The mid 
1960‟s thus saw a dramatic increase in the number of companies selling on the world 
stage, but the consumer market for this elevated number of companies was not 
sufficiently enlarged to incorporate the influx of new companies operating at the global 
level. The depression of domestic demand within the German and Japanese economies 
thus meant that the United States‟ consumer market was overwhelmingly relied upon as 
the main source of demand for the global economy taken as a whole.  
However the US response to the intensification of competition within its 
domestic economy was to undertake efficiency measures that further decreased the 
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degree of aggregate demand being exercised throughout the global economy. The 
intensification of international competition that this move induced, heralded the end of 
the Golden Age era of growth. A new set of conditions gripped the global economy, as 
competition heightened and the ability to undertake successive price reductions became 
the pivotal scope of export competitiveness.
53
 Contemporary scholars label this new 
system a „race to the bottom‟, with constant cost-cutting and efficiency measures 
placing an ongoing depressant on global demand, intensifying international competition 
in the process.
54
  
In changing its focus from demand-management to one of how to create 
competitive conditions of supply, economic doctrine experienced a significant 
ideological shift in this period. For the duration of the Golden Age, the prevailing 
economic doctrine was that of Keynesian demand-management. Keynesian ideas had 
prevailed ever since the policy prescriptions of John Maynard Keynes had provided an 
effective measure in stimulating national economies out of the extreme depression that 
had decimated industrial production during the interwar years. However the seemingly 
ineffectiveness of these policies in enabling the United States to overcome its twin 
problems of stagnation and inflation - or „stagflation‟ as it was later termed – led to the 
discrediting of this set of ideas. In turn this led to a greater reception to the monetarist 
ideas of Milton Friedman and other neo-classical economists writing during this period. 
In order to analyse the reasons why Keynesian demand-management proved ineffective 
in rectifying stagflation, it is necessary to look at this theory in detail. It is to this topic 
that the paper now addresses. 
 
The Keynesian Theory of Demand-Management 
Keynes‟s theory of demand-management highlighted the potential for the public 
sector to stimulate growth out of an economic downturn. Keynes‟ showed how at the 
onset of a business slowdown, the prevailing market conditions induced cautionary 
measures amongst both industrial firms and households alike. Responding to a market 
downturn, firms will reduce their investment and growth, narrowing employment 
prospects in the process. Households respond to these narrower prospects by reducing 
their consumption and increasing their savings, thus effectively removing liquidity from 
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the national economy. This reduced consumer spending eats into company profits, 
impacting their profitability and potentially leading to increased redundancies as 
companies reduce their costs as a means to maintain their business. In this way a 
business downturn induces a recessionary cycle, with severe repercussions to the 
national economy if left unchecked.
55
  
In solution, Keynes proposed two government-directed measures to address this 
market problem. The first method was to be employed in periods of general economic 
slowdown, notably towards the end of the business cycle when most economies enter 
into a short stage of recession. Keynes argued that left solely to market forces, the loss 
of business confidence, output and investment during the initial recessionary stages can 
reduce levels of aggregate demand to such a state that firms‟ profitability is reduced to 
the point of bankruptcy and a severe depression will grip the nation. Keynes proposed a 
pre-emptive measure against this downward spiral. He argued that in the initial stages of 
a downturn, the overnight rates set by the central bank should be lowered, in order to 
make it easier and cheaper for firms to borrow, thus providing the financial liquidity to 
maintain investment and production at the levels that prevailed before the downturn. 
This reduces the need to make cut backs on employment or other costs of production. 
As a result the impact of the recession is minimised and its duration significantly 
shortened.
56
 
The second method is one that is to be implemented only when a recession has 
deteriorated to the point of depression. Here a stronger stimulus measure is required. 
This is necessary because in such a depressed state of demand, it does not matter how 
low interest rates go, firms will avoid undertaking any new investment or growth 
because household spending is so low that an expansion in production will not lead to a 
sufficient increase in sales to warrant the initial expense of expansion. Here, the 
proposed solution is for the government itself to become directly involved in the 
economy, by creating jobs within the public sector for those individuals rendered 
unemployed due to depression. The increased financial stability that this new 
employment provides encourages households to increase their spending levels, as their 
confidence in their economic prospects is elevated by their recent employment. This 
increase in household spending increases the sales of the nation‟s firms, increasing their 
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revenue and providing a market incentive to increase production and employment, along 
with undertaking new investment initiatives. Thus through an initial government 
injection, business confidence is increased and the economy is enabled to grow its way 
out of the depression.
57
  
Of these two methods, the first of the two - a reduction in the overnight rates of 
interest set by the central bank – was by far the most preferred method for American 
policymakers throughout the postwar period. The second proposal - that of the 
government creating jobs within the public sector – was considered only as an option of 
last resort, to be employed in situations of dire need, such as the severe depression that 
gripped the nation during the 1930s.
58
   
However, this last resort approach ignores the degree in which direct 
government spending aided the stability and growth prevalent throughout the Golden 
Age period. Admittedly, the United States government did not as much directly create 
jobs as it did provide a customer for the production of advanced military technologies 
by American manufacturers. Nevertheless, in the absence of this government spending, 
the incentive to research and develop such technologies would be markedly reduced, as 
the corresponding risk of undertaking such investment would be exponentially 
increased due to the absence of a stable customer. In turn, the spin-off effects civilian 
technologies gained from the advances made in the government-funded military field 
would have been markedly reduced. 
Thus the Keynesian tool that American policymakers preferred to officially 
employ in the 1970‟s with the onset of stagflation was a Federal Reserve initiated 
reduction in interest rates. Indeed this policy tool became increasingly attractive from 
the mid 1960s‟ on, as increased liquidity began to circulate around the global economy 
following a number of international developments. These developments include: the 
establishment of the Euromarket; the initiation of full convertibility of Western 
European currencies in 1958; the related relaxation of controls on their current accounts; 
and finally, the rise of multinational corporate activity. All of these developments will 
be discussed in detail below. For now it suffices to say that the increased liquidity 
associated with these developments introduced a source of funds that the US 
government could draw on to finance its Keynesian strategy of lowering the cost of 
credit within its domestic economy. 
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Keynesianism in the Era of Globalisation 
Due to its prevailing reserve-currency status, along with the fact that trade in a 
large number of important commodities – most notably oil – was conducted in dollars, a 
large demand for US dollars existed among the central banks of other national 
governments. This demand was further increased by the cost-competitive export-
oriented growth strategies of Japan, Germany and other less-advanced capitalist nations. 
In order to ensure that their exports would be cost-competitive within the US market, it 
was necessary for their currencies to be of a lesser value than that of the dollar. With 
lower valued currencies, the export of their goods would be comparatively cheaper than 
the goods produced in the United States, whose higher valued dollar rendered its 
products considerably more expensive.  
In order to maintain a lower value for their currencies vis-à-vis that of the US 
dollar, the central banks of these countries actively purchased dollar-denominated assets 
from the US government, and stored these dollar reserves within their own central bank 
holdings. In this way the international demand for the US dollar was increased while 
that of their currencies was reduced, ensuring a higher valuation for the US dollar 
compared to that of their own. With a cheaper currency, their exporters were 
tremendously assisted in their cost-competitive strategy of acquiring market inroads into 
the US consumer market. In this manner, monetary arrangements could be manipulated 
by national governments in order to assist the profitability and export success of their 
real productive economy.
59
 
The benefit to the United States of this system was that it had become relatively 
inexpensive to engage in the interest-rate reduction Keynesian policy prescription. 
Financing its way out of recessionary conditions became as simple as the Federal 
Reserve printing more money. With more US dollars circulating throughout the system, 
other national governments were forced to purchase additional dollar-denominated 
assets in order to maintain the lower value of their currency compared to that of the 
dollar. In this way, the United States could afford to undertake progressively larger 
federal budget deficits and allow these deficits to be financed by foreign governments.
60
 
The problem with this approach of increasing financial liquidity through foreign 
borrowings is that it introduced inflationary conditions into the country without 
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allowing for a corresponding rise in economic growth to absorb this inflation. The 
primary problem for the US economy in the 1970s was the intensification of 
international competition within its domestic market. In consequence, the government-
directed stimulus measures failed to induce American corporations to undertake new 
investment initiatives, as the market competition was so fierce that the prospects for an 
adequate return on a new investment was markedly reduced. Thus with more liquidity 
(in the form of credit) circulating the national economy, but intensified competition 
curtailing long-term investment prospects, prices throughout the US economy began to 
rise in line with the increase in the largely credit-created conditions of consumer 
demand. According to the scholar Robert Brenner, “[f]aced as they were with declining 
rates of profit, and thus reduced surpluses and a deteriorating business climate, US 
manufacturers naturally responded to any given increase in demand with relatively 
lower levels of growth of output and investment than previously, as, for example in the 
period of rising profitability between 1961 to 1965”. As a result, Brenner observed, “the 
increased demand that resulted from rising government deficits was thus predictably 
unable to stimulate a corresponding increase in domestic supply, and called forth 
instead more rapidly rising prices and imports”.61 
In this way it was primarily the economies of Japan and West Germany that 
benefited from the Keynesian stimulus measures initiated since the mid 1960‟s. With 
widespread inflation throughout the American economy, German and Japanese 
exporters could afford to raise their prices in line with American producers and still 
remain cost-competitive, aided by their lower valued currencies and cheaper production 
costs than those that prevailed within the United States. It is thus arguably clear that the 
stimulus measures enacted by the US government did in fact work in generating greater 
profitability, it was just that in the new globalized nature of economic relations, it was 
not the US economy that received these benefits but that of its primary competitors, thus 
compounding the primary problem of intensified competition for US producers at that 
time.  
 Due to the decreased returns of investment within the United States, compared 
to that of other advanced industrial economies, US corporations began to increase their 
investment overseas, largely at the expense of new production opportunities at home. 
As such there was a significant rise in multinational corporate activity beginning in this 
period. Brenner shows that by “1965, the ratio of investment by majority-owned foreign 
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affiliates of US corporations in manufacturing overseas to corporate manufacturing 
investment in the US had grown to 21.4 per cent, up from 11.4 per cent in 1957. By 
1973, this had increased to 31.3 per cent”.  Another way of looking at this is that by 
1973 US corporations were investing roughly one dollar overseas for every three dollars 
invested at home. As such, Brenner argues that there “could hardly be a clearer sign of 
the relative cost problem confronting manufacturing investors in the US economy at this 
point”.62 
 The increase in multinational corporate activity during this period heightened 
the dependence of US firms on the financial sector, as manufacturing firms required the 
services of financial institutions in organising currency exchanges and other associated 
measures. With a greater need now for financial services, this sector began to grow in 
both size and importance within the increasingly internationalised economy. The 
political-economist Lawrence Krause observed at the time how “spurred by 
multinational firms, an active international bond market has developed outside the 
United States”. The extent of this development is demonstrated by the fact that “in 
1963, only half a billion dollars was raised through new international bond flotations 
outside the US, and 90 percent was for governments or International organisations”. In 
contrast, by “1971, new flotations exceeded five billion dollars, with over half by 
private companies”.63  
 Importantly, these currency transactions provided an avenue for increased profits 
via speculative tactics, divorced from the actual production undertaken by the company 
concerned. Krause observed that as American-based multinational “firms operate in 
many countries, they have knowledge of and financial ties to all major money markets 
and most smaller ones as well”.64 According to Krause: 
Corporate treasurers will shift their liquid funds from country to country in 
response to interest rate incentives and also will take positions in currencies in 
expectations of adjustments in exchange rates. Thus if the interest rate in one 
money market, for example Frankfurt, is higher than another one, for example 
New York, then firms will shift funds from the United States to Germany. 
Likewise, if one currency is thought to be a candidate for devaluation and 
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another for revaluation, firms will move funds from the weaker into the stronger 
currency.
65
  
From this we can see how speculative flows began to play an important role in 
exacerbating trends in the international currency markets. This was an important 
development, embodying a key catalyst in the subsequent financialisation of the 
international economy. It was one that was to have profound ramifications for the 
systemic structure of the US economy, as it increased its interaction with the 
international markets. 
 An outcome of increased overseas investment by US firms was that the US 
economy began to experience a considerable outflow of capital from the mid-1960s. In 
response to this development, US officials began to enact measures designed to tighten 
the regulations controlling capital flows out of the States. The first regulatory measure 
to discourage capital flows out of the country was the 1963 interest equalization tax 
(IET) on all new issues of foreign securities and equities sold in the US. In 1964, this 
tax was extended to cover “bank loans with a duration of one year or more as well as 
nonbank credits of one to three years”.66 The following year, 1965, saw the 
establishment of a voluntary capital controls program, which was notable in that it not 
only imposed controls upon US banks, but also upon the activities of non-financial 
multinational corporations, headquartered in the United States.
67
 
 Nevertheless the financial infrastructure that had developed in the international 
sphere enabled US based multinationals to circumvent these domestic controls. This 
was primarily achieved through the private Eurodollar market that developed in London 
during this period. It is to this development that we shall now turn. 
 
Unregulated Global Finance: The Eurodollar Market 
The Eurodollar market began as an attempt by the British government and the 
banks of London to regain the financial prominence they had formerly held in the 
international economy during the colonial period of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 Centuries. During 
the concluding agreements of the Second World War, Britain, bowing to US pressure, 
ceded to the dismantling of its formal colonial trading system. US diplomats wished to 
                                                             
65
 Ibid 
66
 Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance, P. 85 
67 Ibid, P.86 
45 
 
create a more open market for international trade in goods and services, a market in 
which the then superior manufacturing capabilities of US corporations would be able to 
dominate, as opposed to one where trade was favoured along the lines of old colonial 
ties.
68
 
Despite the dismantling of this formal system however, established links ensured 
that trade largely followed along the lines of the previous colonial regime. As a result, 
up until the year “1957, the financing of this [informal] trading system  - accounting for 
about forty percent of all international trade – took the form of loans of the British 
pound sterling”.69 However the nationalisation of the Suez Canal that year threatened to 
become a major destabilising factor for the continuation of this informal trading regime. 
According to the scholar Edwin Dickens, without “the inflow of capital from the Suez 
Canal, the British banking system could no longer supply an outflow of capital to 
finance the trade of the former colonies”.70 However, owing to the substantial flow of 
US dollars circulating around the global economy, London banks found they could 
continue on with their foreign financing through the use of dollars rather than sterling. 
Demand for the dollar proved high, due to the dollar‟s special status in the international 
economy. As such, London banks were not only able to maintain the financing of their 
trading regime, but also expand their lending and foreign financial business 
considerably, through the use of dollars as a source of loans.
71
 
 This development proved highly destabilising to the established nature of 
banking operations within the domestic economy of the United States. During the early 
years of the postwar period, American banks conducted their business according to the 
norms that prevailed throughout most established industries within the US economy at 
that time. That is, they ran their business according to the accepted convention of 
maintaining industry stability by refraining from enacting undercutting activities against 
their market competitors. The following account given by William Shepherd provides 
an apt description of the US banking industry as it then existed. 
Banking has long had a fraternal, “professional” code of ethics against price 
cutting and many other competitive causes of instability. Interest is not to be 
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given on deposits; gentlemen‟s agreements keep banks from encroaching on 
each other‟s areas; and large accounts are not crassly competed for.72 
This system of banking worked fine in the nationally confined period of the Golden 
Age. However, like other American industries, this stability was seriously undermined 
in the mid-1960s with the introduction of external actors operating outside the corporate 
culture of the United States. In this instance, the outside actor was the Eurodollar 
market in London. Owing to an industry-wide agreement on the price of loans offered 
by US banks (a reflection of the complicit price coordination strategy that prevailed 
throughout American corporate culture during this period), London bankers found they 
were able to attract international clients by pricing their dollar-based loans below the 
price that prevailed inside the United States. The industry-wide “price for dollar loans in 
the early 1960‟s was a 4.5 percent leading rate plus a requirement that borrowers 
maintain compensating balances of 10 percent to 20 percent of loans”. As such, the cost 
of borrowing from US banks “ranged from 0.045/1 – 0.045/1 – 0.2, or from 5 and 5.6 
percent”. During this time, “the interest rate on Eurodollar deposits averaged 4.1 
percent”. As a result, the British banks could bid for dollar deposits from nations who 
held a surplus reserve of dollars looking for a profitable place to store them, and then 
lend this money at profitable margins while still underpricing the rate offered by US 
banks. In consequence, by “the end of 1965 the British banks had attracted $5.3 billion 
of Eurodollar deposits, an amount equal to that of the $33.8 billion dollars [US] 
sloshing around the world economy” at that time.73 
 The success of the Euromarket, combined with the tighter regulations banks now 
faced inside the United States, encouraged a number of American banks to turn to the 
Euromarket as a means to conduct unregulated business. Dickens observes that “from 
1966 on, the growing use of Eurodollars by British banks to finance their foreign 
operations was complemented by the growing use of Eurodollars by the US bank cartel 
to finance its operations”.74 
 The key catalyst for this growing use of Eurodollar financing by US banks was 
the restrictions placed on bank lending by the Federal Reserve in response to the August 
1966 raise in lending rates, which all US banks agreed to initiate. This raise was 
opposed by the Fed “on the grounds that the higher rates were tantamount to higher 
costs of working capital which corporations could use to justify higher prices”. Thus in 
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an effort to curtail an inflationary spiral as companies passed on their higher costs of 
financing on to consumers, the Federal Reserve restricted the funds available for US 
banks to invest. Rather than accept this restriction however, US banks turned to the 
Euromarket as a source of funds for their lending activity. This move marked “the first 
time the Eurodollar market came to widespread public attention”.75 
 The turn to the Euromarket by US banks represented an important turning point 
in the growth of the private international financial system, a system that was essentially 
divorced from the governance and regulatory control of any national government. The 
use of Eurodollar funds by US banks expanded and transformed the nature of that 
market “from a short-term money market into a full-fledged international capital 
market”.76 The scholar Eric Helleiner argues that the main attraction of the Euromarket 
was that it could be utilised in order to escape domestic regulation. He maintains that 
“for the U.S. financial community, the London Euromarket provided a setting where 
they could conduct their international activities unencumbered by an increasingly 
unfriendly federal government”.77  
 The principal source of Eurodollars that the US banks drew from was that of the 
Bundesbank, the German central bank. This relationship fitted in well with the system 
of trading relations that predominated during that period between the two countries. As 
part of its export-oriented economic growth strategy, Germany ran persistent trade 
surpluses with the United States, selling far more to the US than it consumed in US 
exports. As we have seen, this strategy was largely based on a cheaper valuation of the 
deutschemark compared to that of the dollar. Due to its efforts to maintain a cheaper 
currency, along with its accumulation of dollars via its constant trade surplus, the 
Bundesbank held a considerable store of dollar reserves within its holdings. The 
Euromarket thus provided a profitable outlet for the Bundesbank to recycle these dollar 
holdings.
78
  
 Thus through the financial intermediary of the Euromarket, the German central 
bank could lend its dollar surplus to the US banks, who then repatriated the money back 
into the United States. This lending process pumped up the international demand for the 
dollar, thus maintaining the lower valuation of the German mark and the cost-
competitiveness of German exports. It also supplied the US with the financial liquidity 
                                                             
75 Ibid, P.214 
76
 Helleiner, States and the re-emergence of Global Finance, P.89 
77
 Ibid 
78 Dickens, ‘The Eurodollar Market’ in Epstein, Financialization and the World Economy, P.215 
48 
 
required to purchase the German goods being sold within the US consumer markets.
79
 
In consequence, the increase in financial liquidity and the undermining of US corporate 
competitiveness that this process ultimately entailed, contributed significantly to the 
simultaneous appearance of an inflationary economy and stagnating industry inside the 
United States. Thus in contrast to the neoliberal assertion that liberalising finance would 
help solve the stagflationary tendencies of the US economy, it was the undermining of 
regulatory control through the private offshore Euromarket that largely contributed to 
the emergence of stagflation in the first place. 
 As a result, the Euromarket became a way for the US economy to generate 
cheap credit in order to tide over production in the face of a business slow down. This 
came to constitute a key characteristic of the US economy over the next thirty years, as 
the Keynesian solution of lowering interest rates was adopted as a means to stimulate 
the economy out of the series of recessions that began in the mid 1970s. Indeed, the 
reliance on foreign finance to generate the liquidity that its productive economy could 
no longer supply is one of the major causative factors behind the 2008 recession. Its 
origins can therefore be traced back to the expansion of the Euromarket in the mid 
1960s, and its ability to circumvent the national regulations governing credit creation 
within the domestic economy of the United States. 
 Nevertheless, this system, whereby Germany and other countries financed the 
United States deficit, providing it with the financial liquidity to spend beyond its means 
and thus fuel the export-oriented boom of Japan and Germany, ultimately proved 
unsustainable and thus self-undermining. This first became evident during the build-up 
to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.  
  
The Breakdown of Bretton Woods and the Rise of Private Finance 
The United States monetary authorities began to encounter serious difficulties in 
managing the reserve currency status of the US dollar from the beginning of the 1960s. 
Already at this stage, there was a large amount of dollars circulating outside the US 
economy, an inevitable outcome of the dollar‟s reserve status and the fact that a large 
portion of international trade was now conducted in dollars. Indeed by “1961, the ratio 
of dollars to gold outside the United States had risen above levels that would be 
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willingly held at $35 per ounce of gold”.80 In response, the market price for gold shot 
up, while that for dollars dwindled. As such, the incentive for central banks to trade in 
their dollar deposits for gold from the United States Treasury increased in line with this 
change in market valuation. The expansion of world trade and the rise of the private 
Euromarket exacerbated these conditions considerably.  
 In fact the development of the private Euromarket proved to be a major factor 
behind the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. One of the factors which initially 
ignited inflation inside the United States was the ability of its banks to increase their 
lending rates in the face of Federal Reserve restrictions. This was achieved through 
borrowings made from the unregulated Euromarket as a substitute for funds from the 
publicly managed Reserve Bank. In response, American corporations, reacting to the 
increase in their costs of financing from the country‟s financial sector, passed these 
costs onto their consumers via the enactment of higher prices. Observing this trend, the 
German monetary authorities began to worry that inflation would be recycled back into 
the German economy, as German manufacturers were able to raise their prices in line 
with American producers. The German government thus began to apply pressure on the 
US government to impose reserve requirements on all US bank borrowings in the 
Euromarket, employing its considerable holdings of US Treasury bills as diplomatic 
leverage in order to attain this objective. Reserve requirements were thus implemented 
in the United States, and the borrowing by American banks on the Euromarket 
decreased from a “1969 peak of $12,118 million to $3,300 million in 1971”.81 
 However these reserve requirements failed to halt both the expansion of the 
Euromarket or the spread of inflation from the US market into the German economy. In 
response to the reserve requirements, an increased amount of dollar holdings flooded 
into the Euromarket. This thus reduced the pre-eminent role of the Bundesbank as 
provider of official dollar reserves and the market became much more diversified and 
increasingly more volatile as a result. This diversification precipitated a move away 
from long-term lending to one of more short-term and speculative capital flows. Edwin 
Dickens argues that this development “institutionalized a vast pool of short-term capital, 
outside the control of any monetary authority, which was ready and able to move with 
lightning speed in and out of different currencies”.82  
                                                             
80 Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Princeton 
University Press, 2008, P.121 
81
 Dickens, ‘The Eurodollar Market’ in Epstein, Financialization and the World Economy, P.216 
82 Ibid 
50 
 
 As the reserve currency holder, the United States found itself in a progressively 
more precarious position from the outset of the 1970s. With the short term speculative 
flows emanating from the Euromarket exacerbating the run on the dollar instigated by 
the demands of other national governments to exchange their dollar holdings for gold 
deposits, the ability of the US to maintain its role as central banker for the world 
economy became considerably more difficult to sustain. The ultimate solution out of 
this conundrum was for the United States to generate a sufficient surplus in its current 
account. This would provide it with the reserves to support its currency and thus 
increase international confidence in the dollar, ending the speculative run then in place 
upon it. Indeed, the British economy had experienced a similar dilemma in the 1840s 
and had employed an expansion of exports as a means to grow its economy out of this 
precarious position and thus maintain its hegemonic role within the world economy.
83
 
However with its primary competitors unwilling to expand demand within their own 
economies, such a strategy proved extremely difficult for the United States to initiate.  
Foreseeing no other possible solution out of this conundrum, the United States‟ 
monetary authorities decided to abrogate itself from its international commitment to 
convert dollars for gold at thirty-five dollars per ounce, and embarked upon a 
mercantilist strategy of increasing its own competitiveness within the global economy. 
This was initiated under the Nixon Administration‟s „New Economic Policy‟, which 
along with the suspension of dollar-gold convertibility, placed a ten percent surcharge 
on all imports and implemented a range of tax cuts for American producers and 
consumers alike.
84
 
 In response to the United States unilateral abrogation of its reserve role in the 
international monetary system, the national governments who made up the advanced 
capitalist world at the time, came together to work out an arrangement to save the state-
managed fixed exchange rate regime that constituted the Brettons Woods system. The 
end result of these multilateral discussions was the signing of the Smithsonian 
Agreement in December 1971. Here it was agreed that the dollar should be devalued by 
a rate of 7.89 percent against gold, and the currencies of the other attending economies 
should be revalued against the dollar. This brought a revaluation of the mark by 13.5 
percent and a revaluation of the yen by a total of 16.88 percent.
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 Nevertheless, the Smithsonian parities held a particularly short shelf-life in this 
new international economic environment, as private short term flows continued to 
expand in an increasingly volatile manner. Indeed these flows proved particularly 
disruptive following the implementation of stimulus measures by the Nixon 
administration during the run-up to the 1972 presidential elections. The net effect of 
these measures was to significantly enlarge the federal budget deficit, while 
simultaneously increasing the level of liquid credit circulating throughout the US 
economy. This worked to increase inflation throughout the US economy, a process that 
increased both the competitiveness and profitability of German and Japanese exporters 
selling in the US market, who did not have to contend with the same rise in costs as US 
producers, and so were thus able to reap the benefits of economy-wide price rises by 
raising the price of their product but still being able to undercut US producers in the 
process. This culminated in “a tripling of the record trade deficit in 1972”, a process that 
perpetuated a massive capital outflow away from the dollar towards the more 
competitive economies of West Germany and Japan. As a result, world reserves 
doubled the amount that existed in 1969, “increasing as much in the intervening three 
years as in all previous centuries of recorded history”.86  
 This massive capital outflow ensured that as inflation increased inside the 
United States, this increase would also be carried over into the economies of its primary 
competitors. In an effort to contain inflation, the Nixon administration imposed a ninety 
day wage-price freeze. While this was able to temporarily contain inflation for the 
duration of the freeze, the build up of forces it precipitated unleashed a fresh new flow 
of inflationary conditions (and expectations) following the lifting of the freeze. As a 
result, “the annual rate of increase of consumer prices exploded from 3.9 per cent in the 
last quarter of 1972 to 6.2 per cent in the first quarter of 1973”.87  
The resulting outflow of inflationary capital from the US economy, led to an 
intergovernmental agreement to allow a further dollar devaluation to the magnitude of 
ten percent. Nevertheless despite this devaluation the “US authorities made clear that 
they were in no way committed to support the new parities or, by implication, even to 
the maintenance of a fixed-rate regime”, thus undermining the prevailing system.88 In 
response 27.8 billion deutschemarks flooded back into the German economy from the 
Euromarkets. Likewise the other economies of Western Europe, and even Japan, who 
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held particularly stringent capital controls, faced a massive influx of short-term capital 
rushing into their respective economies.
89
  
These flows proved too much to contain, forcing these economies to dispense 
with their capital controls program and assume a floating rate regime for their 
currencies on the international markets. In line with the prevailing short-term trends, 
significant currency appreciation followed this floating. In the case of Germany, “the 
mark was revalued by 20.4 per cent against the dollar, making for an extraordinary total 
appreciation of the German currency against the dollar between 1969 and 1973 of 50 
per cent”.90 Japan‟s currency “was revalued a further 12 per cent in 1973, making for a 
total appreciation since December 1971 of 28.2 per cent”.91  
All of these changes in relative values between national currencies proved 
extremely beneficial to the competitiveness of US manufacturers, both at home and on 
the world stage. Indeed Brenner argues that in consequence of this, in “the space of a 
few short years, the US manufacturing sector secured by dollar devaluation the kind of 
turnaround in relative costs that it had been unable to achieve by way of productivity 
growth and wage restraint”.92 The corollary of this increase in US competitiveness 
however was a reduction in the competitive prospects of the German and Japanese 
economies. This was a factor that had significant consequences for these countries, 
owing to the dependence they had placed on the US market for generating growth 
within their own economies. As Brenner shows, between “1970 and 1973, unit labour 
costs in manufacturing (expressed in dollars) grew at an average annual rate of 0.6 per 
cent in the US, compared to 17.6 per cent in Germany and 19 per cent in Japan. Over 
the same period, US relative unit labour costs in manufacturing fell on average by 9.9 
per cent per year”. As a result the “average annual growth of US export prices between 
1971 and 1973, at 9.5 percent, could therefore achieve rough equality with those of 
Japan, at 9 per cent, and Germany, at 8.7 per cent – after having grown at double 
Germany‟s and at close to 5 times the rate of Japan‟s between 1965 and 1970”.93 
As can be seen, Japanese and German exporters lost a considerable degree of 
competitiveness via their currency revaluations during this period. Their response to this 
revaluation was to lower the prices for their products on the export markets, in order to 
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compensate for the increase in their currency valuation. For instance, Brenner shows 
how in Japan in the year “1972, unit labour costs in manufacturing in terms of the 
national currency rose by just 1.1 per cent, but in terms of a trade-weighted currency by 
no less than 11.8 per cent, and in terms of the dollar by a stunning 20.3 percent”. In 
order to preserve export competitiveness therefore, “Japanese manufacturers limited 
their export price increases in dollar terms to only 8 per cent”. This required a 
“reduction in their export prices in yen terms of 3 per cent, compared to an average 
annual increase of almost 2 per cent over the previous five years”.94 Likewise in 
Germany, between “1969 and 1973… relative unit labour costs grew at the very large 
average annual rate of 6.1 per cent”, a development that Brenner argues is “entirely 
attributable to the increased value (effective exchange rate) of the mark”. In response 
“German exporters held down the increase of their export prices in terms of marks to an 
average annual rate of only 3.7 per cent”.95  
This reduction in the market price for their exports left less revenue for internal 
investment or increased employment within their industrial companies. The net effect of 
this strategy was therefore to dampen demand within their domestic economies, 
exacerbating their dependence on the US consumer market to achieve growth.  As such, 
this fresh new round of price reductions acted as a depressant on global aggregate 
demand and reduced revenue intakes considerably. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
fact that “between 1965 and 1973, aggregate manufacturing profitability in the G-7 
economies declined by about 25.5 per cent”.96 This constitutes a significant drop in 
profits and can thus be seen as a major catalyst for the international recession of 1974. 
 
A Renewed Dependence on the Financial Sector 
The US government responded to the global recession of 1974 by lowering the 
Federal Reserve discount rate in order to reduce the cost of borrowing and thus provide 
a financial incentive to encourage further investment. As such, the main concern for the 
US monetary authorities at this time was the need to attract sufficient levels of foreign 
capital to finance this credit-induced recovery of the domestic economy. However this 
was a task that was proving progressively difficult to achieve, especially with the 
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existence of the Euromarket and its ability to attract large sums of capital due its 
unregulated environment.  
There thus began to build considerable pressure inside the United States for the 
government to liberalise the country‟s financial sector, in order to attract a greater share 
of the private financial funds circulating throughout the global economy. Indeed this 
was considered an imperative as the government‟s stimulus strategy required easier 
access for the nation‟s firms to financial capital, in order to compensate for the 
deteriorating investment prospects and the decline in profitability of the productive 
sector. The emergence of petrodollars as the OPEC countries sought to capitalise on 
their now considerable income streams following the 1973 oil price hike provided a 
further impetus to liberalise.
97
  
The United States government thus began to institute significant deregulatory 
measures for its financial sector. This included: the “May Day” liberalisation of 1975 
that abolished minimum commissions for securities trading; the abolishment of the 
previously mentioned capital controls program; and a number of other measures that 
facilitated the movement of free capital into the country.
98
 
The deregulation of the financial sector, combined with the stimulus measures of 
lower-cost credit, significantly expanded the level of borrowing throughout the 
American economy. The prevalence of inflation also encouraged this trend by reducing 
both the cost and risk associated with borrowing. Over time, inflationary conditions 
depreciate the purchasing power of money, as prices rise throughout the economy. In 
turn, this also depreciates the real cost of the interest rate set at the outset of the original 
loan. To demonstrate, between “1973 and 1979, real interest rates fell below zero, 
averaging negative 0.1 per cent, compared to 2.5 percent between 1960 and 1973”.99 
This was because the rate of inflation was larger than the interest rate or cost of credit. 
As such, when inflation was factored into the equation, the real cost of the loan was 
virtually nothing.   
In consequence, American firms found a cost incentive to increase their 
borrowings in order to make up for their reduced competitiveness in their home market. 
By doing this however, they gradually moved away from their preferred position in the 
                                                             
97 Helleiner, States and the re-emergence of Global Finance, P.114 
98Philip G. Cerny, ‘The Infrastructure of the Infrastructure: Toward “Embedded Financial Orthodoxy” in 
the International Political Economy’ in Ronen P. Palan, Transcending the State-Global Divide:a Neo-
Structuralist Agenda in International Relations Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994,  P.240 
99 Brenner, Economics of Global Turbulence, P.167 
55 
 
Golden Age years of limiting their dependence on external sources of finance to as 
much as possible.  However the stagnation of the 1970s severely limited the ability of 
American firms to follow this Golden Age internal investment strategy, while the 
inflation of that decade reduced the risk associated with external financing.  
It must be noted that this increased reliance on the financial sector significantly 
increased the profitability of the country‟s productive sector, providing a well-timed 
boost to productive investment that enabled the country to capitalise on its newly 
devalued currency and increase its industrial competitiveness within the international 
markets. This productive investment was able to be enacted due to the reduction in 
rentier repatriation that corporate managers imposed upon their shareholders, who 
correspondingly sacrificed short-term profits under the acknowledgement that their 
investment would gain greater long-term growth by financing real productivity 
improvements within the firm. In doing so shareholders subscribed to the prevailing 
investment strategy that had reigned supreme during the Golden Age years of economic 
growth.
100
  
Thus between 1973 and 1979, “manufacturing corporate managers reduced 
annual dividend payments as a proportion of profits to just 16 per cent, compared to 26 
per cent for 1950 and 1973”. This reduction in annual dividend obligations enabled the 
“manufacturing sector to increase its investment in these years at an average annual rate 
of 5.6 per cent, about the same rate as between 1950 and 1973, when it was 5.8 per 
cent”. Furthermore, during this same timeframe, the net capital stock of American 
corporations increased at “an average annual rate of 3.8 per cent, which was just about 
the same as between 1950 and 1973, when the figure had been 3.9 per cent”.101  
In turn this investment generated a rapid revival of profitability for American 
manufacturing corporations. “Between 1975 and 1979, manufacturing output rose at the 
average annual rate of 7.2 per cent, about the same rate as during the high boom years 
of 1958 and 1965”. In the same period, “manufacturing labour productivity grew at the 
average annual rate of 2.6 per cent, not all that far below the average annual rate of 3.0 
per cent between 1950 and 1973”.102  
This expansion in productivity, assisted by its now cheaper currency, enabled 
the United States to increase its export-sales within the world markets. Indeed this was a 
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significant achievement, especially considering the drop in global aggregate demand 
that occurred in this period. Indeed between “1973 and 1979, US exports increased at 
the average annual pace of 5.8 per cent”. While this figure was only slightly higher than 
the 5.3 percent growth achieved during 1965 to 1971, it nevertheless signified a notable 
increase in international competitiveness, especially considering that “world trade grew 
in this period at only half the rate of the later 1960s and early1970s”.103  
Thus economic growth was able to be achieved in the second half of the 1970s 
via a much enlarged dependence on exports as an engine of growth within the US 
economy. The extent of this dependence is demonstrated by the fact that exports 
increased “as a proportion of GDP by 35 per cent” and “manufacturing exports as a 
proportion of manufacturing output by almost 50 per cent”. In turn, the increased 
prospects for productive investment within the United States reversed the outflow of 
corporate capital from the country, demonstrated by the fact that while foreign direct 
investment had increased to thirty percent by 1973, it had come back down to twenty-
one percent between 1975 to 1979.
104
 
 
The Locomotive Strategy 
Recognising the fact that the United States recovery was largely dependent on 
its recently devalued currency, along with increased access to foreign sources of credit, 
the Carter administration saw that the only way to translate this short-term recovery into 
a sustainable growth path was to increase the level of aggregate demand operating 
throughout the world economy as a whole. The Carter administration aimed to increase 
global demand by pursuing a multilateral-based stimulus package, whereby the three 
most powerful national economies at that time: the United States, Germany and Japan, 
would simultaneously embark upon a set of expansionary policies in order to act as an 
engine of growth for the world economy at large. In this way the three economies would 
function as “locomotives”, providing a source of demand to pull the rest of the world 
out of the stagnation that mired the 1970s. The combined effort of these three 
economies would thus function in much the same way that the United States had in the 
decade of the 1960s, in providing the demand that grew the economies of Japan and 
Germany to their globally competitive levels. The plan thus reflected the new economic 
position of Germany and Japan in the world of the 1970s and asked them to share the 
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burden of stimulating the global economy from which they had benefited from over the 
last twenty years.
105
  
This locomotive strategy therefore carried huge potential. If successful it could 
have built the foundations for a new multilateral economic order, one that was centred 
on a growth platform where the strongest economies provided the demand to grow that 
of the weaker ones, raising global aggregate demand in the process. Unfortunately 
however, the strategy failed. The governments of Germany and Japan refused to initiate 
domestic expansion to the level that was necessary, fearing that the increase in the 
domestic costs of production would inflict a further blow upon their cost-competitive 
export strategies, on top of the one already received through the revaluation of their 
currencies at the beginning of the decade.  In consequence, “[a]lthough the rhetoric 
retained a commitment to cooperation, the policy became one of pursuing a unilateral 
expansion” within the United States.106  
The Carter administration received substantial foreign inflows to finance its 
stimulus program, largely from the central banks of Japan and Germany, who purchased 
the release of new dollar-denominated assets in order to appreciate the value of the US 
currency compared to that of their own. Foreign financing of the dollar received 
additional impetus in the second half of the 1970s with the added input of the OPEC 
countries, who “were also major defenders of the dollar in this period because both the 
revenue from oil exports and a large proportion of their assets were denominated in 
dollars”.107 
As a result, the unilaterally pursued expansion proved highly inflationary within 
the domestic economy of the United States, as the growth of aggregate demand failed to 
match the economy-wide rise in prices. As it had in the late 1960s, these inflationary 
conditions proved unattractive to international investors and capital began once again to 
flow out of the United States towards the more competitive economies of the other 
advanced capitalist nations. In consequence, the dollar experienced another series of 
devaluations, which at the time generated considerable political controversy for the 
Carter administration amongst its domestic constituency.
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According to Barry Eichengreen, the Carter stimulus package was implemented 
“with full knowledge that its inflationary effects would weaken the dollar”.109 The 
administration however hoped that the German and Japanese authorities would pursue 
similar expansionary policies, thus reducing the incentive for speculative flows. Mutual 
adoption would significantly reduce the incentives for speculative flows from one 
economy into another in order to exploit exchange rate differentials, as the basic 
conditions between the three economies would all remain roughly the same. As we have 
seen, this hope ultimately proved ill-founded, a factor that was to have grave political 
consequences for the Carter administration back home. Among its domestic 
constituency, the administration‟s policies were accused of exacerbating the 
stagflationary tendencies prevalent throughout the country‟s economy. This was a 
verdict that held considerable truth, owing to the intensification of competition inside 
the United States as the two other internationally dominant nations failed to contribute 
to the task of raising global aggregate demand.  
The failure of Carter‟s locomotive strategy ultimately paved the way for the 
political popularity of the simplistic supply-side solution of the Reagan administration. 
However, unlike the Carter strategy, the Reagan solution held no basis in economic 
sensibilities. As such, its implementation introduced an ideological redirection into 
American society. This would prove to be a redirection that would heavily favour the 
financial sector at the direct expense of America‟s real productive economy. Economic 
redirection was enacted despite the fact that over the last thirty years of comparatively 
impressive growth levels, the American economy had overwhelmingly based its 
economic advancement on this productive sector. The era of financialisation had begun.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the domestically oriented planning system of the American 
economy suffered a serious disruption from the incursion of cheaper foreign 
competition beginning in the 1970s. The economic issue of „stagflation‟ that emerged 
shortly thereafter is commonly cited as an empirical indictment against the effectiveness 
of Keynesian policies. In turn, the popular acceptance of this indictment paved the way 
for the ascension of the neo-classical school of economic thought, along with the 
supply-side policies that this theoretical position has ultimately inspired.  
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In contrast to the neo-classical position, this paper argues that the emergence of 
„stagflation‟ does not signify the empirical redundancy of the Keynesian tradition per 
se; rather it identifies the problems associated with the application of domestically-
oriented demand management policies in the context of an unfettered international 
environment. The series of Keynesian stimulus packages implemented by the federal 
government throughout the decade of the 1970s did serve to stimulate a national 
economy (indeed they served to stimulate several); the problem was however, that none 
of these stimulated economies happened to embody that of the United States itself.  
The primary causative factor behind the stagnating tendencies of American 
industry during the 1970s was the influx of cost-competitive imports that undermined 
the normative regime of the planning system to refrain from engaging in aggressive 
price-based competition. It was this complicit agreement that had ensured that the high-
road economic model of the planning system would generate the required revenue that 
enabled American corporations to engage in long-term productive investment projects. 
The stability of the planning system therefore was effectively undermined by the 
incursion of price-aggressive foreign competition. 
In consequence, the lowering of interest rates by the American government as a 
means to inspire a credit-induced recovery of its stagnating economy failed to 
encourage US manufacturers to re-engage in productive investment projects, due to the 
fact that the ability to generate a return on any productive investment in this period was 
markedly reduced by the ability of foreign competitors to undercut American producers 
within the United States‟ consumer markets. As such, the lowering of interest rates by 
the Federal Reserve at this time merely induced an expansion in American consumer‟s 
ability to spend through increased credit. This enabled all suppliers within the US 
market – both foreign and domestic alike – to raise their prices, thus leading to price 
inflation.  
However, because the market share of American producers had been radically 
reduced by the incursion of foreign competition, these price rises were unable to 
generate sufficient revenue for American companies to once again engage in long-term 
productive investment projects. Thus we have the emergence of an inflationary 
economy that does not have the corresponding economic growth (in terms of an 
expansion in investment, employment and wages) to accommodate these price rises, as 
had occurred in the previous planning system. It is for this reason why price inflation 
became a major problem for the American economy during the 1970s.  
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An inflationary economy meant that American producers now faced an increase 
in the price of intermediate products, which in turn increased their overall cost of 
production. The incursion into their markets by foreign competitors however, meant that 
they were not able to correspondingly increase their profits in order to cover these rising 
costs as they had done during the planning system. This resulted in the stagnation of 
American industry.  
Their foreign competitors however, initially did not share this same inflationary 
problem in a rising cost of production, due to their national export-oriented strategy of 
suppressing domestic demand in order to ensure the price-competitiveness of their 
products inside the US consumer markets. They were thus able to raise their prices in 
line with the American market, but still to a level that was able to undercut American 
producers, since they did not face the same level of production costs as the American 
manufacturers did through inflation. It is for this reason why these foreign competitors 
became the primary recipients of the American government‟s Keynesian demand 
stimulus packages. This is clearly evident from the growth in their economies during 
this period, compared to the decline of growth experienced by the US economy in this 
same time frame. 
The expansion in consumer credit that was fuelling the rise of inflation in this 
period experienced a further boost in growth via the emergence of another international 
development. The rise of the Eurodollar market provided an unregulated source of funds 
for US banks to draw on, in order to evade the lending restrictions imposed by the 
Federal Reserve as a means to halt the spread of inflation throughout the American 
economy. The Eurodollar market provided a way for West Germany in particular to 
purchase US dollars, in order to keep its own currency down relative to the dollar– 
along with the price of its exports – and then loan these purchased dollars to the US 
financial sector via the unregulated international intermediary of the Euromarket. This 
therefore enabled US banks to increase their lending throughout the American economy, 
thus providing the consumer credit that was fuelling the problem of inflation within the 
United States at this time.  
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the ensuing intergovernmental 
agreements led to a devaluation of the US dollar, which led to an increase in the price-
competitiveness of US products and a brief turnaround for the American economy. This 
turnaround however was based on an increased role for exports in generating economic 
growth for the United States‟ economy than had previously been the case. In turn, 
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America‟s industrial competitors took steps to further reduce their own domestic 
demand, in order to generate cost-effective conditions of production, to compensate for 
the increase in price of their exports from the revaluation of their currencies. This 
however worked to further depress the conditions of global aggregate demand, 
exacerbating the initial problem that had instigated the emergence of „stagflation‟ in the 
first place.  
The Carter administration attempted to address the issue of insufficient 
aggregate demand at the international level through its „locomotive‟ strategy. The 
inadequate implementation of this strategy by West Germany and Japan however, led to 
the failure of this global growth stimulus strategy. As such, the full implementation of 
this strategy by the United States alone proved to be highly inflationary for the US 
economy, as the stimulus package was ultimately undermined by the undercutting 
activities of foreign competitors, as had occurred throughout the 1970s. This discredited 
the political viability of the „locomotive‟ global growth strategy and paved the way for 
the ascension of the neo-classical position, along with the subsequent financialisation of 
the US economy. 
What this all calls into question therefore, is the assertion made by orthodox 
economists today that Keynesian theories of demand management are no longer 
relevant to the current debate. What seems to have been more of an issue in the 1970s 
was not domestic Keynesianism per se but rather the unfettered international 
environment that had undermined domestic Keynesianism in the first place. Keynesian 
policies proved an effective policy tool in stimulating national economies after the last 
great global depression in the 1930s. Perhaps rather than Keynesian policies being 
discarded by conventional policymakers, the unregulated nature of the international 
environment is looked at more closely and solutions are reached that aim to address this 
debilitating international environment. For as we shall see in the following chapter, the 
neoliberal laissez-faire solution, as practised in the United States throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, only worked to establish a financialised economy based on speculation, 
which in turn encouraged a serious decline in the country‟s productive sector, along 
with the emergence of a low road employment model.  
Today solutions need to be reached that avoid the establishment of these 
debilitating conditions. More than simple regulation in the financial sector needs to be 
introduced. Fundamentally, what is required is a move away from financialised growth 
back towards a productive-based system, similar to the one that was practised during the 
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Golden Age period. What this Chapter has shown is that the neoliberal assertion that the 
Keynesian planning system of growth was responsible for the emergence of 
„stagflation‟ in the 1970s is based on fairly shaky ground and other explanations are 
available. The current debate needs to be expanded to include these alternative 
perspectives if an effective solution (rather than a temporary stop-gap measure) is to be 
reached to grow the global economy out of its current predicament. 
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Chapter 3: Financialisation 
 
Introduction 
The perceived failure of the Carter administration‟s attempt to expand global 
aggregate demand through its „locomotive‟ strategy, paved the way for the ascension of 
neo-classical theories of economic development within American policy-making circles. 
This school of thought was heavily focused on the overall efficiency of an economy. It 
was thus implemented in American policy-making circles as an attempt to improve the 
country‟s competitive conditions of supply, in order for American producers to become 
more competitive against the cheaper prices of its primary competitors.  
The following chapter will provide an analysis of the practical outcome of the 
initiation of these supply-side policies. This will be employed as an argument against 
the continued application of neoliberal policies as the preferred policy response to the 
current recession. The chapter will trace the development of the process of 
„financialisation‟ during the 1980s and 1990s, a direct outcome, it will argue, of the 
pursuit of neoliberal supply-side policies throughout this period.  
The chapter will begin by analysing the impact of the „Volcker Shocks‟ - the 
imposition of high interest rates by the Federal Reserve - on the structure of the US 
economy. It will be argued that the imposition of these high interest rates ultimately 
worsened the situation of the American economy. As the rise in interest rates inspired 
an appreciation of the US dollar on the world‟s currency markets, it exacerbated the 
problem of profitability for the country‟s tradable sector against the influx of cheaper-
priced foreign imports. The following section will explore the theoretical roots of this 
high interest rate policy, namely the theory of Monetarism put forth by the neo-classical 
economist Milton Friedman. This section will show how the theory of Monetarism was 
largely formulated in opposition to the Keynesian theory of demand-management. 
 The next section of the chapter will analyse the supply-side policies put in place 
by the Reagan administration. It will be argued that these policies worked to redistribute 
resources and power away from Labour and America‟s middle class towards the holders 
of wealth within the country‟s financial sector. The economic environment that emerged 
under these polices led to the rise of the „corporate raider‟. This will encompass the 
focus of the following section. The chapter will argue that the rise of the corporate 
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raider was a response to the economic conditions of the time, where there existed large 
amounts of liquidity within the financial sector but no profitable outlets within the 
productive sector through which to invest this financial capital in. The rise of the raider 
constituted the first phase of the economic process of financialisation.  
 There did exist a brief attempt to revert the process of financialisation inside the 
United States economy and achieve growth through the country‟s productive sector. 
The next section of the paper will examine these efforts, in particular focusing on the 
attempt made by Treasury officials in the mid-1980s to address the problem of the high 
dollar, which was then stifling the profitability of the country‟s productive sector. These 
officials organised a diplomatic solution to the problem through the formulation of the 
Plaza Accord. This diplomatic effort achieved a measure of success, but was ultimately 
undermined by international developments that occurred outside the orbits of the 
Accord‟s agreements.  
 The next section of the chapter will analyse the second phase of financialisation 
inside the US economy. This second phase involved American corporations themselves 
adopting the short-term sharemarket appreciation strategy of the corporate raiders. The 
chapter will show how this second phase of financialisation was assisted by the re-
orientation of corporate management incentives during the 1990s. The chapter will 
argue that this second phase of financialisation was extremely destructive for the 
country‟s productive sector and worked to divorce the profitability of American firms 
from the conditions of the country‟s real economy, thus leading to the speculative 
sharemarket boom of the 1990s.  
 The remainder of the chapter will analyse the ways in which this process has 
impacted upon the productive capacity of the United States economy. This section will 
examine the ways in which this process has led to the rise of a number of structural 
factors inside the American economy, which together have encouraged the 
institutionalisation of a low-wage economy. It is this development that constitutes the 
primary problem of the United States economy into the twenty-first century, and is one 
of the major factors preventing an effective recovery from the current recession. 
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The „Volcker Shock‟ 
The redirection in Federal Reserve Monetary Policy following the appointment of Paul 
Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board on October 6 1979 was in many 
ways the preeminent turning point in US post-war economic history. It was largely from 
this point on that the United States turned away from an economy where growth was 
based primarily in the productive sector to one where financial market activity came to 
constitute the preeminent source of profitability for American companies. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, at the time of Volcker‟s appointment, the US economy was beset 
by two seemingly contradictory set of circumstances: industrial stagnation occurring 
simultaneously alongside an overheated (inflationary) economy. The preferred policy 
response to these two particular problems generated considerable debate amongst the 
academic community. In particular, debate revolved around which of the two problems 
should receive policy priority by the Federal Reserve in its efforts to maintain 
macroeconomic stability: industrial stagnation or price inflation.  
As we have seen, the conventional Keynesian solution to stimulating growth 
within a private sector beset by stagnating industries was for the government to directly 
pump money into the economy, via either increased fiscal spending or loose monetary 
policy. This injection of liquidity works to expand  aggregate demand for the goods and 
services sold within the domestic economy, increasing business profitability and thus 
putting productive industry back on a upwards track of economic growth. In direct 
contrast, the monetarist response to high inflation was to target the liquidity function of 
the money supply. This process involves instituting measures designed to reduce the 
amount of money circulating throughout the economy, namely through an increase in 
interest rates. This encourages increased household saving, which in turn reduces 
consumer spending within the economy.  Consequently, with more money tied up in 
household savings, producers are pressured to lower their prices if they wish to sell the 
same number of units within the economy, as consumers forego their previous levels of 
spending due to the higher returns to saving found within the financial sector.  In this 
way prices on the supply curve are lowered in order to meet the reduced spending limits 
exercised on the demand curve. As a result, the inflated economy is brought back down 
to a position of macro-economic equilibrium, thus addressing the problem of inflation 
within the economy.   
The problem however, is that this monetarist anti-inflationary strategy, with its 
emphasis on the demand curve as the ultimate source of pressure on producers to lower 
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their prices, inevitably has a dampening effect on the level of aggregate demand that 
exists within the macro-economy. As a result, if implemented during a period of 
economic slowdown, this strategy will invariably impose a strong hindrance upon the 
ability of private enterprise to overcome its industrial inertia, as the economic 
environment is one that encourages saving not the consumer spending that is necessary 
to increase sales and restore profitability. This therefore exacerbates the problem of 
stagnation for the private sector, a problem that constituted one of the major problems 
of the American economy in the late 1970s. 
It was therefore clear that if implemented, the two opposing theoretical solutions 
would produce conflicting outcomes, heightening the problems experienced by the 
American economy. A clear choice thus existed for the country‟s economic authorities 
in regards to which of the two problems to address: price inflation or industrial 
stagnation.  Initially an attempt was made to revive industrial growth under the Carter 
administration‟s locomotive strategy. However the perceived economic failure of this 
strategy provided an empirical basis for the monetarist position to push forth its own 
policy platform. This was achieved by the rapid redirection in Federal Reserve 
monetary policy under the leadership of Paul Volcker.  
Michael Mussa, a member of the Reagan Council of Economic Advisers 
provides a poignant account of the rapidity of the changes in Federal Reserve monetary 
policy under Volcker. Mussa states that on the “Saturday” of his appointment, Volcker 
immediately increased the Federal Reserve‟s discount rate - the rate it charges for 
overnight lending to the banking sector –a full percentage point “to a new record of 12 
percent”.110 The Federal Reserve‟s discount rate has a huge influence on the rates of 
interest found in the financial markets, as this is the interest rate private banks must pay 
to borrow for overnight lending from the Federal Reserve in order to clear up any 
imbalances left over amongst themselves after the day‟s trading.  
As such the discount rate of the Federal Reserve largely sets the rates of interest 
charged by banks in the private sector. Indeed this was clearly evident after the first 
initial raise in interest rates in October 1979. According to Mussa, the “financial market 
response to the new Federal Reserve policy was immediate and dramatic. On the 
following Monday, the short-term interest rates leapt upward”.111 Interest rates set by 
the Federal Reserve would continue to rise into the first two years of the 1980s. “During 
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the seven weeks following the presidential election, the Federal Funds Rate [the 
discount rate] was driven up 6 percentage points, to nearly 20 percent by mid December 
1980”.112 Indeed, from November 1980 through to October 1981, the “Federal Funds 
Rate was kept above 15 percent, half the time in the range of 18 to 20 percent”.113 
The high interest rates pursued by the Federal Reserve clearly favoured the 
financial sector over that of America‟s productive enterprises. Under the inflationary 
period of the 1970s it had proved extremely difficult for the financial markets to 
generate a profit. Due to the rapidly rising rate of inflation during this period, lenders 
had become increasingly frustrated in their efforts to establish an interest rate that was 
both attractive to borrowers at the time of the loan‟s origination, while also being able 
to maintain a interest rate that was consistently higher than the rate of inflation 
throughout the loan‟s duration. Thus with high rates of inflation steadily eroding the 
purchasing power of money, interest rates had failed to keep pace with the rise of 
inflation, leading to zero or negative returns for those who lent money out into the 
economy. In this regard, inflation was clearly more disruptive to the financial sector 
than it was to the country‟s productive enterprises, who, as we have seen in the analysis 
of the post-war planning system, were able to tacitly coordinate prices amongst 
themselves in order to pass on rising costs of production to their consumers, who in turn 
were able to demand higher wages to cover the rising costs of consumer items.  
From the perspective of the planning system, a rising floor for consumer prices 
within the United States‟ domestic economy was in fact a positive development for the 
nation‟s producers, who had previously experienced a dramatic deterioration in their 
ability to mark-up prices over costs due to the rapid influx of lower-priced imports into 
their respective markets. A rising price floor through inflation was enabling American 
firms to increase their mark-ups once again, in order to recover some of the revenue lost 
through the incursion of aggressive price competition by foreign producers. Over time, 
it is highly likely this mark-up recovery would have enabled firms to generate the 
required revenue to once again initiate internally-driven long-term productive 
investments. It was these investments that carried the capacity to enable American 
producers to regain commercial competitiveness through the innovative production of 
advanced industrial goods, in the process speeding up the technological obsolescence of 
their foreign competitors inside the US consumer markets. 
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Consequently, the conventional means of relying on internal revenue to fund 
long-term productive investments meant that for productive enterprises, an inflated 
money supply was not a disastrous outcome. Profitability for these firms was generated 
from the initiation of productivity improvements or the commercialisation of innovative 
new technologies, not on passively holding money within their corporate coffers. Indeed 
the benefit to borrowing under the inflationary conditions of the 1970s was not 
necessarily a bad thing for America‟s productive industries. With low-cost foreign 
competition inhibiting the ability of US firms to earn the required revenue to engage in 
productivity-improving long-term investment projects, the highly favourable 
inflationary-induced conditions of borrowing could have provided them with a source of 
low cost capital, which could have enabled them to quickly re-engage in their long-term 
investment strategies, thus countering low cost foreign competition through greater 
productivity in their industrial manufacturing.  
However the initiation of high interest rates inside the United States prevented 
the possibility of such an industrial strategy from being adopted by the nation‟s 
productive firms. The combination of high interest rates, in association with the 
country‟s newly deregulated financial markets, proved highly attractive to international 
investors looking for a lucrative location to invest their capital in.
114
 In consequence, a 
considerable sum of capital left the Eurodollar markets in favour of the higher returns 
offered by the elevated interest rates inside the United States. This exponentially 
increased the international demand for the US dollar, which in turn radically appreciated 
its exchange rate on the foreign exchange markets. 
For America‟s productive enterprises, this increase in the international valuation 
of the dollar on the foreign exchange markets dramatically exacerbated their problem of 
having to compete against lower-priced imports inside the country‟s consumer markets. 
Due to the appreciation of the dollar, the cost of the imports inside the United States 
were now rendered even cheaper, as the currencies of the countries where these imports 
originated from were now considerably cheaper than the exchange rate that prevailed 
for the US dollar.
115
 In summary, the US financial sector was boosted by considerable 
funds from foreign investors looking for a place that generated high returns for their 
capital. This however increased the demand for the US dollar on the foreign exchange 
markets, raising its price and in the process undermining the competitive conditions of 
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the country‟s tradable sector. Notably, this included the country‟s manufacturing 
industries, which at the time constituted the primary driving engine of the US economy.  
As a result, the “Volcker Shock” - the imposition of excessively high interest 
rates - culminated in a severe contraction of the US economy. During the “deep and 
prolonged recession” that lasted from 1980 to 1982, “GNP would fall absolutely by 3.3 
percent and the unemployment rate would rise to a postwar peak of 10.8 percent”. With 
their competitiveness now even further undermined inside their home market by the 
dramatic appreciation of the dollar, many manufacturing firms either went bust or laid 
off staff and reduced their productive output. This further reduced aggregate demand 
throughout the economy, weakening demand in the domestic market for their goods, 
which in turn resulted in more redundancies, in the process precipitating a self-
reinforcing recessionary cycle.  
 
Keynesianism Vs Monetarism 
In order to understand this policy development it is important to analyse the 
academic debate that lead to the ascension of the monetarist position. As we shall see, it 
was the practical implementation of this theoretical assumption that largely fuelled the 
financialisation process inside the United States economy. As such, if a full 
understanding of the financialisation process is to be achieved, a clear comprehension of 
the underlying theory is essential. This theoretical analysis is especially essential for an 
understanding of the financial crisis faced by the United States today. Conventional 
analyses of the current crisis are shaped by the monetarist position that gained ascension 
during the late 1970s. The historical foundation of this theoretical paradigm therefore 
needs to be analysed in order to determine whether the orthodox policies of today are 
indeed effective solutions to the contemporary crisis, or whether in fact their application 
in the past was one of the key contributing factors to today‟s financial recession.  
The theoretical backdrop underpinning the Federal Reserve‟s high interest rates 
in the early 1980s was the monetarist position championed by the neoclassical 
economist Milton Friedman. Friedman employed his monetarist theory as a critique 
against the Keynesian-inspired fiscal spending that had been pursued by successive 
governmental policymakers throughout the post-war period. The crux of Friedman‟s 
critique rested on the assertion that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon”. As such Freidman attributed the cause of inflation to an excessive 
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expansion in an economy‟s money supply. (“To control inflation”, Friedman had 
argued, “you need to control the money supply”).116  This excess constituted an 
expansion beyond that which was „naturally‟ produced by the private-sector market 
economy. In this regards, the „natural‟ rate of the money supply was that which was 
directly generated by the market mechanisms of supply and demand, which if left 
unhindered by external forces (such as the government) and thus enabled to achieve 
economic equilibrium, would produce the natural rate of growth for an economy‟s 
money supply. According to this argument, government spending, as an initial injection 
of liquidity in order to stimulate a stagnating private sector, generated an over-excessive 
expansion in an economy‟s money supply. It was this excessive monetary expansion, 
Friedman argued, which had enabled producers to raise their prices above what the 
„natural‟ level should have been in the markets, thus generating an inflationary economy 
in the process.
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Friedman‟s theory on monetarism was essentially a rehashing of the classical 
assumption of “Say‟s Law”, a “law” that had already been largely discredited by 
Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
118
 The 
contemporary scholars William Mitchel and Joan Muysken claim that “[n]othing really 
changed in the modern statement of monetarism that had not been shown to be 
deficient, albeit in different terms, by Keynes and others”.119 It is therefore important to 
examine the empirically flawed argument of this classical “law‟, in order to identify the 
deficiencies with Friedman‟s contemporary position. 
 According to Says “Law” whatever was spent within the economy was earned 
again. It was this “law” that in theory enabled a position of economic equilibrium to be 
reached between the market mechanisms of supply and demand. Over the long term, 
according to Says Law, the output costs of production would match the input gains or 
profits collectively made by private companies. Keynes however argued that this law of 
equilibrium was in fact nothing more than an economic fallacy. He pointed to the 
prevalence of personal savings rates in what he called the “paradox of thrift” to illustrate 
his case. Keynes argued that not all the capital that firms spent on wages and salaries 
was put back into the economy in order to purchase the goods and services sold by 
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business in the consumer markets. This was because individual workers chose to save a 
portion of their earned income. As such, this saved portion of personal income was 
removed from the consumer economy and thus represented a consistent barrier against 
the emergence of economic equilibrium, where output costs match input profits, as 
asserted by Says Law.
120
  
Keynes showed how the higher the rate of savings by individual households, the 
less demand there existed in aggregate for the goods and services produced within the 
economy. If savings as a proportion of income reached especially high levels - what 
Keynes described as „hoarding‟ – in response to, say, for instance, an onset of 
recessionary conditions, which encouraged households to save more of their earned 
income in order to provide them with enough capital to get through the hard times 
ahead, then this would further reduce the degree of aggregate demand found within the 
economy. In turn, Keynes argued, this decrease in demand would result in reduced 
profitability, encouraging layoffs and the further entrenchment of the recessionary 
conditions.
121
 As we have seen, Keynes‟ solution to this situation was for the 
government to step in and fill the fall in aggregate demand through its own fiscal 
spending. 
One of the great revolutionary insights of Keynes General Theory was the 
author‟s conception of the macroeconomy. It was here where Keynes demonstrated how 
the best course of action taken at the micro level of the individual firm does not 
necessarily translate into the best case scenario for the economy as a whole.
122
 In this 
respects, the ascendancy of Keynesian theory signified a massive departure from the 
conventional analysis contained in the classical paradigm. Economists working under 
the assumption originally postulated by the classical progenitor Adam Smith, believed 
that the most efficient results at the aggregate level were produced by each market 
player doing what was individually in their own best interests. Smith had argued that “It 
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our 
dinner but from their regard to their own self-interest”.123  
Classical economic theory therefore was heavily constrained in its analysis of 
economic recessions, primarily through the preconceived assumption that what was 
most efficient at the micro level was also the most efficient at the macro level. Periods 
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of economic downturn were thus attributed to natural fluctuations in the market, an 
analysis that largely ignored how actions taken at the micro level could exacerbate such 
situations, while also exempting the possibility of human action to mitigate such 
recessions.  Indeed it was the inability of the classical paradigm to actively address the 
deep and severe downturn of the 1930s depression that lead to the application of the 
Keynesian prescription as an effective solution to that economic crisis.  
In his analysis on the 1930s depression, Keynes illustrated how the most 
efficient course of action at the micro level – cutting back costs such as investment and 
employment – was actually worsening the economic situation at the macro level, as the 
culmination of cost-cutting activity across the economy curtailed the degree of 
aggregate demand that existed within the consumer markets. In consequence, efficiency 
maximising measures at the micro level were exacerbating the situation of low 
profitability that existed at the macro-level. In summary, during periods of economic 
downturn, the individual pursuit of self-maximisation does not collectively culminate in 
the most efficient employment of resources at the aggregate level, as classical (and 
today neo-classical) economists maintain. In fact, in this scenario, rather than being 
beneficial to all, it is in fact the inverse, mutually destructive for all concerned. The 
pursuit of individual self-maximisation – or rather self-preservation - during the 1930s 
depression, precipitated a down-ward spiralling recessionary cycle, which in the 
collective, constrained the business prospects of the nation‟s productive enterprises.  
Despite the empirical economic recovery that was generated from the Keynesian 
recognition in the major flaw contained within the classical assumption of Say‟s Law, 
Friedman was able to reinstate the defunct classical doctrine by arguing that while 
Keynesian demand-management may prove successful in stimulating an economy in the 
short-term, in the long-run, the inflation that it generates will ultimately prove more 
harmful to the country‟s economy than the effects of the initial recession. In his seminal 
1968 paper „The Role of Monetary Policy‟, Friedman made the assertion that “[t]here is 
no long-run, stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment”.124 In making this 
assertion, Freidman was arguing that the inflationary pressures involved with Keynesian 
stimulus packages would eventually undermine the creation of the short-term 
employment generated through government spending.  
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Friedman‟s argument was based on the classical position that assumed a 
“neutral” role for money in the economy. Under this assumption, the growth of the 
money supply merely reflected the interaction between the market mechanisms of 
supply and demand, with the economic equilibrium between supply and demand 
generating the natural growth of the money supply, a similar proposition to the one 
theorised by Say‟s Law. In accordance with this view of monetary neutrality, Friedman 
argued that any government-induced increase in an economy‟s money supply is unable 
to achieve any real (inflation-adjusted) impact on the economy over the long-term, as it 
merely alters nominal prices and income in a “proportionate way”.125 According to the 
logic of Friedman, following the application of a Keynesian pump-priming measure, 
labour responds to the inflationary-induced increase in nominal wages by increasing its 
supply in the market. Firms on the other hand, carrying the logistical capacity to read 
the real signs of the market, realise that this nominal increase is inspired by inflationary 
pressures and thus do not raise their output accordingly. Eventually, Friedman argues, 
workers realise their „error‟, in that the nominal rise in wages does not represent real 
gains but merely reflects inflationary expectations. They therefore reduce their supply to 
the market and as a result the employment figure falls back down to its “natural level”. 
It is from this theoretically-defined „inevitable‟ outcome that Friedman bases his 
assertion that in the “long-run there is no stable trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment”.126  
It was the ideological belief in this „inevitable‟ outcome that led Paul Volcker to 
continue with his interest-rate shock treatment, even after the American economy had 
succumbed to a severe recession in the early years of the 1980s. Volcker himself stated 
that the “recession had begun in mid-1981, but we did not adopt a strongly 
expansionary monetary policy until the summer of 1982”.127 Why the enforced delayed 
reaction? Namely because the top priority of the Federal Reserve was not employment, 
industrial health, or indeed economic growth; it was inflation. This priority is clearly 
evident in Volcker‟s justifications for the tough actions of the Federal Reserve during 
these years. Volcker argued that “although the economy was in a recession, inflation 
had not fallen very much by early 1982” thus necessitating the need to maintain high 
interest rates.
128
 Volcker obviously felt that the economic effects of continued inflation 
                                                             
125 Ibid 
126
 Ibid 
127
 Paul Volcker, ‘Monetary Policy’ in Feldstein American Economic Policy in the 1980s, P.149 
128 Ibid 
74 
 
would ultimately, over the long-term, prove to be far more disruptive to the country‟s 
economy than the severe recession that at the time gripped the nation.   
 
The Empirical Effects of Monetarism: Financial VS. Productive Growth 
However it was the stubborn insistence on starving the productive economy 
from the essential liquidity required for American industry to grow its way out of the 
recession that ultimately proved to be the most disruptive for the long-term health of the 
US economy. As we have seen in the analysis of the planning system, the source of 
liquidity for long-term investments in the productive sector had traditionally come from 
revenue generated though sales made in the consumer markets. In the 1980s, this 
revenue was severely curtailed by both the domestic recession and the appreciation of 
the US dollar, which had undermined the competitiveness of American producers 
against foreign imports.  
The high interest rates did however generate considerable liquidity inside the 
financial sector, as foreign capital flooded in to capture the high returns found in the 
country‟s financial markets. In this manner, due to the economic conditions established 
by the monetarist turn of the Federal Reserve, far greater returns could now be made 
through the sale of dollar-denominated assets in the financial sector rather than through 
sales made in the consumer markets for manufactured products. From this point on, 
financial-based profits came to constitute a growing component of corporate activity, as 
reliance on revenue gained solely through sales in the productive markets proved more 
and more of an untenable endeavour. Hence, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that 
the real threat to the long-term health of the American economy was not inflation, but in 
fact the anti-inflationary strategy adopted by the country‟s economic authorities. It was 
the imposition of this strategy that set the stage for the financialisation of the US 
economy, a process that has thus far proved highly unstable. Indeed, the crash of the 
2008 credit bubble is merely the latest manifestation of this highly disruptive process.   
A major flaw of the monetarist position is that it took no account of the 
empirical economic situation that existed in the post war planning system. In particular 
it failed to identify the important interconnections that existed between wages, prices 
and consumer demand within that system. In the planning system, the steady and 
coordinated increase in prices was matched by a steady and coordinated increase in 
wages. As a result, by increasing wages, firms increased households‟ disposable income 
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and thus the aggregate demand for their goods within the country‟s consumer markets. 
In this way, inflation was kept in check with economic growth, for by paying higher 
wages, consumer demand continued to grow, enabling firms to maintain their 
established sales-track and thus continue to earn the internal revenue that was providing 
them with the capital to engage in long-term productive investment. Thus in contrast to 
Friedman‟s postulation that wage rises were inevitably inflationary, coordinated wage 
increases actually enabled the American economy to continue to grow, existing as an 
essential component in the growth of consumer aggregate demand that provided the 
financial stability (in terms of sales) for private firms to continue to engage in their 
productivity-improving long-term innovative investment strategies.  
Therefore, in contrast to the monetarist position, wage rises were not a source of 
excessive inflation, disrupting prices and the efficient allocation of investment funds. 
Indeed, the small amount of inflation that did occur in this period was an essential 
component in the ability of Golden Age corporations to plan out and undertake long-
term investment projects, financed as they were by internal revenue generated through 
sales in the nation‟s consumer markets. The simultaneous increase in both employment 
and wages during the twenty years of the Golden Age offers an empirical indictment 
against the Friedman assertion that workers would voluntarily withdraw their labour 
once they had „figured out‟ that their wage rises were only „nominal‟. In reality, the 
technological advancement generated through productive investment ensured that there 
were real economic gains achieved during this period. As we have seen this investment 
was highly contingent on the ability to maintain sales in the country‟s consumer 
markets. The increase in both wages and employment during this period ensured that 
consumer demand would continue to grow, in order to accommodate the sales required 
to finance this productive investment.  
 
The Institutional attack on Labour 
Friedman argued that there was a “natural” level of unemployment for any given 
economy. Any attempts by a government to redress unemployment beyond its natural 
level would invariably, according to Friedman, be inflationary. This ideological 
assumption became established in US policy-making circles through the formulation of 
the NAIRU index, (the Non-Accelerating Rate of Unemployment). The NAIRU index 
calculated a „natural‟ level of unemployment beyond which any attempts to decrease 
unemployment past this point would inevitably prove inflationary. The adoption of this 
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index reflected an ideological shift in American policy-making circles. Rather than 
Keynesian demand management being used as a means to increase employment, 
emphasis was now placed on improving the supply of labour, notably its efficiency, in 
order to improve cost-competitiveness against the United States‟ cheaper commercial 
rivals. Under this ideological imperative, the position of labour was to be readjusted to 
become more malleable with the interests of the free market. The imposition of this 
ideological belief in governmental circles exacted a tremendous toll on the significant 
gains the labour movement had made during the first twenty years of the postwar 
period.
129
 
The Volcker Shock constituted the first regressive undermining effort against 
the position of labour within the US economy. Here the redirection in Federal Reserve 
monetary policy clearly favoured the economic position of financial capital over that of 
labour. By placing primary importance upon inflation reduction at the expense of 
employment, labour became the lamb that was sacrificed in order to restore the 
profitability of the financial sector. Historically high interest rates were implemented by 
the Federal Reserve, as the new governing authorities believed that the country‟s money 
supply had been unnaturally expanded by twenty years of Keynesian fiscal spending, 
particularly after the expansion in social welfare spending under President Lyndon 
Johnson‟s „Great Society‟ programme during the 1960s. In addition to this „correction‟ 
in the money supply, it was believed that suitable measures had to be taken to address 
the structural factors that had enabled this „unnatural‟ growth to occur. This task was 
enthusiastically adopted by the incoming Reagan administration, a bastion of the neo-
classical school of economics. Under this new ideological initiative, Keynesian demand 
management policies were deemed inflationary. It was now up to the United States to 
improve its conditions of supply, or so the ideologues believed, if it was to establish the 
economic foundations to achieve „real‟ as opposed to „inflationary‟ economic growth.130 
The solution to increasing the competitiveness of American industry by the 
Reagan administration and the Republican Congress of the 1980s lay not in increasing 
R&D spending; nor for that matter in making infrastructural investments in order to 
improve the innovation and performance of the nation‟s productive firms. Such a 
strategy would arguably have enabled American firms to effectively regain 
competitiveness in terms of quality, utilising the country‟s established technological 
capacity, particularly its highly skilled workforce, to generate new and improved 
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products for the world and its domestic consumer markets. No, under the guiding force 
of the Reagan administration, America‟s competitiveness was to be achieved by 
enacting measures to reduce its cost of production, so as to put it on a more competitive 
footing (in terms of price) with its cheaper foreign competitors. It must be noted that at 
this point the greatest advantage America‟s foreign competitors had inside the United 
States market in terms of cost was that of their considerably lower exchange rates 
compared to that of the US dollar. As we have seen, this was a disadvantage that was 
largely self-imposed through the high interest rates set by the Federal Reserve. 
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration ignored these international imbalances and 
pursued an efficiency-inducing drive with the aim of decreasing the cost of production 
inside the United States. 
One of the largest cost components of corporate production was labour. Of 
course the costs paid out to labour also played an important function in maintaining the 
domestic demand that had fuelled economic growth during the preceding Golden Age 
period. However the Reagan administration ignored this important demand function in 
favour of an economic system where financial profits would be achieved by 
undermining and reducing labour‟s cut of the economic pie. The Reagan administration 
established its attack on organised labour inside the US economy by setting a precedent 
in the manner in which it dealt with industrial disputes with its own public sector 
workforce. When aircraft workers represented by the union PATCO went on strike 
against unfair working conditions, Reagan responded by firing the workers and 
replacing them with temporary contractors. This signalled an end to effective 
government support for organised labour, and legitimised the application of similar 
action by private employers.
131
 The subsequent adoption of this precedent by the private 
sector was documented by the labour historian Damon A. Silvers. According to Silvers, 
employers “used permanent replacements to break strikes across the industrial 
landscape in campaigns like International Paper, Hormel, Caterpillar, Continental and 
Eastern Airlines”. In addition, Silvers argues that “PATCO was followed by the 
effective cessation of labor law enforcement by the NLRB [the National Labour 
Relations Board]”. 132 
Effectively what the Reagan administration established with the precedent it set 
with PATCO, was a new political economy where labour was not recognised as playing 
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a vital and important role in generating economic growth. Labour was redefined as a 
cost, not as a source of innovation and productivity, as it had previously been defined 
during the Golden Age period. As such, the new political economy established by the 
Reagan administration considerably disenfranchised the position of organised labour 
within the American economy. This disenfranchisement was followed by a massive 
drop in union membership throughout the 1980s. It is important to note here that union 
disenfranchisement preceded the drop in union membership. This is an important point 
to remember in the contemporary climate, where the solution to empowering the 
position of labour is often seen as simply one of increasing union membership. While 
increasing membership numbers is of course a highly worthy endeavour, the greatest 
barrier to the disempowerment of trade unions is a political economy where wage rises 
and increases to employment are perceived as inflationary and a burden to international 
competitiveness. 
The Reagan administration subscribed to the neoliberal agenda that prescribed a 
„trickle-down‟ source of economic growth. This ideological belief has driven American 
economic policy for the thirty years following the electoral victory of the Reagan 
administration and its practical implementation accounts for one of the fundamental 
factors behind the financialisation of the American economy. According to this „trickle-
down‟ theory, wealth initially needs to be concentrated at the top of the income 
spectrum in order to for there to be enough funds to finance new business 
endeavours.
133
 The main problem with this approach however, is that it places too much 
emphasis upon providing funds at the top where the initial  investment comes from and 
not enough on dispersing wealth in order to have a sufficient consumer market to 
purchase the products of the original investment. It is arguably the existence of a 
sufficient consumer market that determines whether the initial investment is profitable 
and thus commercially feasible. However with more wealth concentrated at the top and 
less available for consumption within the middle and lower income stratas, the ability 
for business to make enough sales in order to cover the initial investment is markedly 
reduced. This is a problem that is further compounded by the fact that the trickle-down 
theory assumes a greater role for shareholders and outside investors in financing new 
productive investment. As a result, there is a greater demand on the company to make 
increased returns on any new investment project, in order to satisfy the demands of its 
external investors. In this manner, with increased demands upon their profits by outside 
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investors, together with a reduced capacity for the consumer markets to purchase new 
products, the practical application of a „trickle-down‟ investment model can actually act 
as a disincentive to undertake new productive investment initiatives, at least to the scale 
that was initiated under the planning system of the Golden Age period. 
 
The Reagan Tax Cuts 
Besides labour, the other excessive cost component the Reagan administration 
deemed to be curtailing the competitiveness of corporate America was taxes. Taxes 
were argued to constitute too high a component of corporate America‟s annual 
expenditures and as such were cited as being one of the largest barriers to increased 
productive investment within the American economy.
134
 This ideological belief 
however ignored the significant role the government played during the Golden Age 
period, of providing contracts for research and development throughout the private 
sector. These contracts were of course financed by tax-payer funds, so corporate 
America did in fact derive benefits from taxation and this taxation did spur innovative 
investment within private enterprises. As such, these government contracts served an 
important role in steering the American economy towards the production of advanced 
technological items, putting the country at a significant advantage in the world economy 
for a number of years. However, the supply-siders that dominated the Reagan 
administration believed that paying too much in taxes was holding corporate America 
back. What was required was a reduction in taxes across the board. It was argued that 
this would serve as a stimulus to kick the economy out of the recession the American 
economy was mired in at the beginning of the 1980s.  
The tax cuts that were initiated by the Reagan administration were inspired by 
some extremely shaky economic theory. According to the economic logic of the supply-
siders, the tax cuts initiated by the Reagan administration would ultimately pay for 
themselves. By enabling workers to take home more of their after-tax incomes; it was 
believed more people would be encouraged to enter the workforce. With more workers 
in the workforce, it was argued, there would be greater productivity and thus greater 
incentives to invest in the American economy. Moreover, with more people employed 
in the workforce, the federal government would now have more people to tax from. In 
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this way while the individual tax burden would be reduced for American workers, the 
collective tax-take of the federal government would actually be increased.
135
  
This supply-side tax logic stemmed from an extreme interpretation of the 
already suspect Say‟s „law‟. According to the supply-side interpretation, rather than 
supply matching demand as in the „law‟ of Says law, supply actually creates its own 
demand. From a practical standpoint this is a highly illogical outcome. For why would 
an enterprise choose to employ more workers before the market demand for its products 
had expanded to a level to where the extra labour was needed? Certainly by increasing 
its workforce a business could increase its output as the supply-side doctrine 
maintained, but it would not be able to make money on this increased output unless 
there existed a sufficient and growing consumer market for its products. It is clear that a 
firm will never be able to profitably increase its supply to the market unless the demand 
for its output is growing and the business - in terms of actual sales - has begun to 
expand. In this respects, it is arguably clear that in stark contrast to the supply-side 
position, supply does not increase demand. In fact it is the inverse that is true: an 
increase in demand enables an expansion in supply to be commercially viable, thus 
ensuring that the economy expands in a sustainable fashion. Indeed this constituted the 
key logic behind the Keynesian stimulus measures. Here an increase in aggregate 
demand enabled private business to profitably expand its output of supply, in the 
process generating a self-reinforcing expansionary cycle. In attempting to politically 
discredit the empirically validated Keynesian formula, the supply-siders offered its 
inverse. The practical application of this inverted theory created numerous problems for 
the American economy, not the least of which was the explosion of federal debt 
following the initiation of the supply-side tax cuts.
136
 
Supply-side logic argued that the Reagan tax cuts would ultimately pay for 
themselves. By encouraging more people to take up paid employment, the overall pool 
of taxable incomes would be enlarged. In this way while individual tax intakes were 
reduced, it was postulated that the government would be able to tax an enlarged number 
of individuals. This theoretical presumption however ignored the fact that 
unemployment in the 1980s was primarily structural, not voluntary as the supply-siders 
had claimed. In the early 1980s American companies were unable to expand 
employment in the face of a severe domestic recession, exacerbated by lower cost 
foreign competition that had been given a further boost by the high exchange rate of the 
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US dollar. No matter how willing individual workers were to join the workforce, in the 
prevailing economic climate, most companies could not afford to take them on.  
The series of tax cuts implemented by the Reagan administration displayed a 
remarkable absence of foresight for a governing administration. According to the 
economist Paul Krugman, the logic behind the supply-side tax cuts was so suspect that 
it had very little following amongst the academic community at large, even among the 
most ardent advocates of neoclassical economics. According to Krugman “supply-side 
economics remained a tiny sect, whose ideas commanded the allegiance of only a 
handful of economists, most of the Republican Party, and the [then] President of the 
United States”.  Supply-siders “came from the fringes of economics: from journalism, 
from congressional staff positions, from consulting firms…They promoted their ideas 
not through papers in academic journals but in op-ed pieces and articles in semi-popular 
magazines like The Public Interest”.137  
A reading of articles written by academic neoliberal economists prominent 
during the 1980s confirms Krugman‟s observation. Martin Feldstein, the chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to the Reagan administration, claimed that 
while he “was convinced that there would be some favourable offsetting feedback 
effects of the lower tax rates on total revenue”, was clear in his assertion that “the tax 
cut would definitely not be self-financing”.138  
In addition Feldstein offers an interesting insight into the President‟s own take 
on the supply-side tax theory. According to Feldstein: 
Although the President believed in the supply-side effects of lower taxes, I 
never thought that he accepted the extreme supply-side position that lower tax 
rates would actually increase tax revenue. He did make such statements in public 
announcements and press conferences, but I never recall him saying that in 
private discussions with senior administration officials; perhaps even if he once 
believed it, he no longer did by mid 1982 when I joined the administration. 
139
 
This observation offers an important insight into the interstices of politics and 
economics during the 1980s neoliberal revolution in economic policy-making. While 
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Feldstein‟s observation is heavily based on speculation, it is nevertheless speculation 
undertaken by a man with detailed knowledge of the inside mechanics of economic 
policy-making within the Reagan administration. With this in mind, Feldstein‟s own 
admission that he never believed in the logic behind the supply-side tax cuts is 
particularly telling, especially since he was himself a prominent member in the 
administration that pushed through the tax cuts. The significant difference in Feldstein‟s 
political policy-making and his academic writing demonstrates a considerable 
contradiction in his work. However it is this key contradiction that gives us the greatest 
insight into the formulation of neoliberal economic thought that came to prominence 
during the reign of the Reagan administration.  
 It is clear in the above contradiction that political considerations took 
precedence over the academic concerns of the administrations principal economists. 
This is an important point that needs to be highlighted, not the least because it occurred 
in an administration that publicly championed the removal of political considerations 
from economic policy-making. During his campaign trail, Reagan had capitalised on the 
public frustration that had stemmed from the stagnation of income during the stagflation 
of the 1970s. Reagan campaigned on a platform that promised to reduce taxes and 
increase take-home incomes throughout America. It was nothing short of buying votes, 
made worse by the fact that the administration made no provisions to enable the tax cuts 
to become affordable into the future. Rather the Reagan administration relied on a bogus 
economic theory to explain away its „ability‟ to achieve this. Clearly over the two terms 
of the Reagan administration, political promises took precedence over the formulation 
of effective solutions to the country‟s very real economic problems. This is clearly 
evident in Feldstein‟s admission, that the Party line “did complicate my subsequent job 
as CEA chairman in defending the tax packages as good economics despite its obvious 
failure to raise revenue”.140  
  
The Disproportionate Nature of the Tax Cuts 
The tax cuts instituted by the Reagan administration disproportionately favoured 
those in the upper income spectrum. According to Krugman, citing a study which 
calculated the impact of all tax changes made during the 1980s on families at different 
levels of income, “a family in the middle of the income spectrum was actually paying a 
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higher share of its income taxes in 1989 than it was in 1980”. This increase in tax 
payments was due to the fact that for these middle income families “the increase in 
social insurance payments was more than twice as large as the fall in income tax”. In 
contrast, “a family in the top one percent of the distribution got a lot of tax relief, the 
fall in its income tax was twenty times as large as the increase in its social insurance 
payments. The overall tax rate on these high-income families fell from 36.5 percent in 
1980 to 26.7 percent in 1989”.141 For those in the lower income spectrum the cuts made 
to social services in order to finance the tax cuts ensured that their total losses from the 
so called tax cuts were even greater. 
 Along with those at the top of the income spectrum, those who earned income 
from financial market activity received a significant cut in the tax they paid to the 
federal government. According to Martin Feldstein, an “emphasis on saving and 
investment played an important part in the tax reforms of 1981”. This emphasis 
included: “strengthened incentives for business fixed investment through more rapid 
depreciation allowances; increased incentives to save through universal eligibility for 
individual retirement accounts; and an increased return on individual equity investments 
through lower rates of capital gains”.142 In accordance with the „trickle-down‟ theory of 
economic growth, it was believed that by increasing the tax incentives for wealthy 
individuals to invest in the economy, America would be able to recover economic 
growth, irrespective of the conditions of demand that existed within the country‟s 
consumer markets.  
 As had been predicted, the promised tax cuts were not financially feasible and 
the federal deficit ballooned as a result. According to the economist James M. Poterba, 
“as a share of GNP, the federal deficit rose from 2.8 percent in fiscal 1980 to a peak of 
6.3 percent for fiscal 1983”. For a measure of comparison “the federal deficit averaged 
0.8 percent of GNP in the 1960s and 2.1 percent in the 1970s”.143 This federal deficit 
had to be financed from somewhere and the federal government turned to the nation‟s 
financial sector to provide the loans (through the purchase of government bonds) to 
finance its excess in spending. According to Feldstein, “interest payments on the 
national debt increased from 2.0 percent of GDP in 1980 to 3.4 percent in 1990”.144 As 
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a result, a growing proportion of government spending was now directed towards the 
servicing of its debts to the financial community. In this way the financial sector earned 
a double whammy on the tax cuts it was provided by the federal government. As we 
have seen the tax cuts disproportionately benefited those in the upper income spectrum, 
along with those who derived income from financial market activity. These same 
individuals, as the greatest holders of wealth in the country, also held a disproportionate 
share of government bonds and thus were by far the greatest recipients of the interest 
the government paid out on its national debt. Thus not only did these individuals receive 
a large tax cut that the country could not afford, they also derived income from the 
interest on the loans they provided to the government, a possibility that was provided by 
the fact that the government could not afford to give them a tax cut in the first place. As 
such, it is arguably clear that the Reagan tax cuts were nothing less than a direct 
political redistribution of resources away from the bottom of American society to the 
top by the federal government. It was not - as was publicly proclaimed at the time - the 
efficient allocation of economic resources by the free market system.  
 
The Rise of the Raider: Financialisation Part 1 
With a stream of investment funds flooding into the United States in response to 
the rise in interest rates by the Federal Reserve, the country‟s financial sector was ripe 
with funds to invest in the US economy. The problem however, was that due to the rise 
in the dollar from this flood of foreign funds; the major manufacturing corporations 
were having a hard time making sales in their respective markets. As such they were 
extremely hesitant to undertake new investment projects, owing to the lack of consumer 
demand in their respective product markets. A few entrepreneurial individuals however 
began to devise means to capitalise on the increased access to financial capital, in a way 
that did not involve undertaking a commitment in physical productive investment. It 
was in this manner that the corporate raider and the leveraged buy-out movement of the 
1980s came into fruition.  
 Corporate raiders were financial traders who borrowed massive amounts from 
banks and other financial institutions - who at the time were eager to lend and thus 
capitalise on their recently acquired funds – in order to finance their trading activity on 
the nation‟s sharemarkets. With borrowed funds, corporate raiders would target a 
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company listed on the publicly-traded sharemarkets and then proceed to purchase a 
large amount of that company‟s stock in a short space of time. Stock purchasing would 
go on until the corporate raiders‟ collectively held a controlling interest – fifty percent 
or more – in that company‟s stock. With a controlling interest in the company, the 
raiders were now able to strip off and sell assets from the company balance sheet. The 
short-term spike in company profits from this sell-off would then appear on the listed 
stock exchange as a massive turnaround in profitability for the company concerned. 
This rapid boost in company profits inevitably sparked the interest of other investors, 
who would then begin to bid for that company‟s shares on the nation‟s sharemarkets. In 
turn, with more people now bidding up the price of that company‟s shares on the 
markets, the going price for that company‟s shares appreciates substantially. At the 
height of this share price appreciation, the initial raiders sell off their shares, netting for 
themselves a healthy profit from the inflated share price their financial dealings had 
inspired. Notably, this financial profit was achieved without having to undertake any 
measures at all to improve the company‟s actual production or long-term position.145  
 From the ideological standpoint of neoliberalism, these raiders were serving a 
useful economic function. One of the primary criticisms levelled at American industry 
by neoliberal theorists was that, compared to their leaner and more efficient foreign 
competitors, American corporations represented bloated bureaucracies, whose multitude 
of inefficiencies greatly inflated their costs of production. From the viewpoint of 
neoliberalism therefore, the rise of the corporate raiders was a positive development, 
enforcing efficiency measures within the corporations that were targeted in their strip 
and sell strategies. Corporate raiders were thus credited with playing a key role in 
improving the competitive conditions of supply for American industry. Indeed, the mere 
threat of takeover was enough to induce many companies to undertake efficiency 
measures of their own; reducing their production costs in an effort to boost profit 
margins - or what is called their price-earnings ratio - on the nation‟s sharemarkets. This 
increase in profitability would then lift the going price of the company‟s shares on the 
financial markets, rendering it more expensive, and thus more difficult, for the raiders to 
purchase their shares in a number large enough to initiate a takeover strategy.
146
 
 However, when the corporate raider movement is analysed from a more long-
term macroeconomic perspective, it is clear that it was an extremely disruptive 
development for the industrial prospects of corporate America. The rise of the raiders 
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encouraged a move away from the stable and organised system of the productive 
planning system, towards a mode of business that was narrowly concerned with short-
term financial prospects: what is now referred to as the economic model of 
financialisation. Because the profitability of the raider strategy centred on a financial 
investment that not only failed to increase the productive capacity of the company 
concerned (indeed it actually went a step further and decreased its productive 
capabilities by selling of company assets in order to shore up short term profit margins) 
it was in fact extremely destructive to the future productive potential of the United 
States of America.  
The financial market manipulation of the raiders set in motion a trend 
throughout corporate America that divorced company profitability from the 
conventional processes of the planning system, where profitability was determined by 
long-term productive performance, which was utilised to generate sales within the 
country‟s consumer markets. This sustainable system was replaced by one where 
profitability was based on short-term asset appreciation within the financial markets. As 
this asset appreciation was largely achieved by undermining a company‟s productive 
capabilities, it was an appreciation that became increasingly divorced from the actual 
earnings of the companies caught up in this process. In the aggregate, this culminated in 
the establishment of an economic system where financial growth became divorced from 
actual material growth within the real economy. In consequence, the United States 
economy became progressively beholden to the whims of the financial markets, as it 
was the financial markets that were now largely driving economic growth during this 
period. It was no longer technology and innovation that were the essential components 
of economic growth, as had been the case in the planning system. Now economic 
growth was disproportionally determined by financial market manipulation.   
 
Political Efforts Against the Financialisation Process 
With the emergence of the corporate raiders, the era of financialisation had 
begun. Nevertheless by the mid 1980s, its hold had still not become firmly entrenched 
within the American economy. There still existed an active resistance against the trend, 
notably from the large manufacturing enterprises who were dominant during the 
planning system. These businesses were becoming increasingly frustrated – and vocal - 
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in their opposition towards the direction in which the American economy was taking.
147
 
The high dollar, while providing ample funds for the financial sector to manipulate 
prices on the national sharemarkets, was wreaking havoc upon the country‟s 
manufacturing and tradable sectors, as it was these businesses that still primarily based 
their profitability on producing goods and selling these in the country‟s consumer 
markets. Due to the considerable appreciation of the US dollar, American-based 
producers were being priced out of these markets by the cheaper products of their 
foreign competitors.
148
 This problem of the high dollar persisted even after the Federal 
Reserve had brought interest rates back down in 1982. 
 At the time, one of the main reasons given for the persistence of the high dollar 
was the influence that the large federal deficit was having upon the expectations of 
international investors. Henry Kaufman, a prominent Wall Street analyst, at the time 
argued that the tax cuts the federal government was supplying were unsustainable and 
would inevitably give rise to a substantial fiscal deficit that would increase the 
economy‟s money supply and thus prove highly inflationary for the overall economy as 
a result. High inflation, he argued, would provoke the Federal Reserve to reinstate the 
high interest rates it had employed to effectively address inflation in the first two years 
of the 1980s. As such, even though interest rates had been lowered for the present, the 
prospectus of a large fiscal deficit would likely lead to a rise in interest rates in the 
future. As such, international investors continued to purchase dollar-denominated 
assets, in anticipation of this potential interest rate increase.
149
 
 This argument was widely cited at the time for the cause of the high dollar. 
However with the benefit of hindsight, it is also clear that the trend towards 
financialisation was also playing a prominent part in sustaining the interest of 
international investors‟ in dollar-denominated assets. The short-term share price 
appreciation strategy of the corporate raiders was fuelling a speculative boom in 
financial assets throughout the United States economy. As we have seen, the influx of 
investor funds into the US economy, following the imposition of high interest rates by 
the Federal Reserve, provided a large proportion of the credit the raiders borrowed to 
instigate their share price appreciation strategy. Since this strategy created a speculative 
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boom in asset prices within the American economy, international investors still had 
ample opportunities to make money on dollar-denominated assets, even after the 
Federal Reserve had brought interest rates back down to a more normal level. 
 Thus with the benefit of hindsight, we can see how the anti-inflationary strategy 
of the Federal Reserve had significant long-lasting structural implications for the US 
economy. The recession brought on by this anti-inflationary strategy starved the 
productive sector of required revenue, all in an effort to improve the fortunes of the 
financial sector. However with a productive sector mired in recession, the financial 
markets – now expanded through the influx of international funds - had no profitable 
outlets in which to invest their capital in. Consequently, they turned to other financial 
instruments as a means to appreciate their capital, and financial asset appreciation 
became the main means in which money was made in 1980s America. As this asset 
appreciation was primarily speculative-based, it generated impressive short-term profits 
for the financial sector. This attracted the interest of other international investors, who 
pumped even more funds into the US economy, in order to capitalise on the short-term 
gains to be made on the country‟s financial assets. In the process, this increase in 
international funds fuelled the financial liquidity that was enabling the speculative boom 
to sustain its pace into the 1990s.  
By 1985 it had become clear that financial returns in the United States were 
widely divorced from productive performance. Productive firms were struggling to 
generate a profit under the high dollar; while the high dollar reaped in significant returns 
for financial investors. It was recognised that the divergence in financial growth from 
productive profitability was clearly a sign of a speculative bubble engulfing the 
American economy. This bubble was recognised by government officials and a number 
of initiatives began to be taken to redress this imbalance. 
 According to Feldstein, by “early 1985… the dollar had reached a level relative 
to the Japanese yen and the deutsche mark that could not be reconciled with the existing 
interest rate differentials”.150 By Feldstein‟s calculations the “value of the dollar had 
increased from 1.81 marks per dollar in 1980 to 2.55 marks per dollar in 1983, a rise of 
forty percent. The dollar also rose more than 50 percent relative to the British pound in 
this same brief interval”.151 The economist Jeffrey A. Frankel observed that at the time 
“[m]ost analysts considered the appreciation of the dollar (allowing for the usual lag of 
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at least two years in trade effects) to be the primary cause of the subsequent 
deterioration of the US merchandise trade deficit, which rose $123 billion from 1982 to 
1987”.152  
 This analyst consensus coincided with rising political activism amongst the 
tradable business sector for government intervention against the appreciation of the US 
dollar.
153
 This activism found a supportive government body, largely achieved through a 
reshuffling of officials from the mid-1980s. Key in these new appointments was the 
change in leadership within the Treasury department, with James Baker and Richard 
Darman being appointed as the Secretary of Treasury and Deputy Secretary 
respectively, replacing the previous staunchly ideological leaders Don Regan and Beryl 
Sprinkel.
154
 According to Frankel, writing on the new Treasury leadership: „both men 
had already developed at the White House a reputation for greater pragmatism than 
other, more ideological members of the administration”.155 
In empirical support of this assertion, the new secretary James Baker took the 
political initiative in addressing the excessive appreciation of the US dollar. Baker 
began talks with government officials from the other G-5 economies of France, West 
Germany, Britain and Japan in order to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. 
During the ensuing negotiations, which took place over six months of private 
discussions, a signed agreement was reached which committed the central banks of the 
participating nations to actively intervene in the international currency markets, in order 
to raise the price of the yen and the mark in relation to that of the US dollar. The 
resulting agreement became known as the Plaza Accord.
156
 
According to Frankel, “the Plaza had widely become considered a great public 
success”.157 This success was judged on the merit that on “the Monday that the Plaza 
announcement was made public, the dollar fell a sudden 4 percent against a weighted 
average of other currencies (slightly more against the mark and the yen)”.158 Robert 
Kuttner backs up this positive assertion, revealing that in the “first six months, co-
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ordinated interventions by finance ministries and central banks spent almost all of the 
committed ninety-eight billion dollars and did succeed in driving the dollar down from 
240 yen in September [1985] to 200 yen by the year‟s end and 180 yen in March 
1986”.159  
Throughout the coordinated exchange-rate regime of the Plaza Accord the dollar 
continued to decline against the yen and the mark. “By mid 1987 it was below 150 yen 
and had lost half its value against both the yen and the mark”.160 This sustained decline 
in the dollar shows that the Plaza Accord achieved the objectives it set out to 
accomplish, highlighting the success of coordinated political action to address structural 
imbalances within the global economy. Left unchecked in the absence of government 
intervention, it is highly likely that the free market would have exacerbated the situation 
by progressively pricing the US productive sector out of the international economy.  
 
A New Round of Global Price Depreciation 
Nevertheless, despite the success in the coordinated devaluation of the dollar, 
the US trade deficit continued to grow “from $122 billion in 1984 to $134 billion in 
1985, to $156 billion in 1986 and then declined only slightly to $146 billion in 1987. By 
1990, it had more or less reached a plateau at close to $100 billion a year”.161 Thus 
while the Plaza Accord did have limited success in halting the expansion of the US 
trade deficit by bringing its currency more in line with that of  its primary competitors, 
it was unable to adequately fix the imbalances that existed in the country‟s trade 
position and as a result its overall trade balance remained in deficit.  
The reason for the failure of the accord in addressing the US trade deficit 
primarily lay in international developments that remained outside the orbits of its 
agreement. These international developments were generated from the emergence of the 
newly industrialising economies of south-east Asia, who arose as strong (i.e. cheap) 
competitors within the international manufacturing markets. As had happened with the 
emergence of Japan and Germany in the 1970s, the rise of these economies -  based as 
they were on export-led growth -  dramatically increased the supply of goods sold in the 
international markets, without adding much at all to the corresponding level of demand 
that existed within the global economy. This unleashed a fresh new round of global 
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price competition, an intensification that further undermined the United States trade 
position.
162
 
 The export dependent economies of the south-east Asian „Tigers‟ experienced 
extremely rapid growth from the mid 1980s onwards. This economic development was 
largely fuelled by the massive influx of foreign direct investment from Japanese 
multinational corporations, who viewed production in south-east Asia as a means to 
counter the increased costs of their exports that had followed the appreciation of the yen 
through the Plaza Accord. By relocating labour-intensive components of production to 
south-east Asian nations, Japanese companies could make significant savings in 
production costs and thus lower the price of their products in the international markets, 
thus offsetting the rise associated with the appreciation of the yen. South-east Asian 
destinations were also used by Japan as a platform to launch exports into the United 
States, as a means to get around the “voluntary restraints” that had been put in place 
against Japanese imports by the Reagan administration during the 1980s.
163
  
 Japanese multinationals with subsidiaries in south-east Asia were further 
benefited by the fact that the currencies of the „Tiger‟ economies were pegged to the US 
dollar. Thus as the dollar began to depreciate under the Plaza Accord, so did the 
currencies of the Tiger economies, and by extension, the production costs of Japanese 
multinationals who had outsourced production to the region.
164
 According to Brenner, 
“Japanese banks supplied huge loans to Japanese corporations initiating operations in 
East Asia, as well as to East Asian businesses, and came to constitute the largest source 
of bank loans to every country in the region except Taiwan and the Philippines”.165 
Through this influx of direct investment, the economic development of South-east Asia 
accelerated at a heightened pace. In the process, south-east Asian lines of production 
moved higher and higher up the value chain, to a point where they were able to compete 
directly against Japan and the other industrial nations on the world markets. The 
emergence of new competitors on the world‟s manufacturing markets induced a fresh 
new round of global price competition, a competition that was intensified by the low 
value of the new competitors‟ currencies, along with the low wages that prevailed in 
these countries.  This worked to further depress the level of global aggregate demand, 
intensifying the pressures placed on productive producers inside the United States, 
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accounting for the continuation of the country‟s trade deficit during this period. 
Nevertheless, despite this ballooning deficit, a number of US companies began to 
discover ways where this imbalance could be used to their advantage. They found this 
through embracing the process of financialisation. 
 
The Financialisation of Firms: Financialisation Part 2 
The continuation of the trade deficit was a clear sign that American industry was 
struggling to regain lost ground, not only in its international exports, but also 
importantly, in its own domestic markets. Through financialisation however, American 
industry found a way to regain commercial dominance despite the dramatic decline in 
the competitiveness of its productive sector. Indeed financialisation offered a way for 
American corporations to increase their profitability through the steady erosion of its 
underlying productive capacity. 
 Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of American corporations began to mimic 
the sharemarket strategy of the corporate raiders. Due to the great size of their 
companies however, they were able to initiate this strategy on a scale that far dwarfed 
that which was able to be exercised by the raiders themselves. What followed was the 
merger and acquisitions movement. This movement represented a key development in 
aligning the business strategies of the dominant corporations with that of the 
financialised business model. Employing their giant corporations as collateral, corporate 
executives borrowed from the banking sector and then proceeded to purchase the shares 
of their domestic competitors, to the point where they held a controlling interest in their 
rival‟s firm. Then through a process of strip and sell, the new managing directors 
proceeded to streamline the acquired firm‟s production processes in line with that of 
their own, thus increasing their firm‟s price-earnings ratio and boosting its short-term 
revenue streams.
166
  
 This strategy increased the financial earnings of the controlling corporation by 
two ways. Firstly, by eliminating one of its major rivals, the company could raise its 
future profit projections, heightening the interest of investors in its shares. Secondly, the 
reduction in production costs of the recently acquired firm – generated through the 
sacking of staff and selling off of company assets – translates onto the sharemarkets as a 
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turnaround in the productive performance of the company concerned. This rapid 
turnaround was invariably attributed to the superior management capabilities of the 
controlling corporation by the financial analysts who reported on corporate 
performance. This turnaround thus signalled that the company‟s performance would be 
improved into the future, increasing its interest to sharemarket investors.  
 For the purposes of this paper, it is important at this point to pause and reflect on 
the long-term ramifications of this sharemarket strategy for the industrial health of 
corporate America. To begin with, despite the ideological aims of the supply-side 
reforms in increasing competition within the United States economy, the merger and 
acquisition movement that it inspired actually reduced the level of competition as it 
existed within the country‟s productive sector.  As the bigger firms acquired the assets 
of their smaller commercial rivals, the number of domestic producers decreased, and so 
in turn did the level of competition that existed between American producers.  
Deregulation and a greater access to finance were intended to intensify 
competition within the American economy. This was deemed necessary in order to 
break up the so-called inefficient oligopolistic market structure that had characterised 
business relations during the planning system. It was this oligopolistic structure, the 
neoliberal economic reformers argued, that had enabled industrial inefficiency to 
permeate the American economy, leaving US producers vulnerable to the cheaper prices 
on offer by its foreign competitors during the 1970s.
167
  
 In practice however, it was the financial markets, rather than the productive 
markets, where this intensified competition was carried out. From the late 1980s 
onwards, the financial arena of the nation‟s sharemarkets became the playing field 
where corporate dominance was determined within the US economy. Due to the threat 
of takeover and the loss of corporate control through the nation‟s sharemarkets, 
maintaining a consistently high price-earnings ratio became the top priority for 
American corporations. This short-term focus largely precluded the possibility of 
undertaking a financial commitment towards long-term productive investment. Such an 
investment would necessarily entail a number of short-term costs that would not be 
recovered until the original investment had generated a new product or a new 
productive process. The initial costs involved with the undertaking of such a strategy 
would therefore temporarily lower the price-earnings ratio of the company concerned. 
However in a highly liquid market such as the New York stock exchange, this 
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temporary decline would provoke a selling off of the company‟s shares by its financial 
investors, reducing the company‟s share price in the process. In turn, this reduced share 
price leaves the company highly vulnerable to takeover by a rival firm looking to 
capitalise on the short-term dip in the company‟s share price as a means to obtain a 
controlling interest in the company‟s assets at a low cost to itself.168  
Thus in order to maintain commercial viability, an American corporation must 
make the maintenance of a high share price on the financial markets the number one 
priority - or bottom-line  - of the firm. In doing so, the allocation of internal revenue 
towards innovative investments in long-term production – the pinnacle of growth under 
the planning system – ceased to function as a viable commercial strategy for corporate 
America.  
 One of the most effective ways of increasing short-term profits is to reduce 
operating costs. The easiest cost to decrease in the short-term is that of labour. This was 
achieved by reducing a company‟s workforce and designing ways to force the 
remaining staff to produce the same levels of output that were achieved prior to the cuts. 
It was this so-called „efficiency‟ strategy that embodied management‟s most prevalent 
method of increasing „productivity‟ during this time.169 Indeed this was a strategy that 
proved particularly easy to implement in an economic environment where the position 
of labour had been greatly eroded by the federal government‟s attempts to construct a 
“flexible labour market,” eroding labour laws so that labour would be more malleable to 
market forces, or rather workers would be more compliant to exploitation by their 
employers.
170
 Mass redundancies as a corporate cost-saving measure were also 
indirectly encouraged by a monetary policy that targeted unemployment as a tool to 
counter rising inflation. 
It is plain to see that the financialised strategy of stimulating economic growth 
operates in the entirely opposite manner to the Keynesian system of demand 
management. Under the Keynesian system, increased employment serves as a stimulus 
to demand. With more people working, more people are earning and with more people 
earning, more people are spending. The more people are spending in the economy, the 
more business is making, and the more business is making, the more funds it has to 
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commit to productive investment. In direct contrast, the financialised business model 
generates company profits through unemployment.  By reducing its labour costs, a 
corporate enterprise is able to appreciate the prevailing price of its shares on the 
financial markets and through this achieve financial growth. However this financial 
growth is only able to be achieved by laying off productive workers, selling off 
productive assets and refraining from the initiation of any productivity-improving 
investment measures. In consequence, not only does the financialisation process depress 
aggregate demand and thus the capacity of the American consumer markets to purchase 
its products, it also erodes the productive capabilities of the companies engaged in its 
process.  
 In this financialised environment, the only real avenue available for a business to 
increase profitability is through the financial markets. However as we have seen, while 
the outgoing price for its financial assets are appreciated by this process, its productive 
capacity is markedly eroded. In other words, a company‟s ability to generate real 
earnings is divorced from the appreciation of its financial assets. With its asset prices 
rising and its productive profitability declining, it is clear that a financialised firm‟s 
growth is based on a speculative sharemarket, one that is out of touch with the 
prevailing conditions of the real economy. In the aggregate, with most companies 
following this financialised model, this is an extremely unsustainable platform for an 
economy to follow. It is for this very reason that for the last thirty years the American 
economy has experienced an increasing number of speculative booms and busts, of 
which the 2008 crash is but the latest example. If the United States is ever to escape 
from this debilitating path, then some fundamental changes need to be made to the 
underlying structure of its economy.  
 
“Shareholder Governance”: An Internal Imperative 
From the above analysis we can see how the imperatives of the sharemarket placed an 
external constraint upon the actions of corporate America. Any publicly-listed company 
had to either conform to the short-term requirements of the sharemarket; or be 
subsumed in the takeover strategy of a rival firm, whose mode of business operations 
was more closely in tune with that of the financialised system of economic relations. In 
addition to this external influence, beginning in the early 1990s, an internal imperative 
began to be implemented in an effort to further orient the business strategies of 
America‟s corporations in line with that of the financialised model. This internally-
96 
 
driven orientation was implemented under the term “shareholder governance”. By 
refocusing corporate objectives into generating expanded profits for its shareholders, it 
was argued, corporate enterprises would become more attractive outlets for investor 
funds, and as we have seen, it was access to these funds that was primarily behind the 
drive in corporate growth during this period.
171
 
 The means devised to internally achieve this objective was to realign the 
personal interests of a company‟s senior management with that of the company‟s short-
term sharemarket performance. This was achieved by the awarding of „options‟ to the 
chief executives and other members of senior management within the firm. „Options‟ 
are a commitment that allows its recipients to buy shares in the company at a set price in 
the future, regardless of the going rate of the shares at the time of purchase. In this way, 
if the company‟s share price has appreciated beyond the set price of the shares found in 
the „options‟, its recipients are able to personally pocket the difference in this 
appreciation.
172
 
 Because senior management could now personally fortune from the financial 
appreciation of the company‟s shares, they now had a personal stake in maintaining the 
short-term share price of the company on the national sharemarkets. If the company‟s 
share price experienced spectacular returns in the short-term, so in effect, would their 
take-home salary. Now corporate executives had a personal incentive in implementing 
the cost-reduction reforms that had proved effective in improving company performance 
in the short-term. More and more throughout the financialised era, management „skill‟ 
became merited on the ability to initiate the greatest amount of redundancies within a 
single firm. CEOs that personally cost thousands of ordinary Americans their jobs were 
lionized as heroes by the nation‟s business media, and through the provision of 
„options‟, were financially rewarded for the debilitating impact they were having upon 
the real economy of the United States.
173
  
 It is absolutely remarkable that such a crude method of management practice 
was held up as the epitome of strength within corporate America. For an insight into 
why this indeed became the case, it is necessary to examine the underlying ideology 
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behind the concept of „shareholder governance‟. The concept of „shareholder 
governance‟ came from a branch of neoliberal economics called „agency theory‟. This 
theory provided a formula on how to run a business organisation along market lines, in 
the absence of a single owner in charge of the business. In this way „agency theory‟ was 
a neoliberal response to the twentieth century development of the planning system, 
where the American economic landscape changed from the „entrepreneurial capitalism‟ 
of the nineteenth century - where companies were majority owned by a single individual  
- to the one where companies were largely managed by salaried employees. Ignoring the 
great commercial success achieved by the salaried managers of the planning system, 
„agency theory‟ argued that this twentieth century development embodied one of the 
fundamental problems of American capitalism, identifying it as one of the underlying 
causes of what neoliberal theorists defined as the inefficient production processes of 
corporate America. Thus according to „agency theory‟, if the „efficiency‟ and 
„dynamism‟ of American capitalism were to be restored, then top corporate 
management needed to operate more like owners of the organisation, similar in vein to 
the „entrepreneurial owners‟ of the nineteenth century. And what better way was there 
to make management operate like owners, than to actually make them part owners, 
through the granting of company shares.
174
 
 Agency theory carried a major flaw in that it failed to differentiate between the 
different forms of ownership between the two systems. In contrast to the huge financial 
commitment involved in the forthright ownership in the physical productive properties 
of a company, as was undertaken by the „entrepreneur-owners‟ of the nineteenth 
century, shares offer a much more liquid form of ownership, especially since they can 
be readily sold on the daily markets. Consequently, rather than reflect the financial 
commitment undertaken by the nineteenth century „entrepreneur-owners‟, the 
shareholding corporate management of the 1990s began to adopt the tendencies of the 
1980s corporate raiders. 
 Thus in direct contrast to its stated aims, the implementation of „agency theory‟, 
rather than working to strengthen management‟s commitment to the business, in 
practice encouraged CEOs to become more like financial players, who operated the 
corporation as a source of collateral that enabled them to participate in the financial 
markets, rather than the company existing as a profitable source of production in its own 
right. The decade of the 1990s is flooded with examples of the trend whereby a 
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celebrated CEO is appointed to head an already established company. On appointment, 
the new exec lays off a few hundred workers, sells off some productive equipment – a 
short-term cost-reduction that spectacularly boosts the company‟s outgoing share price. 
With his reputation riding high from this acclaimed „success‟, the CEO leaves the firm 
to take up a position within another company, in the process leaving the original 
company to flounder as a result of the reductions made in its productive capacity, in 
terms of both crucial staff and physical assets.  
 In order to illustrate this debilitating development, here are a few examples 
provided by the journalist Sam Pizzigati of the above trend in action. According to 
Pizzigati, in April 1994, Al Dunlop became Scott Paper‟s “first CEO ever hired from 
outside company ranks. Just two months after arriving he [Dunlop] announced plans to 
slice the company‟s workforce by 35 percent, over 11,000 jobs”.175 In addition Pizzigati 
documents how, once appointed as chief executive, Dunlop “almost immediately 
deprioritised… expenditures that did not directly pump up Scott Paper‟s quarterly 
earnings”.176 In consequence the company‟s budget for research and development was 
cut in half.
177
 However, as soon as this strategy had generated the intended effect on the 
company‟s short-term share price, Dunlop cashed in on his options and left the 
company, thus personally profiting from the destruction of the company‟s productive 
capabilities. As such, in: 
July 1995, just fifteen months after taking charge, Dunlop clinched the deal that 
would, later that year, end Scott Paper‟s long history as an independent 
enterprise. Competitor Kimberly-Clark, the Kleenex Company, would buy out 
Scott Paper and swallow the company whole – all except Dunlop and a handful 
of his executive pals, who under the terms of the merger deal, got ample 
severance packages.
178
 
To illustrate the profitability for Scott Paper‟s top management in initiating the 
company‟s takeover by its primary competitor, here are a few examples of the severance 
deals provided to them: Richard Nikolasi, head of marketing, received “$17.2 million 
for his sixteen months of service in Scott Paper”. Likewise, the company‟s chief 
financial officer was provided $14.9 million; Dunlop‟s deputy, Russell Kersh got $16.4 
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million for his troubles.
179
 As for Dunlop himself, no other words can best describe his 
raider style of management than the words of praise sung by his own mouth: “After 
twenty months of intense work – and thanks in part to my own stock purchases, options 
and other incentives – I left Scott $100 million richer than when I arrived”.180 It was 
through this shameless personal enrichment strategy that Dunlop achieved celebrity 
status, earning the nickname “Chainsaw Al”. According to one of his followers, “Al 
goes in like a chainsaw. He goes in and cuts away all the fat and leaves a great 
sculpture”.181 
 Another CEO that enjoyed celebrity status alongside “Chainsaw Al” was Jack 
Welch, who headed General Electric during the 1990s. Under Welch‟s leadership, 
“General Electric managers ranked their professional employees every year by category, 
the top twenty percent, middle seventy percent or bottom ten percent”.182 Within these 
ranked divisions, the top strata received accolades, the bottom group got fired. “Not 
removing that bottom ten percent” Welch explained to the company‟s shareholders, “is 
not only a management failure but also false kindness as well”.183  
 There are numerous other examples throughout the 1990s, where the productive 
decline of a company has served to personally enrich its senior management. According 
to Pizzigati‟s research, “Intel‟s top five executives exercised over three million options 
in the first half of 2000. These shrewd option moves gained the five executives $160 
million by September, just three weeks before Intel started announcing bad news about 
sales”.184 In another example, the CEO of Cisco Systems “alone got $156 million by 
unloading options early. Together, the top half dozen executives at Cisco cashed out 
almost seven million options before Cisco‟s shares peaked late March 2000. They 
cleared $307.8 million in option profits”.185  
 The proponents of agency theory continually credited CEOs like Welch and 
Dunlop for the “value creation” they brought to American enterprise.186 The problem 
with this accreditation however, is that these managers created nothing, in fact they 
achieved the inverse, they destroyed productive capabilities. Under their style of 
management, staff were made to be more productive by cutting down the company‟s 
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workforce and making the remaining staff work more while paying them less (as 
evident by the stagnation of wage growth during this period).
187
 No training initiatives 
were implemented in order to up-skill the company‟s workforce and achieve 
productivity improvements in this way. Nor were technological investments undertaken 
in order to improve the technological tools the workers were using in order to achieve 
productivity gains. No, downsizing was adopted as the principal strategy of improving 
productivity within the American workforce.  
 Downscaling was initiated on a massive scale, in the attempts of corporate 
America to rapidly shore up costs in order to generate short-term boosts in the price of 
their shares on the financial markets.
188
 For the giant corporate conglomerates like 
General Electric, this downsizing strategy would extend to whole divisions within the 
company apparatus. If a division ever experienced a short-term dip in profitability and 
thus placed a drag on the company‟s overall price-earnings ratio, then the division was 
simply disbanded, with its assets sold off to recoup the losses made from the company‟s 
temporary slackening in growth. This sale would then boost the company‟ short-term 
revenue and thus elevate its price-earnings ratio on the financial markets.
189
 Notably, no 
effort would be undertaken to improve the division‟s performance through investment 
initiatives in order to improve productivity, or to address the problems associated with a 
stressed and overworked staff, which may in fact not have had enough manpower to 
realise the division‟s full productive potential. No the division is simply stripped and 
sold and its productive potential destroyed. Meanwhile the strategy is described via the 
Orwellian notion of “value creation”. 
 It is here where we see the massive departure from the productive enterprise of 
the planning system to the hollowed out shells that prevailed throughout the 
financialised era. The great success of the planning system in the Golden Age period 
rested on the collective power of the country‟s major corporations. Company managers 
organised human resources in a manner that enabled economic growth to be achieved 
through the progressive advancement of technology and skills. Indeed, the power of 
organisation within the American postwar corporation had advanced to such a scale that 
by the early 1990s there existed ample opportunities for predatory managers to start 
pulling apart and selling off productive pieces of these organisations, earning a 
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substantial personal fortune in the process. Years and years of collective commercial 
endeavour had been dedicated into the growing of the productive capacity of these 
businesses, all to be stripped bare within the short space of a few years in order to 
personally enrich a small minority of unskilled managers who understood nothing of the 
productive processes that they presided over. It was the long years of productive 
investment under the previous era of the planning system that had created the real value 
of contemporary corporations, not the crude management practices of the 1990s.  
In Galbraith‟s analysis of the postwar planning system, we saw how the 
commercial power of the productive sector was maintained over that of financial 
interests. Control over the productive process was primarily maintained by a 
management who held detailed knowledge of the complexities involved in the 
company‟s advanced technological production. This was a knowledge that had been 
gained through long years of training and employment within the company by senior 
management. It was this knowledge that the rentier lacked and which thus lay key to the 
commercial independence of the productive sector from control by its financial backers.  
However, in attempting to align the interests of senior management with the 
interests of the financial sharemarkets, management came to be composed not by 
experienced senior staff members, but by individuals who expressed all the traits of a 
financial rentier. Often, such as in the examples of Al Dunlop and Jack Welch, these 
managers were appointed on the basis of a reputation earned outside the enterprise they 
headed. In consequence, these men knew little of the complex production process that 
constituted the true form of value creation in the company. What this new breed of 
corporate management did know however, like the professional players on the financial 
markets, was how to use productive assets as a means to make spectacular gains on the 
short-term sharemarkets. By doing so, they sold off and dismantled corporate 
organisations that in many instances had taken over fifty years to develop into the 
productive organisations that they embodied before the speculative sharemarket 
movement of the 1990s.  
Just like those who personally profiteered from the commercialisation of the 
internet during the dotcom bubble, these managers made fortunes by cashing in on the 
fruits of a long line of earlier investment. Despite what conventional economic theory 
made of the strategy, the economic history of the United States clearly illustrates how 
most CEOs in the 1990s were not creating value but rather destroying it, as evident in 
the decline of the productive capacity of corporate America during this time. Notably, 
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the productive capacity targeted by senior management in their cost-cutting drives had 
taken years of dedicated work and investment by a large number of workers to achieve, 
all lost in a short-sighted attempt by a few individuals to inflate their own salaries.  
 Thus by ascribing human behaviour to the Smithian logic that society is simply 
composed of self-interested individuals, agency theory put at the helm of capitalism‟s 
most productive organisations, self-maximisers who personally profiteered from the 
rapid erosion of corporate America‟s productive capacity. This destruction illustrates 
one of the most visible ways in which the extremely narrow focus of neoliberalism is 
inherently inimical to the real needs of advanced capitalism. 
 
The Structural Implications of Financial Market Dominance 
 According to the neoliberal consensus, free markets are the most effective 
mechanism for determining the accurate price for a good or service. What this 
ideological assertion ignores however is the significant differences that exist between 
different market types. In contrast to the neoliberal position that theorises one big 
homogenous „market‟, a capitalist system is composed of a plethora of different market 
types. For the purposes of analysis, these different market types will be broken down 
here into two broad categories: financial markets and productive markets.  
In a financialised economy, whenever economic analysts speak of the „markets‟, 
they invariably refer to the financial markets, not to the consumer markets of the real 
economy. This is in recognition of the fact that in such an economy, commercial 
viability is primarily dependent on financial performance. As such, in a financialised 
economy, it is the financial markets that largely determine the prices of goods sold in 
the consumer markets. Generally speaking, the financial markets will generate pressure 
on producers to reduce their prices on the consumer markets. As we have seen, the 
threat of takeover through the sharemarket prevents the possibility of corporations 
undertaking any long-term productive investment projects, as this sucks up a significant 
sum of working capital, which short-term investors in the sharemarket identify as a drop 
in short-term profitability and respond by selling off their shares accordingly. 
Consequently, due to insufficient productive investment, competition ceases to function 
along the lines of innovation and quality. With competition no longer running along 
these lines, the only avenue for different producers to compete on is in terms of price.  
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Thus from the 1980s onwards we can see a real depreciation in the price of 
consumer products within the US market. This price depreciation – which primarily 
occurred in electronic and manufactured items – accounts for the corresponding low 
levels of inflation that were experienced during this period. As we have seen, keeping 
rates of inflation low has become the central concern of the Federal Reserve‟s monetary 
policy, so this process of price depreciation amongst the manufacturing sector has 
largely conformed to this governmental macroeconomic preoccupation. Inflation was 
identified by the neoclassical monetarists as embodying a disruptive mechanism that 
distorted prices and thus sent the wrong signals to financial investors in regards to 
which business or industry constituted the best choice to invest in. In this way inflation 
was argued to prohibit the efficient allocation of resources by the free market system. 
 However in over-emphasising the negative effects of inflation, the neoclassical 
school has largely ignored the highly destructive implications ongoing price 
depreciation has had on the structure of the American economy. To compete on price, a 
company must compete on costs. As the empirical example of the United States 
economy clearly demonstrates, the imperative to constantly cut costs is extremely 
destructive for a country‟s productive capacity. It was in this way that the financialised 
structure of the American economy existed as the direct opposite to the form of growth 
generation that fuelled the country‟s economy in the post-war planning system of the 
Golden Age period.  
 One of the most common methods of reducing manufacturing costs within 
corporate America since the mid 1990s has been the outsourcing of production 
processes to offshore locations, where labour costs are significantly lower than that 
inside the United States.
190
 Outsourcing has had two main ways in which it has reduced 
labour costs for American corporations. Firstly, there is the direct reduction it has had, 
in that it replaced positions that once paid a middle-class salary within an advanced 
economy, into poorly-paid positions that operate within the sweatshops of developing 
nations.  Secondly, outsourcing has had an indirect effect through the implicit threat it 
holds for the remaining workers inside America if they push for higher wages or better 
working conditions.  Through the rise of outsourcing, American workers witnessed 
firsthand the repercussions that would be enacted if their cost of labour was pushed too 
high for the financial markets to bear. As such they have held back their activism 
accordingly. 
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 The majority of jobs that were outsourced were positioned within the once-
dominant manufacturing sector.
191
 Under the planning system, these jobs primarily 
constituted well paid middle-class positions. The prevalence of these well paid jobs 
provided these workers with substantial disposable income. This enabled these workers 
to spend within the country‟s consumer markets, thus generating the main source of 
aggregate demand that was fuelling economic growth during this period. As we have 
seen, the manufacturing sector was the hardest hit by the emergence of cheaper foreign 
competitors, who began their rapid penetration into the US market during the 1970s, a 
process that was later intensified during the first half of the 1980s when the price-
competitiveness of foreign imports was assisted by a high exchange rate for the US 
dollar. In order to compete with its lower-cost competitors, American manufacturers 
chose to relocate large portions of their own production to lower-cost locations. The 
nature of the short-term sharemarkets intensified the pressure on American producers to 
outsource production and lower their operating costs. Daily stock trading and the 
publication of quarterly earnings largely prevented the possibility of initiating long-term 
innovative investment as a means to outcompete cheaper foreign competition on terms 
of innovation, or technological sophistication.  
Short-term sharemarkets thus provided no other workable alternative than for 
American manufacturers to compete on price, and in a globalising economy, the most 
effective means to maintain price competitiveness is to relocate production to the 
cheapest location. In terms of the overall international economic structure, this trend 
exacerbated the demand-depressing effects the export-oriented growth strategies were 
having upon the global economy. Previously it had proved strategic for emerging 
economies to keep demand at home low, in order to maintain low production costs and 
a cheaper currency and thus maintain price competitiveness on the international 
markets. This was the strategy that had enabled West Germany and Japan to undercut 
the US in its own consumer markets, accounting for the rise of these economies during 
the 1970s. In the new international conditions that evolved throughout the 1990s 
however, not only did developing countries have to keep conditions of domestic 
demand low so as to be price competitive on the international markets, they now also 
had an additional incentive to keep conditions of aggregate demand at home low, so that 
they could offer an attractive – as in low cost - location for multinational corporations to 
establish production in.  
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In this way, the demand-depressing tendencies that were generated from the 
undercutting strategies of the export-oriented growth models received a further 
intensification in the 1990s, as the emergence of global supply chains proved a popular 
method of keeping corporate production costs down to a minimum. The outcome of this 
trend was to place further limits on the growth of global aggregate demand, as jobs that 
had once paid a middle class wage in a highly developed economy, were now being 
paid at subsistence levels in a developing country anxious to keep its labour costs low 
so as to continue to attract foreign direct investment. What this essentially means is that 
workers who could once afford to purchase the product that they are producing, are now 
losing jobs to workers who can barely maintain their cost of living with the wages they 
are paid, let alone the disposable income to purchase the product their employers are 
selling in the global marketplace. It is in this way that within the international economy, 
supply is far outstripping demand. The aggregate wages paid out in the global supply 
chains are no way near enough to purchase the goods manufactured by the global 
economy.  
It is interesting to compare this development to the Keynesian concept „the 
paradox of thrift,‟ which was used to partly explain the economic depression of the 
1930s. This concept argues that a recession can occur when a drop in business 
confidence spurs both business and consumers to save more of their income and refrain 
from spending within the economy. This lowers the level of aggregate demand in the 
economy, making business conditions worse and ultimately leading to an economic 
downturn or recession. However from a global perspective, the deficiency in demand 
that exists today is not the result of excessive saving by workers as the „paradox of 
thrift‟ suggests. No, it is simply due to the insufficient level of wages paid by big 
business in the world economy, which has led to a contraction in the consumer markets 
available to purchase the products sold in the international economy.  
However, the severe deficiency of aggregate demand that exists at the 
international level has not led to an economic depression of global dimensions, similar 
to the one that engulfed the world economy in the 1930s. This indeed proves an 
interesting paradox, and the reason why this paradox exists is due to the corresponding 
expansion in credit that has accompanied this period. The exponential expansion in 
credit in the United States (and other developed nations), as a means to fill the gap in 
global aggregate demand that has been created by insufficient wage growth, is more 
than just a coincidence. Indeed the expansion of credit within the United States 
106 
 
corresponds closely with the export-oriented strategy of other economies. In order to 
maintain a low valuation for their exchange rates against the US dollar, as a means of 
ensuring that their exports would be price competitive inside the United States‟ 
consumer markets, many trading nations have purchased a large amount of dollar-
denominated assets, and hold these assets within their central banks. These purchases 
have sustained the international demand in the dollar, maintaining its high price 
compared to the currencies of other exporting nations. In turn, this flow of foreign funds 
into the United States has provided the country‟s financial sector with the growth in 
liquidity required to sustain its speculative expansion. It was this continual inflow of 
foreign funds that distorted the picture that had been assumed by conventional 
economic theory and gave rise to the problems we are now seeing inside the United 
States today. 
 Generally speaking, in a closed economy, a speculative boom is collapsed when 
the flow of funds generated by saved earnings in the productive sector reaches its limits, 
thus reducing the liquidity that the financially-driven speculative boom rested on for its 
expansion. This levelling-off of liquidity warns investors that the boom is driven more 
by speculation than the growth of economic fundamentals – as evident by the inability 
of the productive sector to generate the sums required to sustain the boom of growth on 
its upwards trajectory. It thus becomes apparent that the boom in financial growth is 
divorced from the growth of the productive economy, a realisation that cools investor 
activity and reverses the speculative trend of the bubble. The benefit of this system is 
that credit creation is largely limited to the growth prospects of the productive economy. 
This ensures that speculative booms, while they may occur, have very clear limits on 
their growth and duration, thus ensuring that the subsequent crash is not from as high a 
point as what otherwise would have been the case. This enables a faster turnaround 
from the crash and also limits the amount of productive losses caught up in the 
following downturn. 
 However from the 1980s onwards, financial investment within the United States 
became largely divorced from the prospects of the country‟s productive economy. The 
increasing inflow of foreign funds provided an alternative source of liquidity for the 
financial sector, separate from the profits generated through productive endeavours 
within the country‟s domestic economy. Foreign funds thus spurred on the process of 
financialisation that was rapidly engulfing the country‟s economy. With financial sector 
activity divorced from the liquidity limits of the productive economy, and with the 
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productive economy now highly dependent on the financial sector for its growth under 
the short-term drive of the nation's sharemarkets, the expansion of credit within the 
United States' economy proceeded at an exponential rate.  
 Due to the declining ability of the US economy to engineer productive returns 
for the financial sector, an increasing array of financial instruments were invented as a 
means to generate financial profitability from the speculative bubble that was engulfing 
the economy. These financial instruments included: securitization, derivatives, options, 
futures, and a whole host of other financial devices, whose increasing complexity served 
to mask the distance the financial economy had divorced itself from real earnings 
generated within the productive sector.  
 From a medium-term perspective, the great disparity that exists between the 
decline of demand in the productive sector and the exponential expansion of credit-
creation within the financial sector, ensured that when the economy finally did crash, its 
effects would be massive, reverberating throughout the global economy. It is for this 
reason that the credit crunch of 2008 has had such a lasting impact on the global 
economy. The current recession is the manifestation of thirty years where real global 
aggregate demand has contracted, while credit has expanded at an unsustainable 
fashion. If an effective sustainable long-term solution to the current crisis is to be 
established, then the dramatic deterioration of the real economy has to be addressed. 
Furthermore, the excessive reliance on credit as a stimulus to growth has to be revealed 
for what it is: a mask that hides the real problems of the global economy.  
 The next section will look at how this credit-created mask has been used to hide 
some very real problems inside the United States economy. The United States provides 
a useful example as it is here where credit-creation has been the highest and the 
deterioration of productive capacity the strongest. This analysis of the structural 
problems of the United States‟ domestic economy provides a good insight into a number 
of the processes that are affecting the global economy on a wider scale. 
 
The Structural Factors of a Low Wage Economy: The US in the Financialised Era  
As we have seen, the outsourcing of American jobs primarily occurred in the 
manufacturing sector. Here, cheaper imports had acted as a dampener on US producers‟ 
profitability, in the process reducing their market-share and thus placing significant 
pressure on US producers to decrease prices in order to compete. However the nation‟s 
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service sector industries, particularly the retail sector, benefited from the influx of cheap 
imports into the United States, as this radically depreciated their own costs for 
wholesale products. In turn, the giant franchises among the retail industry - of whom 
Walmart remains the most successful example – were able to utilise their enormous 
buying power in order to buy up large amounts of cheaper imported products (which 
were further discounted due to the ability of the retail giants to be able to buy in bulk) 
and use this to undercut the smaller locally-owned (and in many instances locally-
sourced) retailers, who were not able to achieve the same economies of scale as 
Walmart and the other retail giants. This enabled the retail giants to achieve market 
dominance in their respective industries.  
With the employment opportunities in many areas of the United States reduced 
by the outsourcing of the manufacturing firms and the closure of local retailers in the 
face of cheaper competition by the retail giants, the bargaining position of employers 
such as Walmart was significantly enhanced against that of its employees. This enabled 
the retail giants to offer extremely regressive wages and working conditions from that 
which had historically been acceptable within American society.
192
  
Furthermore, in their efforts to keep costs down and compete on price, retail 
giants now overwhelmingly import the majority of the stock they sell on their shop 
floors. In this way the retail giants‟ act as a structural barrier against the ability of 
American manufacturers to sell locally produced products within the American market, 
simply because the country‟s retailers will not stock American-manufactured goods due 
to what is considered their excessive cost.
193
 As a result, the retail giants operate as a 
structural barrier within the American economy, preventing American manufacturers 
from effectively competing against foreign producers. The dominant retail giants 
undercut and in the process eliminated the domestic retailers who stocked American 
products and then dominated the market by supplying American consumers with 
cheaper imports. In this way the rise of the service sector contributed a great deal 
towards the structural decline of the country‟s productive economy. Retail giants 
generated a structural barrier within the nation‟s consumer markets that hindered the 
recovery of American manufacturers from the recession of the early 1980s. In this way, 
from the 1980s on, the most profitable companies within the United States were those 
who profiteered from undercutting American producers and reducing wages and 
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working conditions to as much as was legally possible. Walmart itself was the highest 
revenue earning public corporation in the United States in 2010.
194
  
The logic of growth generation in the American economy has thus been flipped 
on its head from the sustainable system that prevailed during the era of the planning 
system. Economic growth for the largest firms in the country is no longer based on 
expanding the degree of aggregate demand within the domestic economy, as had 
prevailed during the planning system. Now commercial profitability is centred on the 
reduction of the real conditions of domestic demand in a highly destabilising and 
debilitating fashion. 
Of all the productive components of the financialisation process, none was 
affected more so than the country‟s greatest resource, its productive labour force. 
Through the process of financialisation a number of structural factors were initiated, 
which in the aggregate have served to establish a low wage economy within the United 
States of America.  
In addition to the threat of outsourcing, another measure employed to keep 
domestic wage levels down has been the hiring of temporary contractors in the place of 
full-time employees. This was a trend that had its precedent in the Reagan 
administration‟s response to the striking air traffic controllers in the 1980s. These 
striking public sector employees were personally fired by Reagan and replaced with 
temporary contractors. Since this industrial dispute, contract workers have become an 
increasing tool for private employers to keep down their wage costs. 
In their research on what they refer to as the “temporary staffing industry”, the 
economists Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore found that: 
During the course of the last three decades, the temporary staffing industry has 
moved from the role of stopgap-staffing provider, supplying short-term cover for 
eventualities such as maternity leaves and seasonal spikes in demand, to a more 
systematic and continuous function, mediating between companies personnel 
offices and their preferred labour supply‟s across an increasingly array of 
industries and occupations.
195
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As the above findings illustrate, contract workers now constitute a significant sector in 
the country‟s labour force, a sector that is found throughout the United States‟ industrial 
landscape. According to Peck and Theodore, “approximately two-fifths of US temps are 
employed in clerical or pink-collar occupations, a similar proportion work in blue-collar 
jobs, and the remainder occupies a wide range of mainly white-collar jobs, including a 
sizeable scientific and technical segment”.196  
 Contract workers are almost always paid less than their full-time counterparts. 
Peck and Theodore found that in “seventeen of the twenty top occupations [that use 
contract workers] the average wage earned by the temporary workers was less than the 
average national wage for each occupation”.197 In addition, along with paying lower 
wages, hiring temporary contract workers further reduces labour costs, as it enables 
companies to forego paying out the benefit payments that have traditionally constituted 
a significant part of the take-home pay packages of American workers. In their article 
on the temporary staffing industry, Peck and Theodore stress that the hiring of 
temporary contract workers “has assumed a major role in reducing employers‟ exposure 
to obligations associated with workers‟ compensation and unemployment insurance”.198  
 From a microeconomic perspective, the rise of the temporary staffing industry is 
viewed as a beneficial development, as it allowed firms to reduce their operating costs 
and thus boost their short-term profits. However from a macroeconomic perspective, the 
rise of this industry has removed a number of important institutional stabilisers from the 
economy. Traditionally, the legal obligation of having to pay out unemployment 
insurance to any workers made redundant, acted as a disincentive to companies to shed 
workers in the face of an economic downturn. Because companies had to pay out 
unemployment insurance to any worker that was made redundant, it made sense to keep 
workers on, even in the face of a business downturn, since if they were going to have to 
keep paying them anyway it made sense for companies to keep workers on, especially 
as staff retention would enable a company to quickly pick up production again, once the 
conditions of demand had improved and the economy had begun to recover. As a result, 
the disincentive to fire workers provided under the legal obligation of unemployment 
insurance ensured that large scale unemployment would not follow a business downturn 
within the US post-war economy. Unemployment insurance thus operated as a key 
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economic stabiliser, preventing a recession from escalating unemployment and thus 
reaching levels of an economic depression.
199
  
 However the emergence of the temporary staffing industry provided firms with a 
way to avoid the paying out of unemployment insurance to a significant sector of its 
workforce. Because these workers were hired on a contractual basis, contract workers 
were not legally considered as employees of the firm. As such, the firm hiring the 
workers did not have any legal obligation to pay out unemployment insurance in the 
event of their dismissal. Hiring from the temporary staffing industry therefore provided 
a way for American companies to effortlessly discard a significant section of their 
workforce at the mere sign of a drop in profitability, at no cost at all to the company 
concerned. This was an ability that greatly favoured a firm‟s commercial prospects in 
the short-term financialised economic structure that had emerged in America. Thus the 
problem with this seemingly efficient microeconomic strategy is that when expanded to 
the aggregate level, with most firms following this strategy, what occurs is a rapid 
increase in unemployment, which serves to dramatically depress the prevailing 
conditions of domestic demand, thus multiplying the severity of the economic 
downturn. Consequently, as the temporary staffing industry has grown as a proportion 
of the American labour force, so too has the severity of the subsequent recessions.
200
  
 The recovery to the 2001 recession, like the recovery following the recession of 
1989-1990 before it, is referred to by economists as a “jobless recovery”. This is in 
recognition of the inability of the American economy to generate substantial 
employment in the recovery phase of the economic cycle, as historically occurs in the 
capitalist system.
201
 Peck and Theodore found that in both “recent recoveries” (from the 
recessions of 1990 and 2001) “aggregate employment continued to fall for more than a 
year into the rebound”.202 What is important to note here, in analysing the institutional 
foundations that held down wage growth within the US economy, was the type of 
employment that expanded when employment figures began to finally increase. 
According to Peck and Theodore, between “March 1991 (the end of the recession) and 
March 1992 the economy had lost a net 24,000 jobs, despite an increase of 131,000 
temporary workers during the period”.203 Clearly therefore, as the economy began to 
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recover, business enterprises were looking at replacing the full-time workers let go 
during the recession with temporary contract workers, who were able to be quickly 
dismissed in the event of another downturn. Thus as the commercial orientation of 
American firms became more dependent upon sharemarket performance, employment 
decisions became more centred on the need to maintain the “flexibility‟ of the firm‟s 
labour force. What this means is that due to the short-term demands of the sharemarket, 
firms needed to be able to shed workers quickly, in order to free up funds to boost share 
prices, in response to a short-term dip in a company‟ share price performance. The 
temporary staffing industry therefore, has largely arisen to fulfil this market function.  
 As a result, Peck and Theodore show that in “the wake of the recession of the 
early 1990s, the temporary staffing industry… experienced double-digit rates of annual 
growth”.204 During the financialised years of the 1990s, the temporary staffing industry 
cemented its place as a solid institutional actor inside the American economy, 
demonstrated by the fact that “[t]emp employment growth was sustained at a high rate 
throughout the long boom of the 1990s, establishing a market worth almost $64 billion 
per year by the decade‟s end”.205  
 The institutionalisation of the temporary staffing industry is of even greater 
importance when analysed alongside the corresponding decline in the size and influence 
of the trade union movement. As we have seen, the power of the trade union movement 
dramatically deteriorated within the hostile political-economy of the 1980s. This is in 
large contrast to the position of trade unions within the post-war planning system, where 
organised labour embodied an important institutional actor inside America‟s economic 
structure. Periodic industrial bargaining rounds ensured that wage increases were 
adopted industry-wide by all firms, thus preventing the ability of any one firm to 
undercut its competitors on a price that was generated through cheaper labour costs than 
its industrial competitors. National bargaining rounds thus enabled all firms within a 
given industry to coordinate wage rises, and in this way firms were able to pass on the 
costs of these wage rises to their consumers, who in turn were more able to afford these 
small price rises due to the significant increase in income associated with the rise in 
wages. Ongoing wage rises thus enabled the country‟s consumer market to grow 
alongside the economic growth of America‟s productive firms, accounting for the 
sustained growth of the US economy during this period.  
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However in the financialised economy that exists today, the temporary staffing 
industry performs the inverse institutional function of that of the national trade unions in 
the planning system. In their research into the temporary staffing industry, Peck and 
Theodore found that “within the US temp market, large, national contracts became 
increasingly commonplace, as publicly traded staffing firms brokered multiyear 
partnerships with their major corporate clients”.206 With labour composing the sole 
source of competitiveness for these temping firms, entry barriers into the industry were 
very low. Low entry barriers enabled the establishment of new agencies, who were then 
able to come in and outcompete the established firms, by offering cheaper labour than 
the prevailing market price. According to Peck and Theodore, the temporary staffing 
industry “has few barriers to entry, and although there have been several waves of 
consolidation, the US market remains highly fragmented”.207 In consequence, the 
“arrival of thousands of new temporary staffing agencies further saturated the high-
volume of pink-collar and blue-collar segments of the market, where entry barriers are 
lowest”.208 As a result, Peck and Theodore describe the industry as one where staffing: 
Agencies effectively replicated a „low road‟ business model, providing limited 
value added services, holding down billing rates and pursuing high volume 
accounts. A mode of „destructive growth‟ was established, as industry stalwarts 
and start-ups were thrown into competition in maturing markets characterised by 
intense, price-based competition. Aggressive pricing strategies on the part of 
large firms, coupled with endemic undercutting among small agencies, 
contributed to falling gross margins across the industry, even as national 
unemployment rates plunged and worksite employers struggled to cope with 
worker shortages.
209
 
Thus with the growth of the temporary staffing industry (TSI), we have the 
development of an institutional structure that works to suppress wage growth within the 
American economy. Under temping agencies, workers are represented by an 
organisation whose aim is to keep their wages down as low as possible, in order to 
remain price competitive in an industry that is purely centred on labour rather than 
technological competitiveness. Thus while trade unions organised labour in an effort to 
increase workers‟ income; TSI organises labour in a way that reduces it.  
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 Indeed the intense competition inside the TSI industry prevented contract 
workers from increasing their annual income, even in the tight labour market conditions 
that developed during the second half of the 1990s. In theory, according to neoclassical 
economics, a tight labour market should enhance the bargaining power of individual 
workers, enabling them to negotiate higher wages and better working conditions. 
However the prevalence of the temporary staffing industry represented a structural 
barrier that suppressed this theoretical labour market function from coming into fruition. 
Even though in terms of numbers, each individual worker was in short supply in the 
United States during the mid-1990s and thus in theory had the bargaining power to 
negotiate higher wages with their employers, contract workers were represented in the 
workplace by the TSI firm, who due to the large supply of temping agencies in 
operation, faced competitive pressure to lower the price of their labour. Workers within 
the temporary staffing industry thus experienced significant pressure to reduce their real 
wages, and it was this pressure that undermined the individual bargaining position 
afforded to them by the tight labour market conditions of supply. By extension, the 
sheer number of contract workers within the American workplace put pressure on paid 
employees to accept the low wages and regressive working conditions found within 
their respective industries. The highly visible threat of being replaced by contract 
workers if adversarial actions were undertaken by employees in an effort to improve 
their working conditions, were enough to keep wages low and regressive workplace 
policies in check. The prevalence of the TSI industry thus acted as a very strong 
disincentive for labour to adopt a hardline measure against the regressive wages and 
working conditions of the period. 
 By the 2001 economic recovery, Peck and Theodore argue that this “new 
dynamic between temporary employment and the wider labour market seems to have 
become entrenched”. The authors demonstrate this fact by showing that after “[t]wenty-
four months into the recovery, the economy continued to shed jobs at an historically 
high rate (-624,000), yet robust growth in temporary employment (+241,000) had been 
underway for some time. Only after thirty months of recovery [did] the economy finally 
began steadily to add jobs overall, with the temporary staffing industry continuing to 
play a leading role”.210 
The trend embodied in the temporary staffing industry is part of a wider trend 
that aimed to commodify labour into „flexible labour markets‟. This had a profound 
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effect on the quality of working conditions and the level of wages found throughout the 
American economy. According to neoclassical economic theory, „flexible labour 
markets‟ -  or the ability to be able to easily fire workers - was an effective mechanism 
that enabled workers to be removed from inefficient sectors of the American economy, 
freeing them up to be re-employed in other more efficient and profitable sectors where 
their labour would be better utilised. This economic theory fitted in with the short-term 
sharemarket priorities of the country‟s financialised corporations. As we have seen, in 
large corporate conglomerates like General Electric, the financial prioritisation of 
maintaining a high share price often dictated the need to sell off a division of the firm, 
or to readily dismiss a large number of workers, in order to rapidly reduce company 
costs and thus boost short-term profits.  
 However neoliberal economic theory, with its emphasis upon the 
microeconomic level of the individual firm, failed to take into account the 
macroeconomic effects the precarious nature of employment was having upon the 
American economy. In his research into working conditions inside the American 
economy, the journalist Peter Gosselin found that due to need of having to move in and 
out of different jobs – as stable employment gave way to flexible labour markets – over 
time workers accepted lower and lower wages, as their own financial situation became 
more desperate after each successive redundancy. Gosselin found that, with the 
exception of “workers who find themselves in hot sectors of the job market, those who 
must change jobs frequently often have trouble maintaining their income levels. 
Benefits such as health insurance are interrupted or even lost, especially in an economy 
that now relies on smaller companies to create many of its new jobs”.211 Gosselin cites a 
study that “looked at people who lost full time jobs between 2001 and 2003 but were 
fortunate enough to find full time replacement positions, and so were comparative 
winners in the job loss process”. The results from the study found that these “re-
employed people made, on average, seventeen percent less than they would have had 
they managed to hang on to their original position”. According to Gosselin, this income 
drop was “double the wage loss of the late 1990s”. Gosselin argues that “since annual 
rises are fairly modest in most job categories these days, it is difficult to impossible for 
those who lose jobs to catch up after they go back to work”.212  
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 Through further research into the causes behind the economy-wide stagnation of 
American wages, Gosselin found that “on average, college graduates who lost their jobs 
in the early 2000‟s ended up with wages in their subsequent jobs that were more than 
twenty percent lower than what they would have made had they held on to their original 
position”.213 As these findings make clear, the debilitating impact the financialisation of 
the American economy is having upon employment is spreading up the labour chain. 
Originally, the neoliberal justification for the downsizing and wage stagnation 
underway in the US economy was that it was only the low-skilled and unproductive 
sectors that were being targeted by this process. Their eventual disappearance from the 
US economy, it was argued, would act as an incentive for workers to up-skill and move 
into more „knowledge-intensive‟ industries.214 However as the above statistics illustrate, 
employment in „knowledge intensive‟ industries – defined here as industries that require 
a college degree to enter – are now subject to the same income-reducing measures that 
previously wrecked havoc among the blue-collar sectors of employment. Clearly 
therefore, the implementation of supply-side policies has not worked to institute greater 
efficiency measures within the productive sector, rather it has operated to divert more 
and more capital out of the productive sector and into the pockets of financial investors. 
As a result, there has been the increased spread of employment volatility and income 
inequality right up the production chain. 
 The extension of employment volatility and income reducing trends into 
occupations requiring a college education has had an enormous influence upon the types 
of professions American students are now adopting as their chosen career. Daniel 
Brook, a young American journalist, found that due to the widening income disparities 
between different professions within the US economy, the students of his generation 
faced a number of structural pressures directing them towards a particular type of 
occupation, namely within the financial sector. Brook argues that “talented young 
people actually have less control over their lives in a society in which they can get rich 
quick because, in such a society, the consequences of not getting rich quick become 
much more serious”.215 This paradox was due to the fact that the inflated earnings of 
finance professionals and others whose on-paper wealth experienced exponential 
growth during the financialised period, greatly appreciated the price of rents in the 
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country‟s main urban centres. According to the scholar Niall Ferguson, in “recent years, 
the pay packages in finance have been nearly three times the salaries earned by Ivy 
League graduates in other sectors of the economy”.216  
The increase in urban rents rendered a large number of professions unaffordable 
occupations for young Americans to consider. Brook provides the example of Jason 
Eckel, a twenty-six year old music teacher. According to Eckel, if he had stayed living 
in the same city where his job is, he “would have kept going slowly broke from 
renting”. Eckel argues that it was only “because I was a single guy living in a not-so-
nice apartment I was surviving. I was paying a $1200 rent for a one-bedroom 
apartment”. For Eckel, this rent “was over half my salary”.217  
  In addition the dramatic increase in college tuition fees, and the corresponding 
rise in student debt that this has provoked, further intensified the pressure felt by young 
Americans to direct their education towards a career in the more affable financial sector. 
In recognition of this structural pressure, Brook argues that “as the return on education 
investment increases if one pursues finance or a handful of other corporate fields, so too 
does the penalty for anyone who wishes to pursue another path”.218 To illustrate his 
point, Brook provides the scenario of an “idealistic University of Chicago graduate from 
the class of 1980 who opted to stay on the south side and teach in an inner city public 
school”. According to Brooks, in 1980, such an individual “would have earned $13,770, 
more than two and a half times her $5,100 senior year tuition. Today such a student 
would earn $38,551, only twenty-three percent more than her senior tuition of 
$31,500”.219 
In this way, student debt acts as a disincentive to embark on a career of public 
service, or indeed any other career that is not located within the financial sector, as the 
costs involved in such a career prove too great for many well-educated Americans to 
consider. This discourages talented Americans from taking up occupations that have 
socially important functions. One of the outcomes of this is that the quality of public 
schooling in many urban centres is deteriorating. In turn this increases the attractiveness 
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of the top schools – along with the rents in the top school zones – thus exacerbating the 
problem of affordability in undertaking a career outside the financial sector.
220
 
While indeed there may exist a number of selfless young Americans who still 
engage in socially important occupations, this work is really only sustainable while they 
are still young and single. Later on, when they are at the peak of their productive lives, 
family commitments will require many of these individuals to abandon this socially 
important employment and engage their energies towards the generation of wealth for 
financial shareholders within one of the nation‟s financialised firms.221 According to 
another interviewee of Brook‟s, a man who called himself Rajiv, based in Marin County 
California, “wherever the school district is good, the housing prices are very high”.222 
High rents in the zones of the top schools increases the pressure put on many Americans 
to take up an occupation within the financial sector, once family commitments become a 
top priority in their lives. An example of this is provided by Valerie Orth, a staff 
member at the not-for-profit organisation Global Exchange. Due to the great disparity 
that exists between the pay at Global Exchange and the rents in the surrounding area, 
Valerie claims that: “Once I have kids, I don‟t think any of this is sustainable. I don‟t 
know how anyone at Global Exchange has kids”. 223 
In this way, the financialisation of the US economy is generating significant 
social costs for the nation as a whole; social costs whose net effects will only be 
exacerbated into the future unless concrete action is taken now to address the 
macroeconomic cause of this debilitating predicament. As Daniel Brook clearly 
illustrates, if “they [the new generation of American workers] pursue a middle-income 
job, becoming a social worker or a city councilman, they know their children‟s lives 
will be hemmed in by debt. If they want their kids to get a full ride, they will have to 
provide it themselves”.224 It is this stone-cold fact that has decimated the strength of 
socially important occupations within American society, increasing the pulling power of 
the dominant financial sector in the process. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the financialisation of the American economy has been a highly 
regressive development for the great majority of American citizens. It embodies a 
destabilising system that has reduced the real earnings of most American workers 
during this period. The neo-classical school of economic thought argues that if left 
unchecked, the free market will provide the most efficient and productive allocation of 
economic resources. However it is clear from the above analysis that in reality, the 
prevalence of a number of structural factors within the American economy has 
encouraged the free market to develop a low-wage economic system, one that has 
proved extremely detrimental to both the country‟s productive capacity along with its 
prevailing level of aggregate demand. 
The process of financialisation represents the end-result of the practical 
implementation of supply-side policies. By over-focusing on the competitive conditions 
of supply and ignoring the inadequate conditions of aggregate demand – in both the 
United States and the world economy at large – the practical implementation of „trickle-
down‟ economics encouraged the development of an economic system that drained 
resources away from the productive sector in order to fuel financial speculation at the 
top. It was in this way that the process of financialisation embodied the ultimate 
outcome of supply-side policies put into practice. 
It is here where we come to the nexus of the issues involved with the simple re-
tinkering of the neoliberal position by contemporary policy-makers. At the beginning of 
the 1980s, as indeed is still the case today, the root cause of the economic problems 
afflicting the American economy was the insufficient degree of aggregate demand that 
existed at the global level. However this underlying root cause was ignored by 
succeeding economic policy-makers, who chose instead to concentrate on superficial 
symptoms that existed on the supply-side, in an aim to engineer greater „efficiency‟ 
measures throughout the American economy. The greater the efficiency savings made 
however, the greater the drop in aggregate demand. It was in this way that the 
application of neo-liberal policies during the 1980s aggravated the very real 
macroeconomic problems that were present at that time. 
Thus the initiation of supply-side policies from the 1980s on has merely worked 
to paper over the real problems of the American economy. This neglect of the 
underlying issues has dramatically exacerbated these problems for the United States, 
culminating in the severe recession that currently afflicts its economy. As such, if an 
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effective recovery is to be implemented, the proven inability of neoliberal policies to 
effectively address the root cause of insufficient global aggregate demand must be 
acknowledged by the policy-making community. For this to occur, the economic debate 
must be expanded to include alternative policy positions, ones that will prove more 
appropriate to a macroeconomic analysis on aggregate conditions of demand. The 
microeconomic focus of neoliberalism has proved an inadequate paradigm for such an 
analysis, and new positions must therefore be promoted in order to rectify this 
extremely narrow analytical situation.  
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Chapter 4: The Build-Up to the 
Crash 
 
Introduction 
The conventional policy position holds that the current recession is the direct 
outcome of the massive expansion in credit and credit-related instruments during the 
years immediately preceding the crash. This paper agrees with the conventional 
assertion, in so far as the most immediate cause of the recession was the bursting of the 
speculative credit bubble that blew up during the decade of the 2000‟s. However, this 
paper aims to extend the conventional analysis by examining the reasons why credit and 
the trading of credit instruments were relied upon to such a disproportionate extent to 
fuel economic growth in the United States during this period. In the previous chapter, 
the paper looked at the decline in the demand functions of wage growth and long-term 
productive investment projects during the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter will examine 
the expansion of credit into the twenty-first century and show how this expansion was 
used to cover up the gap in aggregate demand that had been opened up by the decline of 
these important demand functions. This extension of the analysis is essential if the root 
cause of the current recession is to be effectively targeted by contemporary policy-
makers. 
The move away from innovative-inducing productive investment projects, 
together with the erosion of real wage earnings throughout the process of 
financialisation, worked to radically reduce the level of real aggregate demand found 
inside the United States‟ economy. Nevertheless despite this real reduction, aggregate 
demand was able to be sustained by the substantial expansion in credit during this 
period. This expansion was further increased into the 2000‟s, when the financial sector 
itself was elevated into the position of prime importance within the United States‟ 
economy, following the crash of the corporate sharemarkets in 2000 and the subsequent 
speculative rise of the housing market into the following decade. 
This chapter will begin by examining the means in which the financial sector 
was enlarged and its trading activities expanded throughout the sharemarket boom of 
the 1990s. This discussion will include sections centred on the rise of 401(k) accounts 
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and institutional investors; the role of credit derivatives; and the process of 
securitization, in expanding the size of the financial sector during this decade.  
Following on from this discussion, the chapter will detail the rise of the financial 
sector into the position of prime importance within the US economy during the 2000‟s. 
This elevation was largely facilitated by the government-directed recovery from the 
recession of 2001-2002. Here the recovery was directed through a series of short-term 
interest rate reductions by the Federal Reserve, who aimed to reduce the cost of credit 
inside the US economy, particularly that for mortgage finance, as a means to stimulate 
economic activity inside the country.  
The increase in mortgage originations that this strategy inspired, created a 
growing loan source that the country‟s investment banks –via the process of 
securitization –converted into a new type of financial asset. Financial trading was then 
able to be reoriented upon this new asset class in order to compensate for the decline in 
corporate equity trading following the sharemarket crash of 2000. The chapter will thus 
analyse the rise of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and the interrelated collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs) in order to illustrate the means in which the financial sector 
was enabled to continue to expand via the redirection in financial trading towards the 
rising residential property market. It was in this way, the chapter argues, that the 
financial sector was able to finally sever its link to the productive sector and achieve 
spectacular growth, despite the now highly visible stagnation of the country‟s 
productive economy. 
Next the chapter will examine the international dimensions of credit expansion 
within the United States economy. The chapter argues that despite the decline of 
productive-based earnings during this period, the US financial sector was able to 
continue to grow through an increase in foreign-sourced funds into the sector, as export-
oriented economies aimed to appreciate the valuation of the US dollar in order to 
maintain the price-competitiveness of their products inside the US consumer markets. 
The chapter will argue that this foreign-financed credit expansion was ultimately 
unsustainable and was one of the major contributing factors behind the severe credit 
crash of 2008. As we will see, this credit expansion merely worked to intensify the 
process of financialisation inside the United States, thus exacerbating the decline of the 
country‟s productive economy, which incidentally, was the only economic sector where 
real material earnings could be generated to reduce the country‟s disproportionate 
dependence on foreign debt as the main source of economic growth. 
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The combination of stagnating wages and declining employment prospects 
inside the country‟s real economy, together with the credit expansion of more and more 
mortgage finance to lower income households, meant that a significant proportion of 
debt within the American economy became progressively unaffordable for its holders. It 
was this combination that culminated in the collapse of the subprime mortgage sector in 
late 2007. The chapter will detail the build-up to this crash, illustrating how at the peak 
of the boom, the major Wall Street investment banks had become extremely vulnerable 
to a crash in the subprime sector through the activities of their subsidiary  financial 
„conduits‟ and „structured investment vehicles‟. It was the implication of these major 
banks in the collapse of the subprime mortgage sector that led to the severe contraction 
of bank lending from late 2007 on. It was this credit crunch, the chapter concludes, that 
led to the severe global recession of 2008. 
 
The Rise of Institutional Investment 
The prioritisation of short-term share market performance by American 
corporations both encouraged - and was itself an outcome - of the exponential 
expansion of the country‟s financial sector during this period. Importantly, this 
expansion entailed a number of highly significant developments, which taken together, 
transformed the nature of the country‟s financial markets during the 1990s. A primary 
influence on the changes underway in the financial sector during this period was the rise 
of the 401(k) account and the subsequent switch in pension plans from defined benefits 
to defined contributions. Roger Lowenstein, a financial scholar who documented these 
changes, states that as “the nomenclature suggests, 401(k)‟s owe their success to an 
administrative accident”. This accident came in a 1980 amendment instituted by 
Congress, whereby a short paragraph –“k”- was added to section 401 of the Internal 
Revenue code. “Essentially, it said that taxes could be deferred on profit-sharing plans 
that were open to lower-paid employees as well as executives”. According to 
Lowenstein, “Congress‟s intent was modest – it was tweaking the rules that applied to 
existing plans, which typically applied to year-end bonuses”.225 
 Nevertheless, the slight change embodied in the “k” provided US firms with 
another means of reducing labour costs in order to boost their short-term profitability 
projections. Instead of providing their employees with a guaranteed pension salary, 
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based on their wages and the number of years the employee had been in service to the 
company, as stipulated under a defined benefit pension plan; a defined contribution plan 
provides each worker with an Individual Retirement account, or 401(k) account, which 
the company contributes funds to and through which the workers can use to invest in the 
financial markets, as a means to appreciate their retirement earnings.
226
  
While the company is legally obliged to make contributions to its workers 
401(k) accounts, it is not responsible for the performance of these accounts on the 
financial markets. Thus the company is not legally obliged to cover any of the losses of 
these accounts if they fail to generate sufficient earnings to provide for their workers‟ 
retirement. The extent of the savings generated by American companies from this 
switch in pension plans is illustrated by the fact that in “1980, 50 percent of the private 
sector workforce was covered by a defined benefit pension plan, with typical employer 
contributions of around 8 percent of payroll. Today, less than 20 percent of the private 
sector workforce has such a plan. The other 30 percent has a 401(k) or other savings 
account, with employer contributions averaging less than 3 percent”.227 
 The emergence of the 401(k) account thus enabled American companies to 
abrogate themselves from the prior responsibility of providing an adequate pension for 
their workers‟ retirement. Previously this had constituted a guaranteed provision, and 
was an essential component of the unique welfare-state system that had developed in the 
United States during the postwar period. Being divested of this responsibility therefore 
effectively eliminated a very large liability on the balance-sheet of most US 
corporations, thus improving their price-earnings ratio on the nation‟s stockmarkets. In 
turn, the new 401(k) accounts provided the sharemarkets a significant boost in capital, 
contributing considerably to the speculative-driven process of share-price appreciation 
that had come to embody the primary source of profitability for America‟s increasingly 
financialised corporate sector. Thus by “1990, close to $400 billion was invested in 
401(k)s. By 1995, the total had doubled”.228  
 The rise of 401(k) accounts encouraged a transformation away from the 
established trend of long-term lending towards a new form of short-term highly 
leveraged borrowing amongst many levels of the country‟s financial sector. 401(k) 
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accounts were mainly managed by mutual funds. The massive influx of working capital 
provided by the 401(k) accounts to these institutional investors dramatically increased 
their role and influence within the nation‟s sharemarkets. According to the financial 
analyst Henry Kaufman, who worked on Wall St during this period, “Mutual funds role 
has been especially pivotal in the stock market, which was long dominated by private 
and public pension funds. But as private pension funds have increasingly shifted from 
defined benefits to defined contributions – thereby encouraging beneficiaries to select 
their own portfolio risk profiles – mutual funds have attracted billions of dollars of 
pension fund assets”.229  
 James Crotly, one of the leading authors of the financialisation literature, has 
documented the rise of institutional investors in the stockmarkets. “Throughout the 
1950‟s”, Crotly found, “households owned about ninety percent of corporate stock and 
[as we have seen] tended to hold their stocks for long periods. However by “2000, 
households held forty-two percent”. This decline was due to the fact that “institutions 
had become the dominant stockholders of large US corporations and were responsible 
for about three-quarters of all stock trades”. 230 
 The impact of institutional investors intensified the process of financialisation 
during the 1990s. According to Crotly, “Institutional investment is a highly competitive 
business in which a very large number of firms fight for contracts to manage very large 
portfolios”. Due to this intense industrial competition, “[f]ailure to achieve at least 
industry-average rates of return for even a few quarters can lead to the cancellation of 
these contracts”. This has in turn led to the situation where on “average, stocks are now 
held for just one year”. As such “[r]ational stockholders … have no reason to be 
concerned about the performance of the companies they „own‟ beyond a one-year 
horizon”.231 The rise of institutional investors as dominant traders in the sharemarkets 
thus intensified the external pressures placed on corporate management to focus on 
short-term sharemarket performance. 
 Institutional investors are also a force that served to exacerbate and expand 
sharemarket movements. Crotly describes the new sharemarket trading environment as 
a “situation ideally designed to generate herd behaviour among investors”. He argues 
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that institutional investors “must follow the crowd as it rushes in or out of industries or 
firms or geographical areas, thereby raising and lowering stock prices”. The alternative 
to not following this herd-like strategy for mutual funds is “to risk below-average 
returns, which can quickly put you out of business”.232 The scholar Robert W. Parentau 
also observed this herding behaviour. According to Parentau, the  
pattern that can be observed over time in the institutional investment business is 
as follows: investment time horizons collapsed, investment performance became 
defined relative to a benchmark or index portfolio, asset allocation and market 
timing skills were made obsolete by a monomaniacal focus on stock selection 
and risk became defined solely in relation to departures made from benchmark 
weightings. Each of these consultant inspired moves had the unintended 
consequence of enhancing herding dynamics among institutional investors.
233
   
 With this herd-like mentality in mind, it is clear to see why the information-
technology (IT) sector saw such an appreciation in the price of its shares during the 
second half of the 1990s, and also why, industry-wide, shares in IT companies plunged 
so quickly at the end of the decade. Crotly found that as “institutions became more 
important in the market, annual stock over (the ratio of the value of the stock sales to 
the market value of stocks) grew ever higher”.234 Institutional investors thus increased 
the amount of turnover of stock sales, which in turn served to accelerate the speculative 
process of share-price appreciation. In the end however, all this managed to achieve for 
the IT sector, was to exacerbate the height and speed of the corresponding crash.   
 Because these institutional investors were primarily in charge of funds required 
for their clients‟ retirement, they had a prerogative to minimize their investment risk to 
as much as possible. Partly this risk-management involved diversifying their 
investments throughout a number of different financial instruments such as stocks, 
bonds, currencies etc. Mutual funds thus held a portfolio of investments, which ensured 
that if one investment dropped, that loss would only constitute a small component of the 
overall pool of investment funds, and would furthermore, likely to be balanced by a rise 
in the value of another investment asset held in the portfolio.  
 In addition to this portfolio risk management system, financial devices came to 
be designed with the intention of further reducing the amount of risk for these 
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institutional investment funds. These financial devices primarily came in the form of 
credit derivatives. According to Kaufman, as “professionally managed portfolios have 
increased in size and scope internationally, many investment managers have sought to 
limit exposure to market risks by making use of derivatives. That, in turn, has been a 
steady source of business for financial institutions that specialize in providing financial 
derivatives as instruments for risk management”.235  
 
 Credit Derivatives 
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is derived from a pre-existing 
financial asset. The market that exists for financial derivatives is a secondary market, 
built on top of the original market for the underlying financial asset. Derivatives come 
in a variety of forms; this includes futures, forwards, options, swaps and „swaptions‟. 
The use of credit derivatives has rapidly increased the amount of trading that is based on 
each underlying asset within the financial markets. Increased trading in the secondary 
derivatives market works to bid up the price of the derivative, and by extension, the 
price of the underlying financial asset. Derivatives have thus radically expanded the 
amount of credit created by a single asset within the financial sector. This credit-
creation has proceeded at an exponential pace. According to the scholar Kevin Phillips, 
derivatives “were a relatively rudimentary market in the 1980s. Their notional value by 
the end of 2005, however, was three times higher than the total of all financial 
instruments and more than ten times higher than total global GDP”.236  
The market need to create credit derivatives in order to minimise risk, led to the 
emergence of a number of new institutional players within the financial sector. Because 
mutual fund investors needed to reduce the amount of risk contained in their financial 
dealings, a market need opened up for the creation of institutional speculators who were 
willing to take on this unwanted risk. According to Kaufman, the “fact is, for every 
cautious portfolio manager hoping to use financial derivatives to limit risk, there must 
be a willing risk taker on the other side. Without the active participation of prominent 
speculators, the market would be lopsided, which would make the cost of derivatives 
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prohibitive for risk-averse businesses as well as for investors who are trying to hedge 
open exposures”.237 This market need was ultimately assumed by the hedge funds.  
While the principal proponents of credit derivatives argued that these financial 
devices provided a measure of stability for the financial markets, a number of more 
sceptical scholars argued otherwise. The scholar Randall Dodd for instance, argued that 
the “first danger posed by derivatives comes from the leverage they provide to both 
hedgers and speculators”. This increased leverage is obtained by the fact that derivative 
“transactions allow investors to take a large price position in the market while 
committing only a small amount of capital”. Therefore instead of taking out a large 
price position on a financial asset, an investor can purchase a derivative whose price is 
based on the entire value of the underlying asset, and through this derivative, capture 
returns that are derived from the full value of the underlying asset, rather than just a 
proportion of it.
238
 For example: 
Instead of buying one million dollars of Treasury bonds or one million dollars of 
stock, an investor can buy futures contracts on one million dollars of the bonds 
or stocks with only a few thousand dollars of capital committed as margin. The 
returns from holding the stocks or bonds will be the same as holding the futures 
on the stocks or bonds. This allows investors to earn a much higher rate of return 
on their capital by taking on a much larger amount of risk.
239
 
It is this ability, provided by the use of derivatives, which Dodd argued enabled 
investors to radically increase their leverage in an underlying asset. While this increased 
leverage does render it easier for hedgers to hedge against risk, it also conversely, 
“makes speculation cheaper”.240 As such, derivatives both expand the possibilities for 
speculation on an underlying financial asset, while also rendering the ability to engage 
in this increased speculation easier to undertake. 
 Nevertheless the majority of financial analysts continued to maintain that the use 
of derivatives removed a large amount of risk from the financial markets. According to 
Kaufman, those analysts who “believe that derivatives may decrease the volatility of 
interest rates, exchange rates, and equity prices generally rely on the concept of 
“stabilizing speculation”. According to this conceptual position, since the speculation 
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undertaken by the hedge funds is balanced by the risk-averse actions of the mutual fund 
investors, “speculation is generally stabilizing” as risk is now borne by those most able 
to bear it. This therefore enables risky investments to be continued to be pursued – in 
the process maintaining the desirable dynamism of the capitalist system - in a manner 
that is not disruptive to the entire financial system as a whole. Thus by this logic, the 
easier it is for hedge funds to assume greater portions of risk, the more stable it is for the 
overall financial system. Therefore “if speculation is generally stabilizing, then 
volatility should gradually diminish with the proliferation of financial derivatives”.241  
 In contrast, Kaufman, who “belong[s] to the opposing camp”, argues that certain 
types of “derivatives have irreversibly changed the behaviour of the underlying 
financial markets on which they are based". These derivatives include “the various 
futures markets (and their associated options markets) on equity indexes and 
government bonds”. According to Kaufman these “derivatives have introduced greater 
symmetry in position taking”.242 What this means is that trading in these derivatives has 
made it just as simple for an investor to go short on an underlying asset than it is to go 
long.
243
 In this way the derivative markets enabled investors‟ much greater ease in 
changing their position on a financial asset. This therefore accelerated market 
movements, leading to less financial stability, not more. 
 From a macroeconomic perspective, the increased volatility in the financial 
markets introduced by credit derivatives intensified the external pressure placed on US 
corporations to prioritise short-term sharemarket performance. Because this short-term 
focus was undermining the long-term productive capacity of these firms, it is clear that 
the increasing use of derivatives was not managing to reduce risk, but in fact was 
undermining the productive basis of the real economy, whose growth had historically 
determined the sustainability and stability of the country‟s economic system.     
Thus the greater volatility that the use of derivatives has brought to the financial 
markets exacerbates market swings and as such, works to increase systemic risk within 
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the economy. According to Kaufman, derivatives work to “amplify the business cycle 
by introducing more leverage into the system and thus expand credit availability, 
especially for marginal borrowers”.244 Dodd supports this assertion, he argues that the 
“spreading of the losses and failures” is symptomatic of the condition “systemic risk”. 
Dodd defines this as an “economy-wide problem that is made worse by leverage and 
leveraging instruments such as derivatives”.245  
 
Securitization 
Along with derivatives, another financial device that served to increase liquidity 
and the expansion of credit-creation within the country‟s financial sector was the 
process of securitization. The scholar Karl Beitel defines securitization as the “process 
of transforming formerly illiquid loans held in the banks‟ own portfolios into 
marketable (negotiable) assets traded on secondary bond markets”.246 Through 
securitization, loans that were previously considered to constitute both a liability (in the 
case of default) and an asset (by being repaid) were packaged up and sold to outside 
investors and thus transferred to pure assets for the investment bank selling these loans 
on to the secondary securities market. The process of securitization was argued to 
distribute and disburse the amount of risk carried in each loan among a wider pool of 
investors, thus contributing to greater stability within the overall financial system.  
As securitization involved the conversion of formerly non-marketable 
instruments into marketable assets, the process greatly expanded the amount of 
underlying assets that could be actively traded on the financial markets. Henry Kaufman 
describes the process as “[v]ery likely the most far-reaching development in modern 
finance”. According to Kaufman, “securitization has changed the very nature of 
financial assets, as well as the character of financial behaviour”.247 In consequence, the 
development of securitization has had enormous ramifications upon the structure of 
America‟s financial economy.  
Securitization introduced to the financial markets a greatly expanded variety of 
assets that could be continuously bought and sold. “Thanks to securitization” Kaufman 
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observed, formerly non-marketable “assets can be traded, priced, and marked to market 
daily – as Eurodollar bonds, interest rate and currency swaps, junk bonds, zero coupon 
bonds, equity derivatives, options in Eurodollar and US Treasury futures, and in many, 
many other forms”. Securitization has thus opened up “literally trillions of dollars worth 
of financial assets” to valuation by the financial marketplace. “For a long time, 
traditional institutions such as banks and insurance companies carried their 
nonmarketable financial assets (such as loans and mortgages) at par, regardless of 
interest rate movements”.248 However now that these securitized assets have been 
reconfigured into tradable items, their values are now determined by the decisions of 
market traders. Thus, like derivatives, the process of securitization has greatly expanded 
the level of volatility among American financial markets.  
For Kaufman, “the most important” implication of the securitization process is 
the fact that “widespread securitization has had the broad effect of loosening the credit 
process”. According to Kaufman, “[c]redit standards have been lowered, and the credit 
market has grown enormously” following the widespread adoption of securitization.249 
Because securitization provides banks the opportunity to package up loans and sell 
these off onto the secondary securities market, American banks now have a commercial 
interest in expanding the number of loans they give out as credit, as loan origination 
enables them to increase the number of marketable assets they have to sell to the 
securities markets. In this way large investment banks have been transformed into giant 
financial intermediaries, with securitization enabling them to sell off their banking 
responsibilities to outside investors.  
Banking profitability is now primarily generated through the collection of fees 
from facilitating the transactions of these securitized loans. According to the scholar 
Karl Beitel, banks “realize profits on the fees they charge for services provided in 
underwriting this type of debt, for example, the purchase and aggregation of loans, the 
creation and sale of securities on the secondary market, and the management of the 
pass-through of the underlying mortgage payments to final purchasers”.250 This has 
come to replace the traditional banking method of maintaining profitability through the 
margin differences that exist between the banks‟ cost of borrowing and its rate of 
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lending.
251
 As such, securitization has had an enormous influence upon the type of 
activity now undertaken by banks within the country‟s financial sector. 
This change in the way in which banks now make their money is one of the 
main causative factors behind the relaxation of credit standards from the mid-1990s on. 
According to Kaufman (who observed this trend during his time at the American 
investment bank Salomon Brothers), since a banker‟s fee now “depends on the 
successful distribution of the issue [selling the loan on through securitization]… the 
investment banker‟s due diligence is limited by his analytical focus on the borrower‟s 
current financial situation”. Kaufman argues that this “in effect, leaves much of the 
judgement in the hands of the investor” as the purchaser of the security. However, the 
investor‟s confidence in his own financial position is in turn elevated by the 
securitization process. “A securitized investment… encourages the investor to believe 
that he can quickly sell the obligation when a credit problem brews, thereby passing the 
problem off to someone else”. This belief, Kaufman argues, gave rise to the “liquidity 
illusion”, where it was believed that there would always be another investor to buy the 
security, if the financial prospects of the current holder started to appear thin.
252
 
 
The Federal Reserve Financial Stimulus Strategy 
The exponential growth of the financial sector during the 1990s, along with the 
massive expansion in its activities through the rise of the secondary markets for 
securities and derivatives, elevated the importance of this sector in the generation of 
growth inside the United States economy. According to the scholar Kevin Phillips, the 
“torrent of new debt-related instruments and borrowing was central in lifting the relative 
weight of financial services from some 15 percent of GDP in 1980 to 20 percent in 
2000”. Indeed, this growth “gave the financial services industry essential wherewithal to 
consolidate its gains in share of GDP and soon to displace the toppled technology sector 
as the leader in US stockmarket capitalisation”. 253 
In 2000, the speculative process of financialisation finally came unstuck, 
precipitating a serious recession within the United States economy from 2001 to 2002. 
According to Robert Brenner, beginning “in March 2000, a string of disastrous 
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corporate profit reports set off a long, deep plunge of equity prices that would ultimately 
by September 2002, bring the S&P 500 and NASDAQ indexes down by 185 and 400 
percent respectively”.254 As we have seen, the country‟s productive sector had been 
gutted by the cost-reducing drive of the preceding boom. This decline in productive 
capacity, along with the even deeper decline in global aggregate demand as the 
emergence of even more export-oriented countries stepped up the level of aggressive-
price competition found within the world‟s export markets, meant that any stimulus 
directed through the productive sector would prove to be a massive undertaking. In this 
regards, any stimulus measures directed through the country‟s productive sector would 
have a long lead time and would thus be unable to generate a rapid recovery from the 
ensuing recession. 
Recognising this fact, the governing authorities saw that the quickest method of 
stimulating an economic recovery within the United States was through the recently 
enlarged financial sector. Conveniently, targeting this sector as the source of economic 
stimulus closely conformed to the ideological doctrine of the „trickle-down‟ theory of 
economics, which had become widely institutionalised within government departments 
by this point. Moreover, as it was the crash of the financial markets that had caused the 
onset of the recession, a financial stimulus was believed to address this root cause and 
thus quickly re-orient the US economy back upon an upwards trajectory of growth. 
According to Beitel, as “equity prices declined, concerns emerged that the massive 
write-down of the (nominal) value of the portfolios of financial speculators threatened 
to pull the entire economy into a downward spiral”.255 Providing another market for 
financial speculation would therefore prevent (or as we shall see postpone) the financial 
markets themselves from crashing and thus from pulling the rest of the economy down 
into a debilitating depression. However with the sharemarkets that had constituted the 
underlying basis for the last phase of financial enlargement now in rapid decline, a new 
form of underlying asset class was required in order to derive financial devices from for 
speculative trading within the secondary markets. The answer to this predicament came 
in the form of housing. 
 Following the first major systemic decline of the sharemarkets in late 2000, the 
Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds rate “from 6.5 percent to 3.5 percent within 
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the space of just a few months”. In 2002, the rate was dropped again to 2 percent, and 
was further reduced to 1 percent by 2003. According to the financial scholar Charles R. 
Morris, this constituted “the lowest rate in half a century”. Interest rates remained in the 
range of 1 to 2 percent until late 2004. Thus for “thirty-one consecutive months the base 
inflation-adjusted short-term interest rate was negative. For bankers, in other words, 
money was free”.256 
 Kevin Phillips, a former Republican Party strategist, argues that the maintenance 
of these historically low rates of interest was part of an “underlying Washington 
strategy… to create a low interest rate boom in real estate”. It was hoped that by 
lowering interest rates, this would expand access to mortgage credit to more sectors of 
American households. This would thereby raise “the percentage of American home 
ownership, ballooning the price of homes, and allowing householders to take out some 
of that increase through low-cost refinancing”. In consequence, Phillips argues, this 
credit-driven housing boom “created new wealth to take the place of that destroyed in 
the 2000 to 2002 stockmarket crash and simultaneously raised consumer confidence”.257  
 
Mortgage-backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligations 
 The financial developments that had given rise to credit derivatives and the 
process of securitisation helped facilitate the financial stimulus strategy of the Federal 
Reserve Board. Investment banks found that they were able to capitalise on the increase 
in mortgage originations in this period, by purchasing these loans and transforming 
them into bond-like assets called mortgage-backed securities (MBS).Thus through 
securitization, banks were able to commodify mortgage loans into tradable assets and 
then use these assets to create a new secondary market to replace the one for equity 
derivatives that was then undergoing a state of decline following the sharemarket crash 
of 2000.  
The secondary market for mortgage-backed securities experienced exponential 
growth throughout the following years. According to Beitel, mortgage-backed securities 
were “one of the largest financial asset classes by outstanding volume… bought and 
                                                             
256
 Morris, The Two Trillion Dollar Meltdown, P.58 
 
257 Phillips, American Theocracy, P.278 
 
135 
 
sold on US capital markets [May 2008]”. Moreover, these instruments came to 
constitute “the major conduits of funding for new mortgage loans” throughout the first 
decade of the twenty-first century.
258
 
   From these mortgage-backed securities, a number of new credit derivatives 
were created, whose formation worked to expand the level of financial trading 
associated with these underlying securitized assets. Of these new forms of credit 
derivatives, the “most prevalent” was the collateralized debt obligation (CDO).259 A 
CDO is a credit derivative that is created through a Wall Street investment bank or a 
government-sponsored entity (Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac), purchasing large numbers 
of MBS, and then categorizing these securities into different tranches, in accordance 
with the amount of risk contained in each group. Each tranche of MBS are then ranked 
with the least-at-risk at the top and the most-at-risk at the bottom. From this 
categorization a system of risk-mitigation is established whereby the lowest tranche will 
be the first to absorb any losses from loan defaults of the underlying mortgages. Once 
this lowest tranches has absorbed all losses within its capacity, the next lowest tranche 
will be the category to absorb all losses and so on. In this way the highest tranche of 
CDOs will be „insured‟ by the risk absorption of the lowest tranches. For their part, the 
lowest tranches will generate a higher return for their investors, in order to compensate 
for the amount of risk that these CDOs hold.
260
  
 In this way mortgage loans were transformed into securities that resembled the 
form of corporate bonds. These bond-like instruments were then categorised into 
tranches as CDOs, which aimed to cater to a range of tastes throughout the investment 
spectrum, from the risk-averse interests of the pension funds to the risky yet high-
yielding interests of the hedge fund investors. Beitel states that “CDOs have been 
promoted by their sponsors as vehicles that provide investors with a greater range of 
investment options by allowing fund managers to more readily recalibrate the relative 
balance of risk and return in their portfolios”.261 In this way a secondary market was 
created for mortgage loans, which replaced the secondary financial market that had been 
derived from the sharemarket boom of the 1990s.  
Thus, even though the profitability of the country‟s productive sector had been 
incapacitated by the impact of the 2001 recession, the growth of the financial sector was 
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enabled to continue at a heightened pace. It was now clearer than ever that financial 
growth had become completely cut off from real material growth inside the country‟s 
productive economy. Economic growth in the United States during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century was overwhelmingly based on financial speculation, fuelled by 
cheap credit.  
But if the funds backing this financial growth were not coming from the 
country‟s productive sector, where indeed was this cheap credit coming from? The 
answer to this question is the same source it had been coming from since the mid-1970s; 
from foreign investors and sovereign central banks, looking for a location both to 
appreciate their financial wealth, and also as a means to maintain the low valuation of 
their currencies against that of the US dollar. It was in this way that the financialisation 
of the US economy was inextricably linked to the wider processes of globalisation 
within the world economy at large. 
 
The Foreign Source of US Credit 
The great expansion in foreign financing of the US financial sector during the 
first decade of the twenty-first century was primarily fuelled from the corresponding 
rise of East Asian economies (especially China) and their strategy of purchasing large 
amounts of dollar-denominated assets in order to increase the price competitiveness of 
their exports inside the American consumer market. According to Brenner “East Asian 
governments‟ unending purchases of dollar-denominated assets, with the goal of 
keeping the value of their currencies down, the competitiveness of their manufacturing 
up, and the borrowing and purchasing power of US consumers increasing, made for a 
rising supply of subsidized loans” into the United States during this period.262  
Indeed these central bank purchases were markedly increased in the aftermath of 
the South East Asian currency crisis of 1998. According to the scholar Raama 
Vasudevan “capital inflow through the 1990‟s was accompanied by increases in 
reserves as emerging markets increased their precautionary holdings of foreign reserves 
in order to insulate their economies of capital flight after the experience of the Asian 
crisis”.263 The increase in dollar reserve holdings by these East Asian governments 
correspondingly increased the amount of capital that flooded into the US financial 
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sector in order to purchase these dollar-denominated assets. In fact, “[r]eserve holdings 
by developing countries rose to about $2.7 trillion (37 percent of US GDP) in 2007”. 
Consequently, “the United States absorbed 34 percent of global capital imports in 1995 
and now absorbs 65 percent of global capital imports”. This indeed signifies a 
substantial increase in foreign funds into the United States‟ financial sector, providing 
the capital base that enabled the financial expansion to occur, irrespective of the decline 
in earnings from the country‟s productive sector.264 
The Federal Reserve‟s strategy of lowering short-term interest rates in order to 
fuel a financial boom through the housing market was ultimately dependent upon a 
corresponding decline in long-term interest rates during this period. This long-term 
decline had largely come about due to the increased inflows of capital into the country‟s 
financial sector from East Asian central banks from the mid-1990s on. According to 
Brenner “the Federal Reserve‟s campaign to bring down short-term interest rates was 
incapable by itself of insuring a recovery”. This was because “it could not directly bring 
about a reduction in the 30 year fixed mortgage interest rate that was still standard in the 
US housing market”. Changes in this mortgage rate “were determined by long-term 
interest rates dependent in turn on the supply and demand for loanable funds in the 
world economy as a whole, which the Federal Reserve could certainly affect but could 
not fully determine”.  In the ten year interval between 1995 and 2005 “the yield on 10 
year Treasury bonds fell more or less steadily… declining in this interval from 7.09 per 
cent to 4.29 per cent in nominal terms and 4.49 per cent to 0.89 per cent in real 
terms”.265  
The initial impact of the rapid succession of short-term interest rate reductions 
by the Federal Reserve threatened to place an enormous strain upon the American 
economy‟s ability to effectively recover from the recession. According to Brenner, 
when “US economic authorities sharply reduced short-term interest rates and vastly 
increased the federal budget deficit, they rendered US dollar-denominated assets even 
less attractive than otherwise and risked a flight of capital that would push up long-term 
interest rates, force down asset prices, and end up squelching the recovery”. Indeed 
“during 2002, a serious run on the dollar did begin to materialise and the real interest 
rate on 10 year Treasury‟s rose”.266  
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However in the interests of maintaining the export market that their economic 
growth was ultimately dependent on, East Asian central banks took actions that 
ultimately trumped the decisions of private investors during this period. According to 
Brenner “as they had during the first half of the 1980s under similar circumstances, 
Japanese economic authorities saved the day by unleashing an unprecedented wave of 
purchases of dollar-denominated assets”. Brenner‟s statistics reveal that between “the 
start of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004, with their activity reaching a peak around 
June 2003, Japan‟s monetary authorities created 35 trillion yen, equivalent to roughly 1 
per cent of world GDP, and used it to buy $320 billion of government bonds and GSE 
[Government Sponsored Enterprise] debt. This was “enough to cover 77 per cent of the 
US budget deficit during fiscal year 2004”.267  
In addition to this exponential expansion of Japanese-sourced capital to the 
United States financial sector, Brenner shows that between “2003 and 2004, East Asian 
governments taken together increased their dollar reserves by $465 billion and $507 
billion, respectively”. This equalled “enough to cover 90 per cent and 75 per cent, 
respectively, of the US current account deficit in those years”.268 It was these capital 
inflows that enabled the long-term rate of interest to continue to decline, providing 
cheap credit to fuel the financial-driven boom. 
 
Credit-driven Consumerism 
 The cheaper credit provided by the low interest rates, along with the 
greater accessibility to mortgage finance, generated an enlarged source of credit for 
Americans to access for purposes of consumption. In this way easy-access credit came 
to replace wage growth as the pre-eminent source of consumer demand in the United 
States during the first decade of the twenty-first century. The change in the source of 
consumer demand is clearly revealed by the fact that “between 2000 and 2004, 
household debt grew by 39 percent, whereas “[r]eal disposable income… showed very 
little growth”.269 Moreover, in “2005 macroeconomist Stephanie Pomboy explained that 
over the three previous years consumers had leaned more heavily on new borrowings 
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($675 of non-mortgage debt) than on paychecks (up only $530 billion) to make possible 
the overall $1.3 trillion increase in their spending”.270  
Increased access to consumer credit was in large part an offshoot of the Federal 
Reserve‟s interest rate reduction stimulus strategy. The ability of credit card companies 
to borrow at an interest rate hovering around the range of 1 to 2 percent provided these 
companies with the means to offer very attractive initial rates of interest to new 
customers. Despite these initial low rates of interest however, credit card companies 
were still able to substantially increase their profits during this period, primarily through 
an extension of fees and penalties. Indeed, “[a]ccording to CBS News, the portion of 
credit card-issuer profits represented by fees jumped from 28 percent in 2000 to 33 
percent in 2002, 35 percent in 2003, and an estimated 39 percent in 2004”.271 
Furthermore Kevin Phillips found that “once the new enrolee was hooked, the card 
companies were free to raise rates on just about any pretext – often from 6 or 11 percent 
into the 20 to 30 percent range”.272  
As a result, once all the fees and rate rises are accounted for, credit cards became 
a progressively more expensive source of credit for consumers. This is revealed by the 
fact that between “1990 to 2003 the number of people holding credit cards jumped by 
75 percent – from 82 million to 144 million – but the amount actually charged exploded 
by 350 percent, up from $338 billion to $1.5 trillion”.273 At surface value therefore, 
credit cards appeared to be a cheap and thus affordable source of credit for consumers, 
but the hidden fees and penalties ensured that they were in fact a major contributing 
factor to the great explosion of personal debt during this period. 
Along with credit cards, greater access to mortgage finance was increasingly 
relied upon to fuel consumption throughout this period. Responding to the massive 
appreciation in the valuation of their homes, many households believed that they could 
rely on their appreciating house value to do the saving for them. This wide-spread belief 
was reflected in the substantial reductions in the amount of savings found in traditional 
bank saving deposits during this period. According to Brenner, personal savings rates 
“continued at or near the postwar lows registered during the later 1990s, reaching its 
second lowest level since 1945 in 2006, at -0.6 percent”.274 The fact that it was the 
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appreciation in the value of their homes that was encouraging this reduction in personal 
savings is demonstrated by the fact that those “households that took out home equity 
lines of credit (HELOC) in this interval entirely accounted for the decline, their rate of 
savings dropping from -6.6 percent to -11.3 per cent”. As a result, during “the brief 
period between 2000 and 2007, household debt doubled”.275  
It is important to note that a large proportion of this credit-fuelled consumption 
was not spent on extravagant purchases; rather it was employed as a means to cover 
basic living costs that were now unable to be covered by income alone, due to the 
stagnation in real wages since the early 1980s. For example, in regards to health costs, 
from“2001 [to 2007], health premiums have risen 78 percent while wages have only 
gained 19 percent”.276 This problem is further compounded by the corporate abrogation 
from paying out employee benefits. In the past employers would “cover almost all of an 
employee‟s health-care bills. Now workers are shelling out an average of $3,281 from 
their paychecks for family coverage”.277 Indeed, across the board, basic living costs 
have been rising in relation to the wages of American workers. According to Phillips, 
“mortgage, childcare, health insurance, car and taxes – have been consuming more and 
more of the “discretionary” remainder of family income”.278  
The increasing use of debt to finance spending on these necessary living costs 
has in turn generated yet another increase in the cost of living for American households. 
We have already seen how the use of credit cards enacted a considerable cost on US 
households during this period. The strategy of masking the true cost of borrowing by the 
card companies was replicated by the majority of other credit-lending institutions 
throughout the United States. For example, “according to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and the National Credit Union Administration”, in the year 2004 alone, 
“banks, thrifts and credit unions collected a record $37.8 billion in service charges on 
accounts, more than double what they received in 1994”.279 The scholar Michael 
Perelman states that “Banks continue to raise fees for late payments, low balances, and 
over-the limit charges to as much as $39 per violation. Some banks even charge for 
speaking with a service representative”.280 In total, Kevin Phillips found that “the 
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percentage of household disposable income spent on debt service – principally 
mortgage, auto loan and credit card debt – had risen from just over 10 percent in 1983 
to 14.5 percent in 2006”.281  
Another factor that was exacerbating the credit bubble inside the United States 
was the fact that this debt-induced consumer demand was not fuelling the profitability 
of the country‟s productive sector but rather that of its primary competitors. As 
highlighted by a CNN/Money analysis, “the chart of the current account gap as a 
percentage of GDP, incidentally, looks almost like a chart of consumer credit as a 
percentage of income”.282 American households were increasing their individual 
personal debt in order to increase the profitability of foreign producers, who due to their 
offshore location, held no prospect for enlarging employment within the United States 
itself. As such this debt was ultimately unsustainable, as it held no stimulus measures 
that could be used to increase the real earnings of American workers and thus provide 
them with a means to pay back this debt at a later date. The only way this debt-driven 
spending could be recycled back into the US economy was through the financial sector, 
via the purchasing of dollar-denominated assets by the central banks of these producing 
nations. Therefore the only way American households would see their spending 
recycled was through an increase in credit by the country‟s financial sector. However in 
such a situation, an increase in credit merely works to expand the country‟s total debt 
rather than providing a means to reduce it. 
Therefore, this credit-driven consumption system operated in the exact opposite 
manner of the wage-growth demand function of the planning system. Under the 
planning system, the growth of wages and employment provided the disposable income 
for American workers to consume in the economy. This consumption provided the main 
source of demand for the goods of the country‟s producers, who were able to utilise this 
growing revenue stream as a means to engage in long-term productive investment 
initiatives. In turn, once realised, these investment projects increased corporate 
productivity and profitability, providing these companies with the material means to 
take on more workers, along with increasing workers wages, thus instituting a further 
boost to the consumer demand that was fuelling economic growth during these years. 
Thus rather than expand debt, the planning system worked to reduce America‟s 
dependence on it. This independence from the financial sector, applied to both 
consumers and producers within the economy. 
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The State of the Real Economy 
 Aside from the financial services industry, the only other economic sector 
experiencing significant growth in the decade of the 2000‟s was that of retail. According 
to Brenner: 
The long-standing dependence of retail trade for its own expansion on the 
growth of domestic manufacturing had been broken by the rocketing currency 
and the rise of East Asia during the second half of the 1990s. Thanks to the 
continuing rise of private consumption expenditures, as well as the record 
breaking increase of imports, especially from China, it continued to do very well 
in the 2000‟s.283  
As we saw in Chapter Three, the profitability of the giant retail corporations was 
achieved in a way that structurally undermined the profitability of the domestic 
manufacturing sector. In addition, as these retail giants become the predominant 
employer among the majority of American communities, their employment practices 
helped to systematise the establishment of a low wage economy inside the United States 
of America. With these developments in mind, it is clear that the growing profitability 
of the retail sector - far from being a sign of sustainable growth for the American 
economy - was in fact an indication of the extent of decline of the country‟s real 
economy.  
Thus the larger the retail sector grew during this period, the stronger the 
entrenchment of the structural barriers that were suppressing wage growth and 
undermining productive profitability within the country at this time. These problems 
were further compounded by the fact that the growth of the retail sector was 
overwhelmingly due to the corresponding expansion of consumer credit underway at 
this time. What was required to pay back this borrowed credit was enlarged wage-
growth and productive investment within the American economy. Rather than being 
suppressed, these vitally important economic factors needed to be grown if the United 
States was to break its unsustainable reliance on debt as the main means of economic 
growth within the country. Indeed the fact that they were undermined largely accounts 
for the poor economic growth levels experienced by the country‟s real economy during 
this period. 
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 Even accounting for the dramatic expansion in consumer credit  and the spin-off 
stimulus effects from the housing bubble, the levels of economic growth achieved in the 
decade of the 2000‟s were extremely low by historical standards. For the “first five 
years of the business cycle”, from 2000 to 2005, economic growth “averaged just 2.3 
percent” per annum. This level of growth for the US economy was “markedly lower 
than any other comparable period during the postwar epoch”. Furthermore, of this 
growth, “the bubbling housing sector, by way of its effect in raising expenditures on 
personal consumption and on home construction and home furnishings accounted, on 
average, for no less than 0.7 percentage points per annum or about 30 percent of total 
GDP increase during the interval”. In addition, it also “accounted for at least 50 per cent 
of all jobs created in these years”. Therefore had “it not been for housing, the average 
annual increase of GDP between 2000 and 2005 would have been a miniscule 1.6 per 
cent – even despite the soaring federal budget deficits in this period – and employment 
would have been strongly in the negative”.284  
 Moreover in this same five year timeframe, “the increase of both non-residential 
investment and net exports was less than zero”. This meant that “personal consumption 
and residential investment were left to drive the economy virtually by themselves”. The 
structural implications of this was that for “the business cycle as a whole (2001-2007 
inclusive), not only was GDP increases by far the worst since 1945, but so was the 
increase of plant, equipment and software, of employment, of total real compensation 
and of net exports”.285 Therefore, in terms of actual material growth achieved during 
this business cycle, the record was abysmal. Any increase in wealth during this period 
was primarily driven by a speculative induced appreciation of financial assets, an 
appreciation that was bound to crash owing to the poor prospects of the underlying real 
economy during this period. 
 In fact all that the lowering of short-term interest rates and the expansion in 
credit had managed to achieve for the bulk of the country‟s corporate sector was to 
further intensify the crash-inducing process of financialisation. According to Brenner, 
during the 2000‟s, corporations “sought to benefit from the depressed cost of borrowing 
and historic run ups of asset prices, including eventually corporate equities, by 
allocating their profits in unprecedented proportions to the purchase of financial assets, 
not least their own shares, and used much of what remained to fund dividend payouts to 
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stockholders”.286 As we saw in Chapter Three, this process was severely debilitating for 
the conditions of the country‟s underlying productive economy, suppressing the 
aggregate demand functions of wage growth and the initiation of innovative long-term 
investment projects. The intensification of financialisation in this period therefore, 
seriously undermined the vitality of the country‟s real economy. 
 The debilitating impact of financialisation during this period is clearly illustrated 
by the fact that throughout the 2001-2007 business cycle, manufacturing corporations 
“continually shed employees, bringing about by 2007 an unprecedented loss of 3.3 
million workers, or 20 per cent of the manufacturing labour force”. The impact on 
aggregate demand of these reductions was further compounded by the fact that these 
same companies “managed to hold the growth of real compensation per employee to 1.3 
per cent compared to 1.4 per cent between 1990 and 2000. The consequence of this 
suppression was that “over the course of the business cycle, total real compensation in 
the manufacturing sector (number of employees × compensation), which had increased 
at an average annual rate of 1.05 per cent during the 1990s cycle, actually declined at an 
average annual rate of 1.9 per cent”.287 As we have seen, this reduction in employee 
benefits meant that households had to turn to increased borrowing as a means to 
maintain living standards during this period.  
In regards to the state of productive investment during the business cycle, 
“manufacturing investment, which had increased at an average annual rate of 5 per cent 
during the 1990s cycle, collapsed, falling at an average annual rate of 2 per cent, with 
the consequence that the manufacturing capital stock (plant, equipment, software) 
actually contracted by 2.5 per cent”.288 As a result of the above two processes, domestic 
aggregate demand took a tremendous hit during this decade. 
 In consequence, due to the considerable decrease of real aggregate demand, 
credit-driven consumption and the inter-related speculation of the housing market was 
overwhelmingly relied upon to stimulate economic growth within the United States 
during the 2000‟s. In fact “consumption and residential investment together accounted 
for 98 per cent of the growth of GDP that took place during the length of the business 
cycle”.289 As such, with the dearth of real earnings, the 2000‟s business cycle was 
almost completely reliant on the growing access to consumers of debt-inducing credit 
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and the speculative appreciation of the housing market, both of which constituted highly 
unsustainable pillars from which to base the growth of an advanced economy upon. 
 
The Expansion of Subprime Mortgages 
 Throughout the business cycle, residential mortgages continued to be extended 
to poorer and poorer segments of the American population. In the process, this credit 
extension enabled the speculative-driven house-price appreciation to continue at a 
heightened pace. “Never before in postwar history”, Brenner states, “had housing risen 
for any significant interval faster than prices in general or than rents. Yet, between 1998 
and 2006, they had increased in real terms by 68 per cent”.290  
 Due to the decline in long-term interest rates, it had become progressively harder 
for banks to generate a profit from the traditional strategy of borrowing cheap in the 
short term and lending dear in the long term. Indeed the profitability of this traditional 
strategy became increasingly untenable from 2005 on, after the Federal Reserve 
increased short term interest rates (in a pre-emptive move against inflation) while long 
term rates continued to decline (in accordance with the constant inflow of foreign funds 
into the US financial sector). With the generalised decline in yields from long-term 
lending, the main means to maintain profitability for American banks was to purchase 
mortgages that had been originated from riskier and riskier households, as it was these 
mortgages that generated the highest rate of return on the secondary market for CDOs. 
As such, in order to keep profits high, more and more of these high-yielding mortgages 
were required from the subprime sector.
291
  
 In order to attract new subprime borrowers, a number of measures were 
employed to mask the true cost of the loan these borrowers were taking out.  For 
example “interest-only mortgages, which only required borrowers to pay interest 
charges and were often set at seductively low “teaser” rates, began to proliferate” during 
this period.
292
 Likewise so did “negative amortization loans” where the borrowers 
monthly payments were less than the monthly interest added on to the loan. Here the 
difference between monthly payments and accumulated interest is capitalised back onto 
the principal of the loan, so that over time, the principal and the amount of interest this 
loan generates is actually increased. Also becoming more prevalent throughout this 
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period were adjustable rate mortgages, which involved “contracts that essentially bet on 
several more years of fast-rising prices”.293  
In addition, with the aim of lending to “households with limited savings, 
mortgage brokers began to offer no-down payment loans, lending up to the full value of 
the home”. Towards the end of the boom, borrowers “were allowed to state their income 
on loan applications without lenders requiring any supporting documentation”. Finally, 
in order to “encourage working class households to take on higher levels of debt, 
subprime borrowers were told not to worry about higher payments as their mortgages 
reset, given that they could always refinance at a later date”.294  
 While of course the subprime borrowers who took on these unaffordable loans 
do bear an onus of responsibility for the subsequent crash, their actions must be 
analysed in the context of the economic environment that had emerged during the 
decade of the 2000s. The combination of stagnating real wages, declining employment 
prospects and extremely low real interest rates offered in traditional savings accounts, 
left the rapidly appreciating housing market as one of the only accessible outlets to 
improve one‟s economic position within the United States during this time. As such, it 
was not so much the reckless borrowing habits of subprime mortgage holders that 
brought the American economy to a standstill in late 2007, but the wider 
macroeconomic environment that offered no other viable alternative to economic 
advancement for the majority of American households.  
 Investment banks and other financial entities had initially turned to CDOs as a 
way to restore profitability in the face of declining long term yields. However the 
sustained demand for these CDOs meant that these packaged securities too “were soon 
subjected to the same bubble-driven stresses as were pressing down on the credit 
markets as a whole”.295 This thus rapidly reduced the returns that could be derived from 
these assets, relative to the amount of risk carried in each tranche of CDO. In 
consequence, from around 2004 on, the only means to generate higher yields was to 
package up mortgages from riskier and riskier borrowers, as this increased risk 
warranted the ability to attain a higher yield on these CDOs, in the face of a generalised 
decline in yields during this period.  
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 As a result, “from 2001 to 2006, the quality of subprime loans deteriorated 
markedly according to every indicator. Loan-to-value ratios fell; debt to income ratios 
fell; and the proportion without documentation soared”. Nevertheless, despite the 
substantial increase in the origination of ever more riskier loans, “interest rates on non-
conforming mortgages, as well as the spread between subprime and prime loans, fell 
steadily throughout most of the period, inexorably determining a corresponding decline 
in the yields on most MBS/CMOs [collateralised mortgage obligations] that referenced 
them”.296  
 In order to maintain financial profitability in the face of a generalised decline in 
the yields from lending in the US economy, investment banks engineered ever more 
complex tranches of CDOs. However in reality, all this added complexity was able to 
achieve, was to mask the risk of default of the underlying mortgage loan. Thus as the 
business cycle of the 2000‟s progressed, investment banks: 
Collateralized CDOs that were backed (for the most part) by unsold mezzanine 
pieces left over from collateralized CMOs, and, as the bubble got even bigger 
and yields still more compressed they created      that were backed (for the 
most part) by unsold mezzanine pieces derived from CDOs. At the very top of 
the securitization bubble, some banks even issued     , CDO‟s of CDO‟s of 
CDO‟s, constituted as before by re-cycled tranches that were insufficiently 
attractive to be sold on a standalone basis so had to be restructured, generally so 
as to provide the collateral for the newly-constituted senior and equity tranches 
of higher-power CDOs.
297
 
In this way, ever higher levels of increasingly unstable credit were built upon ever more 
riskier loan originations. Ironically, this process was described by its principal 
proponents as an advancement in financial innovation that was working to eliminate 
risk from the American economy. However as the empirical example of the 2008 credit 
crash assuredly demonstrates, this so-called financial „innovation‟ achieved anything 
but.  
 Alan Greenspan, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, claimed that this 
process of financial engineering constituted a “new paradigm of active credit 
management”.298 Greenspan, along with the other advocates of this „innovative‟ strategy 
                                                             
296
 Ibid, P.56 
297
 Ibid 
298 Alan Greenspan cited in  
148 
 
argued that risk as a disruptive function had been largely removed from the American 
economy. This was because, it was argued, that risky assets had been distributed out to 
those individuals and institutions that were the most capable of bearing it. Furthermore, 
pieces of financial assets (through the use of credit derivatives and securitization) had 
been distributed out to such an extent, that if a risky loan were to default, it would only 
impact upon a very small section of each investor‟s overall portfolio of interests. 
However while the growing market for mortgage-backed securities was indeed 
distributing risk out to a great number of market players, as the market grew bigger and 
more and more subprime mortgages were packaged into CDOs, the more riskier of the 
mortgage securities began to be held in increasing numbers by the major banks. Thus 
while the market for securitized subprime mortgages grew, risk was disbursed 
throughout the system, but the greatest risk, embodied by the most recent securitized 
assets, became progressively concentrated in holdings linked to the biggest banks in the 
American economy.   
  
The Concentration of Risk: Structured Investment Vehicles 
When the secondary market for CDOs first came to play a major part in 
investment banks‟ business operations, banks would invariably line up investors for 
their CDO assets first, and only then, once credible buyers had been established, would 
they proceed to purchase loans from mortgage originators as collateral for the purposes 
of securitization. However at the height of the credit boom, when institutional investors‟ 
demand for CDOs had reached epic proportions, banks began to store large quantities of 
mortgage-backed securities in reserves, so that they could quickly supply the growing 
demand for these assets. These reserves were held in giant „conduits‟ and „structured 
investment vehicles‟ (SIVs), which were established with the appearance of embodying 
separate institutions, financially independent from their parent banks. Banks used these 
investment vehicles to store large amounts of MBS loans, which thus enabled the banks 
to remove these unsold mortgage securities as a potential liability from their balance-
sheets. SIVs were intended to hold on to these unsold securities for only a short 
duration, until an investor had been lined up to purchase them from the bank. At “their 
peak in 2006 and 2007, conduits possessed a stunning $1.4 trillion in assets”.299  
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 As a means to maintain their financial independence from the parent banks, 
SIVs relied on the asset-backed commercial paper market as a source of short-term 
capital to purchase the MBS reserves. Commercial paper is an extremely short-term 
source of credit, with the loan reaching maturation within one to ninety days of its 
origination. Nevertheless, these debts were typically rolled over as they matured. 
According to Karl Beitel, as long as the “purchasers of this paper (the money market 
funds) are confident that borrowers are solvent, debts are typically rolled over at 
maturity at the prevailing interest rate”.300   
 As a condition for borrowing from the short-term commercial paper market, 
each SIV was “required to secure a back-up line of credit from the sponsoring bank as 
insurance in the event that the SIV does not have sufficient cash on hand to settle these 
obligations at the time they come due”. Thus even though these large reserves of unsold 
securities were placed off the balance sheet of the major investment banks, their 
obligation to bail out these SIVs if need be, ensured that these large reserves remained a 
significant liability for the major American banks, regardless of what their balance 
sheets had stated at the time. 
 The use of SIVs and financial conduits greatly expanded the amount of trading 
done with mortgage-backed securities. Beitel states that much “of the explosive growth 
in mortgage credit after 2005 reflected the entry of SIVs as a major new supplier of 
housing finance”.  In fact, “subprime lending jumped from an annual volume of $145 
billion in 2005 to $625 billion in 2006”.301 The problem with this SIV-driven expansion 
was that the SIVs “operate on razor thin margins”.302 These tight margins heavily 
increased the liability these institutions held for their parent banks, as it meant that the 
SIVs were highly vulnerable to both a drop in demand for mortgage-backed securities, 
along with any increases made in the cost of borrowing from the short-term commercial 
paper markets. Incidentally, it was pressures coming from both sides of the investment 
equation that helped contribute to the crash of the subprime sector, in the process 
exacerbating the consequences of the fallout throughout the financial economy of the 
United States of America. 
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The Crash of the Subprime Sector 
 In late 2005 the Federal Reserve increased interest rates “in a pre emptive strike 
against inflation”. This meant that as interest rates rose in response to the increase in the 
federal funds rate, “a growing number of “teaser” rate loans started to reset 
accordingly”.303 Since domestic demand in these years was primarily driven by cheap-
credit fuelled consumption and property appreciation based on highly leveraged 
speculation, this slight rise in interest rates helped contribute to a general slowdown in 
economic growth throughout 2006 and 2007. The net effect of this slowdown was to 
further reduce the earnings capacity of subprime borrowers to meet their recently 
elevated monthly mortgage repayments. 
 According to Brenner, “the descent into recession was already well into progress 
before the outbreak of the financial crisis in July-August 2007”. This is illustrated by 
the fact that non-financial “corporate profits peaked with housing prices in the middle of 
2006 and then declined by 10 per cent by the third quarter of 2007. In addition, during 
“the first half of 2007, already-weak jobs growth had fallen by 50 per cent compared to 
2005 to 2006”. Also, in the “second quarter of 2007, the increase in real cash flowing 
into households, which had run at about 4.4 per cent in 2005 and 2006, fell to near 
zero”.304 
 Thus by the first half of 2007, the precarious position of subprime households 
had progressively worsened. With their homes beginning to rapidly lose value at the 
same time as their monthly mortgages repayments became much more of an intense 
burden to bear, the number of loan defaults emanating from the subprime sector 
increased accordingly. Aided by their ability to effortlessly switch positions in the 
market, institutional investors rushed to reduce their exposure to mortgage-backed 
financial assets. In the process, this worked to reverse the massive inflow of financial 
liquidity that had fuelled the viability of subprime lending. A number of high-profile 
meltdowns of subprime mortgage originators increased the stampede out of the market. 
On 2
nd
 April 2007, New Century Financial, “the largest US subprime lender”, filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 status, American Home Mortgage followed suit at the 
beginning of August. “This was followed in rapid succession by several high profile 
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meltdowns in Europe, with the UK-based Northern Rock Bank and BNP Paribus, the 
French banking group, both taking major hits to their mortgage-backed portfolios”.305  
 With the mass rush out of mortgage-backed securities, the collateral SIVs had 
used to borrow from the commercial paper markets had become essentially worthless. 
In response the money “market funds began to refuse to roll over the SIV‟s commercial 
paper”.306 This meant that the parent banks were now committed to supplying a large 
amount of credit to these investment vehicles, in order to meet the SIV‟s outstanding 
obligations to the commercial paper market. As a result, the large Wall Street banks 
were forced to considerably curtail their lending activity, in order to have enough funds 
to meet these maturing obligations in the face of the massive depreciation in the value 
of their main class of financial asset – the mortgage-backed security. This problem was 
further compounded by the fact that the complex tranching and re-tranching of CDOs, 
meant that investment banks‟ were finding it extremely difficult to accurately calculate 
how much exposure their underlying assets had to the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage sector. It was this uncertainty that led to the considerable contraction in 
lending during the second half of 2007. 
 According to Beitel, “[d]espite the officially quoted rates on overnight federal 
fund and LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer on short-term funds borrowed in the 
Euromarket), banks were engaged in rationing short-term credit, refusing to lend to even 
other ostensibly solvent multinational financial institutions”.307 Credit – the lifeblood of 
the financialised economy of the 2000‟s – had effectively dried up. It was this great 
contraction in credit, starting in late 2007, that exposed the United States to the realities 
of the serious suppression of wage-determined demand and the debilitating decline in 
the country‟s productive capacity. It was the great credit contraction of 2007 therefore, 
that finally revealed the façade of financialisation for what it was. 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the substantial enlargement of the financial sector during the 
sharemarket boom of the 1990s elevated the position of the industry to one of prime 
importance within the US economy. New forms of financial devices were engineered in 
order to rapidly expand the amount of trading done within the sector, significantly 
enlarging the size of the financial sector in the process. Two of the most prevalent 
devices employed to enlarge the size and scope of the sector were credit derivatives and 
the process of securitization. Credit derivatives greatly expanded the amount of trading 
that could be undertaken on any individual asset; while securitization substantially 
expanded the number of underlying assets that could be traded upon within the financial 
system.  
 Financial expansion ensured that after the country‟s corporate sector had 
collapsed following the sharemarket crash of 2000, the financial sector had the ability to 
rapidly reorient itself towards another asset class and thus continue its self-generating 
speculative boom. This reorientation was directed towards the housing sector, a move 
that had been facilitated by the series of short-term interest rate reductions implemented 
by the Federal Reserve, who aimed to stimulate a credit-driven recovery through an 
expansion of mortgage finance throughout the economy. Increased mortgage 
originations provided an asset class that investment banks could securitize into MBS, 
which could then be pooled together into CDOs as a means to cater to the range of 
portfolio interests throughout the investment spectrum.  
 The financial sector continued to expand its wealth despite the dramatic 
deterioration of the country‟s productive economy. This situation, where financial 
liquidity undergoes spectacular expansion while the productive economy experiences an 
accelerated decline, contains an inherent contradiction that is unable to be explained 
from a solely domestically-focused analysis. Indeed, this inherent contradiction is 
especially evident when one considers both the duration and extent of financial 
speculation in generating economic growth within the United States in these years. As 
such, the only way that the financialisation of the US economy can be properly 
understood is by looking at the larger imbalances that exist in the world economy taken 
as a whole.  
 The export-oriented strategy of economic development that Japan and West 
Germany first employed in the 1970s has come to be adopted by the great majority of 
other countries trading within the world economy. In consequence, the process of 
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globalisation has worked to generate an international system based on aggressive price 
competition. This manifestation has exponentially increased the amount of suppliers 
within the system, while simultaneously instituting downward pressures upon the 
growth of aggregate demand at the international level. With more and more countries 
entering the global economy, the United States has been increasingly relied upon to 
provide the consumer demand for this increase in international suppliers. However, the 
cost-cutting drive of financialisation has worked to effectively decrease the amount of 
real aggregate demand found within the US economy, as determined by wage growth 
and the initiation of long-term productive investments. As such, an expansion in the 
amount of credit available to American consumers has been used as a means to address 
the great deficiency of aggregate demand that exists in both the United States and the 
global economy taken as a whole.  
 As exemplified by the 2008 crash of the US economy, this foreign-financed 
credit expansion is ultimately unsustainable. With constant inflows of foreign funds 
reducing the cost of credit within the US economy, the price of long-term lending 
experienced a generalised decline. This meant that the traditional strategy of borrowing 
short cheap and lending long dear was proving increasingly unprofitable for the 
financial institutions that relied on this strategy. As a result, most major banks turned to 
the selling of CDOs, (especially the selling of the higher earning yet riskier CDOs 
composed of subprime mortgage holdings) on the secondary markets as their main 
means of profit generation within this period. 
 However with the availability of credit experiencing exponential expansion, 
while that of wage earnings and employment opportunities were in a state of decline, 
the number of households who could not afford to maintain their interest payments on 
their mortgage commitments rapidly increased, expanding the size of the subprime 
sector in the process. Consequently defaults within this sector increased substantially, 
especially after the interest on adjustable rate mortgages was raised in response to the 
Federal Reserve interest rate hike in 2005.  
The crash of the subprime sector, which had overwhelmingly been relied upon 
as the main means of profitability by the major investment banks during the later years 
of the boom, generated a widespread contraction in lending by the majority of financial 
institutions operating within the US economy. This credit crunch largely eliminated the 
access to cheap credit that had been fuelling the financialised growth of the US 
154 
 
economy throughout the decade of the 2000‟s. As a result, a serious recession quickly 
subsumed the American economy in 2008.  
The overwhelming dependence of most exporting nations on the credit-driven 
demand of the US economy has meant that the recession of the United States has had 
serious ramifications for the global economy taken as a whole. The interrelated nature 
of the issue means that for an effective solution to be reached, an internationally based 
response is required. In particular, the severe deficiency of global aggregate demand 
must be addressed by the world‟s nations if a sustainable system of economic growth is 
to be established at the international level. This is vital if economic globalisation is to 
depart from its contemporary „race to the bottom‟ trend. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Issues 
If the current recession is to be comprehensively understood, it must be analysed 
through a wider analytical paradigm in order to illustrate the complete chain of 
causation that brought the US economy to this debilitating predicament. For the current 
recession represents far more than just a business downturn caused by the collapse of 
the subprime mortgage sector. The Great Recession of our time has been caused by the 
inherent contradiction that exists between the expansion of speculative credit and the 
suppression of productive wage growth via the process of financialisation, which has 
been in place in the United States‟ economy since the beginning of the 1980s.  
 A major catalyst for the current recession is the disproportionate dependence of 
the US economy on financial-centred wealth generation over that of productive based 
growth. As evident in the empirical example of the planning system, an economy geared 
towards material productivity as the penultimate source of economic growth embodies a 
progressive system of capitalism, one that is centred on high-road labour relations and 
the technological advancement of the wider society. In contrast, the opposing system of 
financialisation systematises the establishment of a low wage economy, along with 
rendering innovative-inducing productive based investments an unattainable endeavour.  
The fact of the matter is that innovative new technologies do have long lead 
times to create and manufacture and as such require a level of planning and 
organisation, which in turn requires a degree of stability that a disproportionate 
dependence on financial market growth is unable to provide. The ideology of neo-
classical economics claims that the most efficient allocation of economic resources is to 
allow economic growth to be determined by the „free market‟. In the empirical example 
of the contemporary economy of the United States however, this „market‟ has come to 
embody the financial markets, and as we have seen, this market allocation has involved 
sucking resources out of the productive economy in order to fuel speculation inside the 
financial sector.  
This misallocation of economic resources was clearly evident in the cost-cutting 
corporate drive of the 1990s, as American corporations tried to progressively reduce 
costs so as to boost short term profitability in order to appreciate the price of their 
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shares on the financial markets. Thus the unfettered allocation of economic resources by 
the free (financial) markets generates a mass misallocation of productive resources, 
destroying large amounts of wealth in the process, as evident in the series of speculative 
driven financial crashes that have increased in both intensity and frequency since the 
financialisation trend was first initiated in the beginning of the 1980s.  
From the analysis of the planning system, it is arguably clear that the productive 
markets are the most effective market mechanisms for allocating economic resources. 
However these productive markets, in order to prove profitable throughout a long-term 
trajectory, operate on fundamentally different criteria than that which facilitates the 
speculative induced growth of the financial markets. Fundamentally, both market forms 
of growth – productive and financial – require a different role for the government in the 
economy. 
In the analysis of the planning system we saw how there was a clear role for the 
government in the American economy. This role was most effectively exercised in the 
provision of a stable customer that enabled the dominant manufacturing corporations to 
initiate research and development of innovative new technologies without bearing any 
unnecessary risk. In the absence of these government contracts, the uncertainty inherent 
in these innovative technological developments would have rendered these investments 
commercially unfeasible for the corporations concerned.  
Many of the technologies that were used to generate initial excitement in the 
sharemarkets from the second half of the 1990s were technologies whose development 
history could be clearly traced back to this government sponsorship. The overarching 
influence of financialisation during this same decade however, ensured that this 
innovative development largely stagnated from this point on, as ever increasing 
amounts of capital were directed towards financial speculation rather than technological 
development within the productive sector. The stability that the American government 
provided for the initiation of innovative technological advancement thus embodies the 
most effective form of risk mitigation within the American economy during the postwar 
period. This government sponsored system was ultimately far more effective than the 
„active credit management paradigm‟ that was pursued during the financialised period 
of the 2000s, which ultimately proved ineffective in preventing the financial crash of 
2008.  
Another system of risk mitigation that the system of financialisation proved 
unable to replicate, was the complicit consent shared by the dominant corporations of 
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the postwar planning system to refrain from engaging in aggressive price competition in 
their commercial strategies. This agreement enabled the establishment of a high-road 
economic model within the United States of America. In this high-road model, wage-
growth embodied an important function of demand and as such was encouraged rather 
than suppressed (as under the contemporary anti-inflationary stance of monetarism). 
Throughout the period of the planning system, wage growth was able to be 
accommodated through the role of organised labour. Trade unions ensured that wage 
rises were shared industry-wide, enabling increased labour costs to be passed on to 
consumers, whose demand in turn was ultimately dependent upon the growth of wage 
earnings throughout this period. In this way domestic demand was self-generating, 
ensuring sustainable economic growth in the process.  
In direct contrast, the role of government from the 1980s on has encouraged the 
establishment of a low wage system to be implemented inside the United States 
economy. One of the most prevalent ways in which neo-classical inspired government 
policies have worked to influence the spread of this development has been through the 
turn to monetarism in the 1980s. The elevation of monetary policy as the primary 
mechanism used by the government to influence conditions of the macroeconomy has 
proved disastrous for the commercial viability of the country‟s productive economy.  
The primary problem for American industry during the 1970s was the dramatic 
increase of suppliers in the US markets, following the rise of Japan and West German 
exporters during this period. Due to the suppression of their own domestic demand as 
part of their export-oriented strategy, international supply increased exponentially 
during this period without a corresponding expansion in the level of aggregate demand 
at the global level in order to accommodate the impact of these new market players. The 
primary problem in the early 1980s was therefore one of insufficient demand, not 
supply.  
The Monetarist diagnosis of this situation however, was that American supply 
had been rendered uncompetitive due to the supposedly inflated levels of demand that 
had prevailed in the economy from government fiscal policies, which had worked to 
protect American industry from the full competitive forces of the free market. The 
monetarist solution was to further depress demand in the American economy, by raising 
interest rates in order to engineer a domestic recession. This self-induced recession was 
argued to constitute a necessary step by its principal proponents, who believed that the 
US economy was inflicted by inflated levels of demand (or what these theorists referred 
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to as an artificially inflated money supply). As a result, monetary policy exacerbated the 
serious gap that had opened up between supply and demand in both the international 
economy and that of the United States itself. As such, its net effect was to have long-
term ramifications for the subsequent structure of the United States‟ economy. 
 The high interest rate strategy of monetarism improved the attraction of the 
financial sector as an investment outlet over that of the productive sector. The 
competitiveness of America‟s productive industries were dramatically reduced by the 
appreciation of the dollar, as international investors rushed to purchase dollar-
denominated assets in order to capitalise on the high interest rates offered in the 
country. The financial sector thus benefited from the Federal Reserve‟s monetary policy 
through the increase in funds to its sector from international investors, while the capital 
earnings of the productive sector were further reduced due to their decline in 
competitiveness from the effective increase in the price of their products via the 
appreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis that of their primary competitors. It was this evident 
bias towards the financial sector, inherent in the Federal Reserve‟s monetary policy, 
which led to the emergence of financial-led growth – or financialisation – from the 
1980s on. The rise of financialised growth came at the great expense of the country‟s 
productive economy. 
 The American government continued to facilitate the growth bias of the 
financial sector by targeting stimulus measures through the Federal Reserve rather than 
through congressional fiscal policies of demand management. In 2001, monetary policy 
was used as a stimulus (in 1980 it had been used as a handbrake) to generate an 
economic recovery from the recession that followed the crash of the corporate 
sharemarkets. Financial stimulus was generated through the lowering of interest rates in 
order to reduce the costs of borrowing throughout the US economy. This expanded 
Americans‟ access to credit and thus compensated for the shortfall in aggregate demand 
that had been instigated by the decline of real wages and the withdrawal from 
productive investment throughout the previous decade.  
 The sole reliance on monetary policy to stimulate the economy however, meant 
that the cheap credit that this policy induced was ultimately unsustainable. For a point 
of contrast, Keynesian fiscal policies generate real material improvements from which 
future economic growth can be based upon. Government contracts initiate the 
development of innovative technologies that carry the ability to increase employment 
and advance the technological sophistication of American society into the future. 
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Likewise, increased public sector employment, both improves the skills of the country‟s 
workforce and raises aggregate demand through a rise in wage earnings, reducing the 
dependence of American households upon debt in the process. 
 In contrast, the cheap credit generated through the monetary stimulus strategy of 
the Federal Reserve encouraged financial speculation, which was ultimately dependent 
upon a growing stream of even cheaper credit to sustain. As a result, this speculation, 
rather than stimulate the productive economy back to a position whereby it could 
generate the earnings to repay this accumulated credit, worked to further intensify the 
process of financialisation, which as we have seen, operated by sucking capital out of 
the productive economy in order to fuel speculation in the financial sector. Monetary 
policy therefore exacerbated the severe imbalance that existed between the expansion of 
credit and the decline of wage earnings that was responsible for the unsustainable 
ballooning of the credit bubble during the decade of the 2000‟s. What was really 
required were active Keynesian fiscal policies, which work to increase the profitability 
of the productive sector in order to generate real earnings for the American economy. 
The provision of cheap credit, while it provided a quick fix from the 2001 recession, 
was only able to address the superficial symptoms of this recession and thus proved 
ineffective (in fact it exacerbated) the root cause of the problem, which was an 
excessive dependence on debt, due to the dramatic decline of the productive economy to 
generate enough earnings to maintain the aggregate demand that was required to keep 
both the United States and the world economy at large from falling into a debilitating 
recession. 
 One of the principal catalysts behind this excessive debt dependence has been 
the sustained purchasing of dollar-denominated assets by sovereign central banks. This 
has facilitated a massive inflow of credit into the United States, thus intensifying the 
financialisation process, generated as it was during the 2000s by the accessibility of 
cheap credit. As we have seen, these inflows inhibit the profitability of the productive 
economy whilst enabling a cheap source of credit to fuel speculation within the 
financial sector. Thus if a productive based recovery is to be generated inside the United 
States -  in order to avoid the crash-inducing trappings of a financial based recovery - 
then the artificial appreciation of the US dollar must be addressed within the 
international economic environment. 
 The need to address this issue calls for a more active stance by national 
governments in the workings of the international economy. Recent history shows that 
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when this task has been attempted - for example the active intervention undertaken by 
national governments in the foreign exchange markets during the days of the Plaza 
Accord - this has been achieved with a measure of success. Indeed the main barrier to 
more effective inter-governmental coordination on international economic issues has 
been the institutionalisation of the neoliberal ideology within international economic 
organisations and national government departments alike.  
Neo-classical economics actively discourages effective inter-governmental 
coordination by theorising that the most efficient situation at the aggregate level is to 
allow market forces to dictate themselves. However, as the Keynesian tradition 
demonstrated during the 1940s, often the most efficient solution taken at the micro level 
works to create an environment of low profitability at the macro level. If economic 
activity is to be sustainably elevated onto the international stage, then effective inter-
governmental coordination must be undertaken in order to prevent such a regressive 
situation from emerging. Indeed, it is arguably clear that such a situation has already 
developed within the international economy, as the dominant national model of export-
oriented development has worked to increase supply and suppress aggregate demand 
within the international environment, thus precipitating a system of economic 
globalisation that has been characterised by contemporary scholars as embodying a 
„race to the bottom‟, mutually disruptive to all participants. 
 Therefore, the main barrier to the establishment of a more progressive 
international political economy is the institutional adherence to the defunct principles of 
neo-classical economics. The ideology of neo-classical economics argues that in order 
to create competitive conditions of supply, commercial industry must be unfettered to 
feel the full forces of the free market. However, as the recent history of the US economy 
clearly illustrates, these so-called free market pressures primarily compel producers to 
compete on price, resulting in cost-cutting drives, demand suppression and the 
establishment of a low wage employment model. In contrast, the economic environment 
of the planning system highlights the vitally important role Keynesian demand 
management policies play in generating sustainable economic growth. Keynesian 
policies encourage the growth of effective demand that enables the establishment of a 
high-road economic model centred on technological advancement and innovative 
production, along with the generalised improvement in the economic position of the 
mass majority of individuals within this capitalist system. 
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 The postwar American planning system, which had generated near-continuous 
economic growth for twenty years, came unstuck with the increasing 
internationalisation of economic relations during the 1970s. The neo-classical school of 
thought interpreted this development to embody the ultimate failing of the Keynesian 
tradition. In contrast, this paper argues that it was not the failings of the domestic 
Keynesian system, but that of the wider unregulated international environment that 
enabled unbridled price competition to trump the coordination of the United States‟ 
planning system. The failing of the Keynesian system of demand management was not 
due to an internally flawed logic as neo-classical theorists maintain. Rather domestic 
Keynesianism was undermined by a larger international economic environment, whose 
unfettered nature from effective inter-governmental regulation rendered it more in 
accord with the neo-classical vision of economic relations.  
 The inability of domestically-oriented demand management policies to 
effectively function within a larger international economic environment governed by 
unfettered capital was a potential problem that Keynes himself had recognised during 
the development of his theories. It was for this reason that Keynes stressed the need for 
national capital controls as part of the international economic framework that was 
agreed upon at Bretton Woods. As we have seen, the need to maintain a low currency 
following the relaxation of these currency controls from the mid 1960s on, has been one 
of the primary reasons why domestic demand has been suppressed within export-
oriented nations. At the international level, this domestic demand suppression by the 
majority of nations practising export-oriented economic growth strategies has 
culminated in the manifestation of insufficient international demand to support the 
substantial increase in suppliers throughout the global economy. It is the emergence of 
this significant imbalance that has resulted in the severe global recession of the 
contemporary period. 
 
What Needs to be Addressed: The Domestic Situation 
 A change in the ideology surrounding the institutional analysis of international 
economic issues needs to be undertaken if an effective solution to the current global 
recession is to be reached. The primary problem within the global economy today is the 
highly insufficient level of aggregate demand that exists at the international level. 
However, the neo-classical ideology that now influences economic policy-making at 
both domestic and international levels is centred on a dogmatic adherence to instituting 
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measures of economic efficiency in order to improve competitive conditions of supply. 
These so-called efficiency endeavours however, in practice, merely improve 
competitiveness through regressive price reductions rather than quality improvements or 
the initiation of innovative production.  In the aggregate, these cost-reductions 
exacerbate the problem of insufficient international demand and thus intensify the 
primary problem within the global economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, the 
ideology of neo-classical economics has inspired an extremely debilitating trend for the 
direction of contemporary globalisation, culminating in the severe recession that 
currently inflicts the global economy. Indeed there is a clear causation from the 
undermining of Keynesian demand management policies inside the United States, to the 
adoption of neo-classical economics, to the productive decline of the US economy, 
financial speculation, economic instability and the onset of the Great Recession of the 
contemporary period.  
 In regards to the domestic economy of the United States, it is clear that the 
process of financialisation is an unstable system of economic growth, which from a 
long-term macroeconomic perspective is proving highly debilitating for the health of the 
country‟s real economy. A move is required for a return to the more sustainable 
planning system of capitalist growth. This will ensure that economic growth benefits a 
far greater spread of Americans than the inequality inducing system of financialisation 
is able to provide. In addition, this will also ensure that the United States experiences 
heightened technological progression, rather than materially stagnating as vast swathes 
of potentially productive capital is wasted through unsustainable speculation within the 
financial sector.  
 In recent years there have emerged a number of rising environmental concerns 
that require an innovative technological approach to effectively address. Neoliberal 
theory defines these pressing problems as mere „externalities‟. However for the 
capitalist system to be environmentally sustainable into the long-term, a more proactive 
approach is required. Fortunately a more proactive approach can be employed as part of 
a Keynesian fiscal stimulus strategy to the contemporary recession, producing economic 
benefits (rather than external impacts) for the United States‟ economy in the process.  
For instance, rather than government research contracts only being provided to 
firms specialising in military technology, government sponsorship could be provided to 
firms who specialise in developing technologies that address these pressing 
environmental concerns. This would generate a far more productive capitalist based 
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solution to these problems than the current market based trading approach (which can 
only really stem the speed of the rate in which these „externalities‟ impact upon the 
human population rather than generating a proactive solution in addressing the root 
cause of the problem) is able to provide. A wider range of government contracts will 
once again accelerate the technological advancement of the United States economy. 
They will provide a viable outlet for talented Americans to direct their energies towards, 
rather than this talent being subsumed within the socially disruptive speculative-driven 
financial sector. 
 If earnings are to effectively replace credit-driven demand as a means to reduce 
America‟s unsustainable debt-dependence, it is vital that the low wage economy of the 
United States is effectively addressed. The prevalence of this low wage economy 
increases the pressure on producers to engage in price-based competition. Furthermore, 
as we saw in Chapter Four, many American households depended on debt to cover their 
basic living costs. With the contraction in lending from the current credit crunch, it is 
vital that American incomes are increased to cover these costs and reduce the 
unsustainable dependence on debt. 
 The need for an economy-wide increase in wages, calls for a renewed role for 
industrial trade unions within the American economy. This is required in order for these 
wage rises to be adopted at an industry-wide level and thus not put any dissenting firm 
at an unfair cost advantage. The problem of free-riding can also be eliminated by an 
increase in minimum wage rates through federal legislation. This will contribute 
immensely towards the establishment of a high-road employment model within the 
United States. The establishment of this employment model will generate the necessary 
domestic demand function of wage growth, which will reduce the country‟s 
unsustainable dependence on debt and financial speculation to achieve economic 
growth. 
 In order for the cost of wage increases to initially be commercially viable for 
American companies, an injection of demand stimulus is required by the federal 
government, so that companies have the initial demand to allow them to increase 
employment and raise wages, which will in turn provide a further boost to aggregate 
demand, kicking in a self-reinforcing economic expansion in the process. In order for 
this government demand to stimulate productive growth rather than financial 
speculation, the most productive outlet for this government stimulus is through 
increased public sector employment. It is essential that this employment spreads 
164 
 
throughout the industrial spectrum, from the research and development of new 
technologies through to blue-collar based positions. This will decrease the bargaining 
power of exploitative employers, such as the retail giants, within American 
communities, while also eliminating the pressures that are forcing many Americans to 
abandon socially important public sector jobs in favour of financial sector employment. 
Ultimately, this initial injection of demand-management will create the conditions for a 
more dynamic and prosperous American society, in contrast to the precarious and 
unequal nature of the financialised system that has dominated economic relations over 
the last thirty years. 
 
What Needs to be Addressed: The International Situation 
 Like the situation in the 1970s, the ultimate barrier to the successful 
implementation of a productive based Keynesian-demand stimulus strategy is the 
unfettered nature of the international economic environment. In order for domestic 
Keynesianism to be successful, it must be extended to the wider international economy, 
otherwise it will ultimately be undermined. The specifics of such a development are 
beyond the parameters of this paper to discuss, but the locomotive strategy of the Carter 
administration in the late 1970s offers a useful starting point. Whatever the specifics, it 
is clear that there must be considerably more inter-governmental coordination in raising 
aggregate demand at the international level, if each national economy is to escape from 
the debilitating „race to the bottom‟ trend of contemporary globalisation. 
 At the level of the individual firm, a business strategy must be realised that is 
not dependent on the regressive reduction of costs. Multinational firms need to start 
looking at foreign locations not as a cheap source of labour, but as a potential consumer 
market for their products, which could be used to increase their long-term revenue 
streams and thus provide more capital to engage in innovative productive investment 
projects, reducing their dependence on debt-derived growth in the process. The only 
way to grow these consumer markets is for these firms to pay their outsourced workers 
a wage that provides them with the disposable income to purchase the firm‟s products. 
With all multinational firms following this strategy, this will substantially increase the 
amount of demand within the global economy and thus eliminate a large amount of the 
problem that is currently afflicting the global economic environment. The mass 
production that the economic system of capitalism is ultimately centred on is only 
commercially viable if there exists a sizable market for mass consumption. If mass 
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production is to be extended to the international level by multinational firms then mass 
consumption must also be expanded through the wage growth of the workers who are 
generating this increased production.  
  
A New Role for Government in the International Political Economy 
Therefore, in stark contrast to the assertions of neoliberal economic theory, what 
is required in the contemporary period is a greater role for the government in the 
economy. In regards to the case study of the United States, despite the proclamations of 
the „active credit management paradigm‟, it has been the American government, not the 
„free market‟, that has assumed the overwhelming responsibility for the unaffordable 
risk taken on by the financial sector. The American government has a democratic 
responsibility to the ordinary tax payers whose funds were used to bail out the bankrupt 
banks of the financial sector to ensure that the economic recovery operates in a manner 
that materially benefits the population of the United States taken as a whole, not just the 
financial elite, whose prominence has only served to impoverish workers and suppress 
the technological advancement of American society.  
It is thus the democratic responsibility of the American government to ensure 
that it provides a return to the taxpayers who are financing the current recovery. The 
most effective means through which this can be achieved is through the implementation 
of Keynesian fiscal policies, as a replacement to the financially-oriented monetary 
stimulus strategy of the Federal Reserve. This will ensure that the American economy 
recovers in a way that is beneficial to the great majority of Americans who are 
sponsoring the recovery through their taxes, rather than just to the financial elite, whose 
reckless speculation and destructive expropriation of vital capital from the productive 
sector caused the crash of the US economy to begin with.  
 The US government also needs to adopt a different role within the international 
arena. Rather than supporting the neo-classical policy positions of the WTO, the World 
Bank and the IMF, whose collective pressures are exacerbating the problem of 
insufficient demand at the global level, the American government needs to exercise its 
diplomatic leverage and work with other nations to formulate an effective strategy to 
raise global aggregate demand into the future. The potential of any such strategy being 
undermined by corporate free-riders necessitates the formulation of an effective 
normative regime within the international economy. Capitalism has always required a 
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degree of governance to ensure that it does not descend into a destructive drive towards 
aggressive price competition (for the end result would be monopoly, or commercial 
totalitarianism, not dynamic capitalism). As such, if economic activity is to be extended 
onto the international arena, then it is vital that so too does political governance via 
increased inter-governmental coordination over international economic issues.  
 This task however, is greatly hindered by the pre-dominance of neoliberalism in 
orthodox economic thinking. The neoliberal position regards the analysis of economic 
relations as an exact science that is unable to be disturbed by political involvement. It is 
for this reason why neo-classical economics has proved an inadequate guide for 
analysing the current recession and why a more comprehensive policy debate is required 
in order to generate more effective solutions to the current recession. For it is only 
through an expansion in the contemporary debate beyond that of the limitations of the 
neoliberal paradigm that the macroeconomic imbalance between supply and demand at 
the international level can be recognised. It is clear that the neoliberal position, with its 
preoccupation in microeconomic conditions of supply, is fundamentally flawed as a 
paradigm from which to analyse both the current recession and the deeper issues of the 
contemporary international political economy. 
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